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Abstract  
This study attempts to understand how the functionality of the mayor-chief administrator officer 
(CAO) relationship impacts the ongoing operation of these two local government positions. 
Looking at the structural and interpersonal aspects of the lived experience of this relationship 
enlightens us as to the manner in which the relationship functions. A review is made of literature 
on local government, generally, and on the separate roles of mayors and CAOs as well as the 
limited research on how their relationships operate. General relationship and leadership 
scholarship is used to better understand this specific relationship and its nuanced social 
processes.  Qualitative research and, specifically, grounded theory, it is argued, is the best way to 
probe and better understand social processes. Thus, I used a grounded theory approach to 
discover a constructivist theory of how the mayor-CAO dyad operates and how certain aspects of 
the relationship lead to functionality. The research uncovered the primary relationship 
dimensions of: negotiating, strategizing, boundary setting, power sharing and harmonizing. The 
core relationship dimension that also contributes to the relationship’s functionality was 
“shapeshifting”. A heuristic model of the relationship was developed that also includes the 
temporal context of the relationship. Three theoretical propositions are made regarding the 
mayor-CAO relationship, these are: the interpersonal relationship is nested within its structural 
and temporal context, intersectionality and reconciliation of structural and interpersonal aspects 
of the relationship lead to functionality and the relationship’s collective shapeshifting capacity 
also contributes to functionality. The interpersonal dimensional nuances (not investigated in any 
earlier academic research with regards to this specific relationship) contributed to a much better 
understanding of how the mayor-CAO relationship functions. This dissertation is available in 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Mayors and councils across North America have been terminating their chief 
administrative officers (CAOs)—also called city managers—at alarming rates (Ashton, Kushner, 
& Siegel, 2007). The fundamentals of local democracies are at risk as municipalities are losing 
their administrative ability to deliver municipal services, such as sanitary sewer, roadways, and 
potable water.  Systematic investigations of how the mayor-CAO relationship functionality 
influences this phenomenon has not been undertaken. This study uncovered how the specific 
relationship between the mayor and the CAO of a municipality, influences how and why these 
mayor-CAO relationships succeed or break down. 
In a democracy there is a natural tension between policy making and administrative 
delivery of that policy. The mayor and CAO represent those two structural roles, the mayor the 
policy role, and the CAO, the operational role of implementing and administrating those policies. 
The political and academic debate regarding this tension has continued for over a hundred years 
and has come to be called the ‘dichotomy’ between policy and administration. Much research 
has taken place on whether there is a separation of roles or a different behavioral model is 
prevalent in practice.  Numerous scholars have discovered in practice, a more complementary 
(Nalbandian, 2006; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002) model of working together between these two 
positions (mayor-CAO) to accomplish common goals, however little research focuses on the 
actual relationship functionality of the two individuals in these positions.  The research question 
I answer is: What aspects of the mayor-CAO relationship results in a functional relationship? 
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Historical Context 
In the years between1880 and1920 North American society struggled with high levels of 
political corruption in the delivery of local services. For example, New York’s Tammany Hall 
machine politics involved party politics controlled by political bosses that used illegal payments 
to gain votes and supporters for their party (Hays, 1964).  
To combat this democratic deficit the “Reformers” of the “Progressive Era” (Goodnow & 
Bates, 1919; Hays, 1964; Wilson, 1887) advocated, among other things, for a politically neutral 
and a merit-based bureaucracy that would not deliver services based on partisan interests.  Hays 
(1964) states:  
The reform movement . . . involved a conflict between public impulses for “good 
government” against a corrupt alliance of “machine politicians” and “special interest”. 
During the rapid urbanization of the late 19th century, the latter had been free to 
aggrandize themselves especially through franchise grants at the expense of the public. 
Their power lay primarily in their ability to manipulate the political process, by bribery 
and corruption, for their own ends. Against such arrangements there gradually arose a 
public protest, a demand by the public for honest government, for officials who would act 
for the public rather than for themselves. (p. 157) 
To expose and combat this corruption, Woodrow Wilson (1887) wrote a paper titled the 
“The Study of Administration”. The paper is widely credited for the concept of separating policy 
making from policy implementation. Goodnow and Bates (1919) wrote extensively on this new 
proposal of separating policy making from policy implementation and the historical reasons for a 
dichotomy between these two aspects of governance. The dichotomy was solved, at least 
notionally, by having a professional administration arise to implement policy without partisan 
interference from the politicians who established the policy legislatively. Wilson’s (1887) and 
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Goodnow and Bates’s (1919) writings, likely helped instigate the political movement “reform or 
manager movement”1 that subsequently resulted in the council-manager model of governance.  
From the beginning of city government through to the 1930s, the mayor-council model of 
local governance was the norm.  North American local governments adopted the council-
manager model of governance starting in 1908 through to the 1940s, an approach that 
prominently featured the separation of policy making from policy implementation.  In the United 
States, the city manager system dates back to 1908 with the first city manager appointed in 
Staunton, Virginia (McVoy, 1940).  At that time, there was a clear movement called the 
“manager movement” including a model city charter outlining the roles and responsibilities of 
the manager.   
In Canada, although this system of governance is ubiquitous, the process of adoption was 
much more incremental and without the deliberativeness of the United States (Siegel, 2015a). 
Brittain (1951), an early Canadian political scientist, states:  
As early as 1839 . . . Lord Durham urged [the British Parliament] that the establishment 
of sound municipal institutions in the Province [Ontario] was of vital importance. . . . 
United States influence was even more widespread in the nineteenth century development 
of Canadian local governments. The proximity of the two countries, their common 
business interests, and the similarity of physical environments and traditions as well as 
the identity of the language, made the influence of the earlier–developed country natural 
and indeed inescapable . . . It appears that the example of the United States was a direct 
influence [on local governments] . . . in the last half of the nineteenth century and the first 
decade of the twentieth, those interested in municipal reform turned frequently towards 
the United States experience than elsewhere. (p. 13) 
Although the influence of the United States was substantial, the issues that pushed the 
reformers south of the border (party machine politics, large councils, and partisan corruption) 
were not as prevalent in Canada. Canada also had the British influence that supported the mayor-
                                               
1 Wilson was a prominent member of the “reform movement” and advocated for a separation between policy and 
administration due to political corruption at the time. This movement grew into the “Progressive Era” where the 
council-manager form of governance for local government developed. 
          
  
4 
council form of governance and, therefore, as the council-manager model grew in the United 
States—there 814 council-manager local governments in 1946—Canada had comparatively 
fewer (40) council-manager local governments (Brittain, 1951). In 1951, when Brittain wrote 
Local Government in Canada, he believed that “the council-manager system approaches in local 
administration [came] more nearly to the ideal of responsible local government than any which 
heretofore had been devised” (p. 18). 
A majority of Canadian local governments did adopt, either by provincial legislation or 
practice, the council-manager form of local governance. The city manager (often referred to as 
council-manager) system of local government organization is now the most common structure 
for local governments in the USA and Canada. The major tenet of this system is that the city 
manager is to deliver services without fear or favor and have little influence on policy making. 
The elected officials are not to interfere for partisan purposes with the delivery of services or the 
hiring of bureaucrats.   
Where politicians do engage in partisan politics, the literature often refers to this practice 
as clientelism (Kettering, 1988; Roniger, 2004) or particularism (Seddon, Gaviria, Panizza, & 
Stein, 2001) other than corruption. Earlier characterizations of political corruption have many 
different meanings; I use the act of obtaining a private or sub-group benefit, fiduciary or other at 
the expense of the public interest as a working definition. For example, under the separation of 
policy and administration’s dichotomist orthodox2 (Wilson, 1887), the mayor and council could 
not instruct the city manager to plow the snow first in neighborhoods that politically supported 
the council. This partisan use of the snow removal equipment could be seen as particularism or 
                                               
2 The dichotomy being the separation between making policy (democratic legislative responsibility) and 
implementing or administrating that same policy (administration responsibility) has come to be called an 
“orthodoxy” when these separations of roles are seen as absolute. 
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corruption. Under the orthodoxy of separation between policy and administration council would 
leave the plowing of snow to the CAO who would plow based on managerial priorities, such as 
access to the hospital route first (interpreted by the CAO as in the greater public interest).  
As stated above, CAO terminations are growing at alarming rates. Under the dichotomy’s 
orthodoxy, the hiring of a CAO was to be nonpartisan and based on merit; therefore, any CAO 
termination without cause (suggesting the termination was not based on a lack of merit) may be 
connected to political corruption or particularism and/or the need to control the administration in 
a more partisan manner. The termination may also be just an expedient method of changing the 
CAO leadership for other legitimate—or illegitimate—causes such as personality conflicts or 
other forms of conflict. The difficulty in understanding the reasons for termination or the tension 
between CAOs and their councils is that most local governments deal with these matters in 
camera and the details are seldom made public (Siegel, 2015a, 2015b). 
The mayor-council model (Urbaniak, 2014) is the earlier local governance model that 
places the mayor as the policy instigator and the administrator of that policy.  This system 
regularly results in the partisan hiring of chief administrative officers who report to the mayor 
and manages the municipality for the mayor’s political benefit. The council-manager model 
(Urbaniak, 2014) came later as a reaction to the political abuses of machine politics and partisan 
corruption of the mayor-council model. The council-manager model powers the collective 
council to make policy decisions and focuses the manager on the delivery of efficient apolitical 
municipal services and little involvement in the democratic policy realm.  These two models are 
discussed further in Chapter II. 
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The Mayor-CAO Relationship 
The complexity and societal expectations for local government performance is high with 
the re-election of mayors and the ongoing employment of the CAO at stake. A functional 
relationship between these two fundamentally different roles is paramount to the success of both 
positions and, subsequently, the local governments for whom they work. 
Scholars have investigated the relationship between these two structural functions or 
roles (Nalbandian, 2006; Svara, 1994).  Research does not confirm strict adherence to the 
dichotomy between roles (Demir & Reddick, 2012; Dunn & Legge, 2001; Montjoy & Watson, 
1995; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Nalbandian, 1994, 1999, 2006; Overeem, 2005; Siegel, 2010, 
2015a, 2015b; Svara, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2006, 2008; Stocker &Thompson-Fawcett, 
2014; Waldo, 1948; Zhang, 2014; Zhang & Feiock, 2009). All of this research approaches 
investigations from a positivist worldview. Seen through this positivist lens, the research 
attempts to link organizational performance, governance, policy influence, administrative 
influence, and efficacy, in the delivery of local government public goods and other measures 
with this orthodox dichotomy. However, little research has been done to delve deeply into this 
relationship, in a constructivist manner, to understand the lived experience of the mayor-CAO’s 
relationship and its functionality.  
Other political relationship studies reflect on the dynamics of asymmetrical power 
relationships, and how those relationships function, particularly in the international arena 
(Arreguin-Toft, 2001; Geyskens, Steenkamp, Scheer, & Kumar, 1996). Much of this research 
considers conflict and the use of power between nations, including war, as a way of 
understanding the relationships between nations. This body of research cannot be used for 
comparative relationship given that these relationships are collective in nature. Substantial 
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research has been done on trust, generally, and trust in leadership in organizations was found to 
be an important dimension of the mayor-CAO relationship (McAllister, 1995). McAllister (1995) 
posited two demonstrated constructs for trust include cognitive trust and affective trust which 
were found to fit the structural and interpersonal dimensions of the mayor-CAO relationships. 
Trust in a relationship empirically points to improved organizational outputs on a number of 
dimensions of organizational life. Although initial indications suggest a reciprocal relationship of 
mayor and CAO based on different roles and given that the mayor is typically the CAO’s           
day-to-day supervisor but is not expected to display any management leadership (Graen &         
Uhl-Bien, 1995) leader-follower research did not have any direct applicability. Other relationship 
research in the area of social psychology including attachment theory (Bowlby, May, & 
Solomon, 1989), relational cultural theory (Fletcher & Ragins, 2007), and relational theory 
(Lazarus, 1991), did shed light on the mayor-CAO relationship. 
The mayor-CAO relationship is a dyad; therefore, we can be more discrete in our 
understanding of the cause and effects of these two individuals’ behavior within the framework 
of their defined roles and responsibilities. The mayor-CAO relationship includes at least two 
roles or identities, one structural—who does what and why?—and the other, interpersonal—why 
each person treats and behaves in a particular way with the other. Social scientists have studied 
the structural ways these two roles function within the local government context. However, there 
have not been studies about what is transpiring within the relationship regarding identity 
construction, meaning-making, and other internal processes within the interstitial space between 
two local government actors, and how that may relate to the dimensions of functionality of that 
relationship. I am interested in how the interpersonal and interstitial space in a relationship 
relates to the relationship’s trajectory for functionality. 
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In Chapter II, I organize the research on the many dimensions of the mayor-CAO 
relationship. In this study, I used a constructivist lens to view the relationship using a grounded 
theory methodology. A grounded theory approach is a methodology for qualitative research 
questions interested in inducting new theories or constructs while investigating a constructivist 
understanding of the internal meaning-making and identity construction of human endeavors. It 
matches the need for a deep understanding of the relational nature and utility of CAOs’ and 
mayors’ everyday acts in governing local municipalities. 
Researcher Positionality 
Positionality is important in this dissertation because a grounded theory approach 
involves the interpretation of participants’ narrative by the researcher. My engagement in this 
meaning-making was influenced by my past experiences relevant to the mayor-CAO 
relationship.  
As a practitioner-scholar and a CAO myself, a better understanding of the dynamic of the 
mayor-CAO relationship could be very helpful in reducing the number and severity of the 
publicly-displayed relationship breakdowns that I have witnessed. At conferences and gatherings 
of CAOs, mayors and other municipal staff, a frequently debated issue is the termination of the 
latest CAO, or the public display of dysfunctionality of elected officials towards each other 
and/or to their CAO. In the political realm one does not need to go too far to witness 
dysfunctional behavior towards other elected officials and staff members by certain elected 
officials. This behavior takes place at the highest levels of political life and is mimicked by local 
government elected officials on a daily basis (Stueck, 2017). 
I have worked as a city manager or CAO since I was 27 years old. In the intervening 34 
years as a practitioner, my relationships with my mayors (13 of them) were both the highlights 
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and disasters of my career as a CAO. The nature of these somewhat tumultuous relationships 
with mayors has captured my interest in understanding more about this relationship. Some of 
these mayors had 10 or more years of municipal experience and had worked with other CAOs. 
Others have been newly-elected and relied on my experience to help them come up to speed on 
their position’s obligations. Regardless of the circumstances, the relationship was a daily 
operational imperative. All large organizational decisions, either operational or political, were 
always discussed by me and my mayor. Making decisions independently, by either one of us, 
even if it was our role, meant the decision would likely only reflect one perspective. We would 
then be independently vulnerable for the outcomes that would lack one set of perspectives. 
My personal relationships with my mayors were largely functional; we could work 
through our conflicting structural interests and implement solutions. Sometime the solutions 
favored one point of view or the other. However, on balance, respect for the structural 
obligations of each party and a larger vision for the community would prevail over any ongoing 
conflict. 
I did, however, experience one very dysfunctional relationship with a mayor. The turmoil 
of this relationship resulted from the mayor's behavior, her disrespect of my organizational role, 
of me personally, and of the organization itself. These behavioral conflicts resulted in my 
termination without cause. To my chagrin and disappointment, the one other time I was 
terminated, occurred three days after an election without me even meeting the newly elected 
council, again, without cause. These terminations had significant ramifications for the 
organizations in which I worked. I believed that I was treated unfairly and as such I still hold 
emotional pain resulting from this treatment. I have spent many hours reflecting on my feelings 
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that are anchored in these events and have made significant progress in reframing them as a deep 
learning of relational disruption and its consequence. 
I tell this story because of the frequency of CAO practitioners finding themselves being 
terminated when a new political leadership is elected. The distinction between terminations 
without cause from those when cause is significant: without cause, the employer is not required 
to have a reason for termination. In contrast, with terminations for cause—such as for theft or 
lying—termination is straightforward and understood. However, the vast number of CAO 
terminations are without cause (N. Taylor, personal communication, February 22, 2017). In 
many cases of which I have personal knowledge, the reasons for termination were not in 
accordance with the law. For example, many CAOs were terminated for political reasons, or for 
whistle-blowing on corruption of the elected officials or even just stating their professional 
opinion.3 Amongst CAO practitioners, these terminations are called “political terminations”. 
Practitioners acknowledge that politicians terminate CAOs for various political reasons, many of 
which reflect their need to scapegoat the bureaucracy after an election that represents a populist 
need for change in a local government.  
I believe being a city manager or CAO is an honorable profession that allows my active 
contribution to my community and results in me making a positive difference in the lives of the 
citizens. My father was a city manager before me and I see this employment as a large part of my 
working identity. My passion for more deeply understanding the relationship of the CAO to 
mayor is inspired by many rewarding, challenging, and disappointing experiences in the role of 
CAO.  I aspire to have my research be more than a structural understanding of these two 
                                               
3 A striking example was the 2012 firing of Gary Webster from his position as general manager 
of the Toronto Transit Commission. His advice conflicted with the view held by the mayor and, 
therefore, he was terminated. (Siegel, 2015) 
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positions which dominate the empiricism to date.  While this understanding is important, 
interesting and helpful in describing the external form of these two positions, based on my own 
lived experience it does not uncover the nuances of interpersonal engagement in this governing 
relationship. 
Utility of Research for Practitioners 
Numerous groups and individuals may be interested in this investigation.  Local 
government practitioners (CAOs), elected officials (mayors and councilors), media, political 
scientists, individuals that follow democratic discourse and even other asymmetrical power 
relationships between leaders of strategic governance groups and instigators of governance 
policy (chairs of boards and CEOs; NGO elected boards and their CEO’s; and First Nations and 
their band managers to name a few) may see value and transferability in these investigations.  
The local taxpayers are the recipients of the mayor-CAO relationship’s failure with 
severance packages and service disruptions on the one hand or the efficient and effective use of 
their leadership resources if the relationship flourishes. It may also be of interest to anyone that 
has a hierarchical relationship at work by presenting the possible ways of understanding the 
relationship dimensions at play within their relationship.  
It is understanding the phenomena of the individual’s lived experience of the relationship 
between the mayor and the CAO, particularly the relationship dimensions that support 
functionality of the relationship; that is the central purpose of this investigation. By interviewing 
numerous mayors and CAOs in Canada a grounded theory yielding constructs emerged from the 
interview data. The central phenomena is defined as understanding the dimensions of the       
mayor-CAO relationship both structural and interpersonal in medium sized (5,000 to 100,000 
persons) local governments in British Columbia. 
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
Doing Literature Reviews in Grounded Theory Research: A Contested Endeavour 
In any research it is important that the work be situated in relation to earlier relevant 
scholarship, however, within a grounded theory approach as a methodology, there is a scholarly 
debate regarding the appropriateness of starting a research project by conducting a 
comprehensive literature review.  From the inception of grounded theory, there was an intent to 
build theories inductively being as little as possible influenced by other research about the 
phenomenon of interest. Some have called this the “myth of a blank slate” (Urquhart & 
Fernandez, 2013, p. 224).   
Glaser (1998) suggested that in grounded theory, investigation of the literature prior to 
obtaining the empirical evidence from the actual research could prejudice, or as he puts it, 
“contaminate” the researcher’s ability to follow evidence’s own path to the theory that is being 
uncovered. This, I think, would be the expected view if the world is seen through a positivist or 
modernist epistemology. I assume Glaser’s contamination is by way of an implied bias based on 
absorbing the literature. Taken to the extreme, avoiding other literature on one’s subject will 
ready the researchers for the fresh imprint of new research that will write its own truth on the 
researcher’s blank slate mind.  
I would argue that no researcher has been living in a vacuum up until the time they do the 
research for their dissertation. In today’s VUCA4 (Stiehm & Townsend, 2002) world, attitudes, 
beliefs, and even our sensory perceptions—given virtual reality—can arise from hidden prior 
assumptions, beliefs and thoughts that will invariably impact the way we make meaning in our 
process of research.  
                                               
4 Stands for: Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous an acronym first used as an “acronymized 
mantra” (Stiehm & Townsend, 2002, p. 6) by the U.S. Army War College to describe today’s world. 
          
  
13 
If Glaser’s (1998) dictum were followed, how would researchers know what scholarship 
is missing in their area of interest or what research has already been completed? How would they 
understand the interconnectedness of diverse research and the interdisciplinary similarities that 
create new ways of seeing the same circumstances, without some familiarity with other 
scholarship about their topic of interest? 
Certainly, to be a scholarly researcher one needs to put aside favorite theories. I have 
theorized about my local government experiences after 34 years of  “on-the-job”                
meaning-making. But I am deeply curious about my research interviewees’ own experiential 
meaning-making, particularly if the meaning is different from my own. To suggest that we 
somehow put on hold our meaning-making apparatus by forgoing a literature review is 
counterproductive.   
I do acknowledge that due to grounded theory’s open interviewing technique, “leading 
the witness” in interview research could generate bias. However, recognizing this possibility and 
trusting that the interviewees themselves insist on telling their own story, I am convinced that 
this implied bias was managed if not eliminated. Therefore, I reviewed numerous areas of 
literature for gaps in the scholarship and found that scant research has been conducted on the 
mayor-CAO relationship from an interpersonal perspective. Scholarship on the structural 
meaning of the roles of the mayor and CAO, the structural complexity of these roles, both 
structural and interpersonal conflict within these roles, and the interpersonal relationship 
scholarship, were all present in the literature.  
In this review, I have relied on my extensive local government experience to test and 
better understand this scholarship. However, these reviews are used to help to understand what 
others have researched in these fields not to develop or test any theories against my empirical 
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data.  My research data came from articulate capable interviewees who spoke for themselves and 
imprinted a number of new constructs on my less than virginal theoretical mind. 
To be clear, I do see the world through a constructivist lens, and, therefore, see a 
grounded theory approach as the research process that best investigates and explains socially 
constructed phenomena. I see a fine line between constructing and meaning-making before the 
empirical data have spoken, and the process of applying one’s judgments regarding the evidence 
until all the research data are in. I present a further rationale for using grounded theory in 
Chapter III. 
Purpose and Background of Study  
I was interested in studying the relationship between the mayors and chief administrative 
officers of medium-sized local governments in British Columbia. I used reference material and 
the legal structural governance model used in British Columbia. These circumstances have a 
fundamental commonality with other local governments in Canada and United States with some 
contextual differences. When these differences are significant, they will be named. 
  Since my research subjects were only Canadian mayors and CAOs I have focused my 
work on council-manager forms of local governments in Canada. While this investigation may 
be interesting as well to U.S. practitioners and academics, it is from Canadian consciences and 
local governments.   
Local government includes city government, municipal government, county government, 
and regional government. Local governments depend for their authority on delegated powers 
from provincial or state authority to govern within a set boundary of jurisdiction. Since the 
mayor-CAO or council-manager form of governance is used in both countries the comparative 
value of the structural similarities may be interesting.   
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Like many things in life, the relationship between the mayor and CAO is complex; it has 
dimensions of formal structural expectations, interpersonal interactions, and representations of 
thoughts and ideologies embedded in a relationship that results from elections where the parties 
(mayor-CAO) may have never met before. Alternatively, the CAO may come to work for a local 
government through the recruitment process where the mayor was only one member of the hiring 
committee. The CAO may know little about the mayor’s personality, leadership style or other 
working idiosyncrasies. Given the complexity of this relationship, I am attempting to answer the 
following research question: What conditions and aspects of the relationship between the mayor 
and the CAO are necessary to create and maintain a functional relationship?   
Given the potential challenges to mayor-CAO relationships it is surprising that these 
relationships function at all. In fact, many mayor-CAO relationships are failing (McCabe, 
Feiock, Clingermayer, & Stream, 2008) and generally, terminations are also on the increase 
(Local Government Management Association of British Columbia, 2015; McIntosh, 2009; 
Siegel, 2015a). Local government professional associations such as the ICMA (International City 
Managers Association) are also concerned regarding this primary relationship failure.  These 
associations believe the CAO side of the relationship is not well understood or respected by both 
the public and elected officials (Siegel, 2015a). 
One major problem facing local governments across North America is that the 
relationship between mayor and CAO is multifaceted, unique and suffering from relationship 
failures (Siegel, 2015a). My research explored how we may better understand why this failure is 
taking place.   
 This chapter is organized into four broad themes: the historical and general description 
of local governments; the relationship between the mayor and CAO including complementary 
          
  
16 
relationships, structural understanding of relationship, and governance challenges; the 
complexity of the political/administrative structure of mayor-CAO relationships; the discussion 
of interpersonal aspects within the mayor-CAO relationship; and the relevance of leadership 
theories to understand the mayor and CAO role and relationships. I note again that my 
experience as a CAO has contributed to my critique of the literature and I will intersperse this 
chapter with personal experiences and influences. 
General and Historical Context of Local Governments 
The mayor is the most common name for the elected leader of local governments 
throughout the democratic world. Each local government also employs another leader called (in 
numerous and varied wording), the chief administrative officer (CAO), city manager, and by 
several other titles.5 This person leads administration or management of these local governments 
and of the services they supply. In North America, particularly in Canada and the United States, 
these two positions are intended to work together to accomplish political and service outcomes 
for the people that live within the boundaries of these local governments (Svara, 1999b).  
Scholars have investigated the operations of local governments for many years. Much of 
this investigation focuses on the structural manner in which local governments are organized 
(Brittain, 1951; Georgiou, 2014; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Svara, 1994; Tindal, Tindal, Stewart, 
& Smith, 2016). In the United States, much of the research compares council-manager versus 
mayor-council forms of governance (Svara, 2006; Urbaniak, 2014). As Urbaniak (2014) stated:  
The mayor-council form is a miniature American presidency. The mayor is elected at 
large and is endowed with formal executive authority, including the appointment and 
                                               
5 The position of chief administrative officer is synonymous with city manager, city administrator, clerk-
administrator or other similar titles. I prefer city manager because it connotes a reference to the “manager 
movement” of the early 20th century, discussed in Chapter I. However, most legislation in Canada 
references the chief administrative officer as council’s lead appointed officer for the municipal 
corporation. Therefore, I have consistently used its abbreviation, to denote the position responsible for the 
overall management of the municipality. 
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dismissal of senior staff persons . . . Mayors in council-manager systems, on the other 
hand, are not chief executives. Although they may be elected directly, their formal duties 
are often limited to presiding at meetings (including coordinating the agenda) and 
carrying out various ceremonial functions. (p. 207)  
At its periphery, the discussion includes the role of the CAO, in the mayor-council or 
council-manager model. Over the years in the United States, both governance models’ significant 
attributes have tended to be adopted by each other’s model. For example, the mayor-council 
model has adopted a chief manager position and the council-manager model has afforded, in 
practice, a more significant leadership role to the mayor (Cheong, Kim, Rhee, & Zhang, 2009). 
 In British Columbia, my primary geographic area of investigation, the only model of 
governance used is the council-manager model through the legislation of the Community 
Charter, the provincial statutory framework for local government (Buholzer, 2005).  
To help separate the concepts “I have subdivided the following discussion of the general 
and historical context, into these five subsections:  
• policy versus administration,  
• particularism and clientelism, structural conflict,  
• structural conflict in interpersonal relationships, and 
• complementary relationship. 
Policy versus administration. How policy making is separated from policy 
implementation is not a simple question to answer. This separation has come to be known as the 
dichotomy between policy and administration and has been the subject of many academic 
articles, and numerous books (e.g., Demir & Reddick, 2012; Dunn & Legge, 2001; Georgiou, 
2014; Goodnow & Bates, 1919; Overeem, 2005; Rahman & Seldon, 2016; Rosenbloom, 2008; 
Svara, 1985, 1999, 2001, 2006, 2008; Wilson, 1887; Zhang, 2014). Georgiou (2014) has 
developed an atlas of the politics-administration dichotomy spanning 123 years of literature up to 
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2010.  This primarily American research overview presents the relationships between 165 
published papers and 497 citations in a network bibliography. Besides academic attention, 
practitioners have also been interested in the appropriate role for both the mayor and CAO 
(Hassett & Watson, 2002) to allow the full manifestation of democratic representation and the 
efficient and effective delivery of local government services. 
 Regardless of the model of local governance, the relationship in Canada between the 
mayor and CAO is the primary one affecting local governments’ operations. Some governance 
models will grant more or less power to each of these positions (Urbaniak, 2014, p. 207) but all 
models have these two designated roles with notionally similar responsibilities.   
The mayor is the premier elected official and is, therefore, responsible to the electorate to 
lead the council and the city. The CAO is the top appointed official, tasked to operate city 
services (sewer, water, roads etc.) and administer the policies established through the elected 
council’s legislative authority.  For example, the council may establish a parking bylaw, and 
then, the CAO manages the implementation and ongoing operation of that bylaw, theoretically 
without interference by the political arm of the municipality. 
Particularism and clientelism. As noted above there is a substantial literature about the 
dichotomy between the democratic development of policy and administration of that same 
policy. Rosenbloom (2008) concluded that “it was then [1927 to 1936] that the dichotomy was 
broadened to include politics over public policy” (p. 60). I interpret his idea of the broadening of 
politics within the dichotomy over time to include particularism. “Particularism refers to the idea 
that different moral standards apply to different people. This view is inherently discriminatory” 
(Spicker, 1994, p. 2). Clientelism, as used by Hicken (2011) and Roniger (2004), is a similar 
concept to particularism. Particularism or clientelism in the local government context refers to 
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the legislative pandering to specific interests (usually commercial) at the expense of the public 
interest. At times, this has been characterized as political corruption, however these two terms 
(particularism and clientelism) have come into the academic literature as the new and softer 
characterization of corruption. In his or her job description, the CAO is tasked with minimizing 
these dysfunctional practices so as to assure the council that the delivery of services and 
administration of regulatory authorities is done without fear or favor (Montjoy & Watson, 1995).   
 Structural conflict. McGuigan and Popp (2016) stated: 
In complex society’s different systems . . . economic, governmental . . .  must maintain 
specific relationships in order to sustain the society. These specific patterns of 
relationships form the structure of the society. . . Structural conflict is the result of 
patterns of social relationships that fails to satisfy the needs of at least one of the parties 
in the relationship. (pp. 218–219)  
Structural conflict in the local government context refers to circumstances where 
structural roles serve opposite functions or at least appear to contradict each other even though 
the overall objectives may be in alignment. In McGuigan and Popp’s (2016) definition, one party 
may not meet the other party’s needs. For example, both the municipal auditor and the chief 
financial officer (CFO) have common overall goals concerning honest expenditure of public 
funds. However, the auditor, must review and at times disagree with the CFO and therefore be in 
structural conflict. I refer to this apparent tension between roles as structural conflict. If the 
apparent conflict is between levels of government legislative authority, I refer to that as 
structural governance conflict (Long, 2017). I would add that structural governance conflict is 
dynamic and is exacerbated from a structure that marginalizes certain groups. Many local 
governments believe structural governance conflict results from senior governments not updating 
their legislative frameworks, thereby hampering local governments’ ability to deal with a more 
and more complex world. 
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Circumstances can arise where structural conflict pits the mayor, who may wish to 
particularize (and meet his or her political needs), against the neutral administration of council 
policy. The CAO is tasked by role definition and best practice to resist the mayor’s attempts to 
particularize and thereby stay in alignment with the policy that council has enacted in its 
legitimate legislative process.  
Structural conflict is also embedded within the establishment of public policy. The 
process of establishing public policy is complex and the environment in which it takes place 
includes the media, private citizens, political ideologies and their supporters, policy 
entrepreneurs, local government staff experts, and the rest of the decision makers on council, to 
name but a few. Structural conflict is embedded in the system of governance, organization of 
power, the sharing of resources, and distribution of influence, all manifest within the mayor-
CAO relationship (McGuigan & Popp, 2016).  It must be resolved as best the dyad can under 
their collective understanding of possible solutions. Sometimes solutions are obvious, but usually 
they are very complex involving different levels of government, no clear community support, 
ideological directions, and intended and unintended consequences. Therefore, the structural 
understanding of local government and the manner in which the mayor and the CAO are placed 
in this system represents the structural relationship and how it functions.  
Structural conflict in interpersonal relationship. As presented earlier, a structural 
understanding is how local governments are commonly understood. Scholarly research focuses 
on the “what” and “how” of the system of local government (Brittain, 1951; Georgiou, 2014; 
Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Svara, 1994; Tindal et al., 2016).  In fact, much of the dichotomy 
research focuses on the structural aspects of local governments; what role each actor is 
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designated to play, how does the budget get passed, what policies direct the staff to complete 
these budget expenditures and all the issues that connect to this chain of events.  
Given that the relationship of mayor and CAO is based primarily on structural 
responsibilities that lead to conflict—conflict that puts representatives of different identities, 
political and administrative, together in structured roles that requires finding solutions—a 
functional ability to reach positive conflict resolution is very important (Whitaker & De Hoog, 
1991).  This prima facie structural conflict is a product of the legislative structure of the roles of 
both the mayor and the CAO and is one of the major challenges within the mayor-CAO dyad to 
maintain a functional relationship.  
Conflict means different things in different contexts. However, I rely on Burton’s 
definition of conflict as resulting from,  
a blockage of, or a frustration to the satisfiers of basic needs, due to social barriers and 
avoidable obstacles. It is a most insidious blocker of needs satisfiers because it is so often 
invisible, indiscernible, yet significant and unrelenting in its scope. (as cited in McGuigan 
& Popp, 2016, p. 226) 
 The following is an example of a structural conflict seen in local government. The 
annual budget is the responsibility of the CAO once it has been authorized by the mayor and 
council. During the year, a non-budgeted expenditure may be raised by the mayor as an action 
item for the council. The CAO has the authority to exchange one expenditure for another 
provided no new money is spent; however, the mayor is only one member of council, with only 
one vote on the budget. In my experience, these types of structural conflicts happen every day in 
local government. It is the relationship between the mayor and CAO that will likely determine 
the outcome of the budget reallocation and many principles, ideologies, identities, worldviews, 
legalities, advisability, do-ability, other long-term objectives, relationship climate and 
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expectations, and many other thoughts and actions past, present and future will have a bearing on 
the outcome.  
The structure of local governments, the dichotomy between mayor and CAO, and regular 
managerial principles will be used to determine the appropriate outcomes for a local 
government’s mayor-CAO dyad and as the organization as a whole. This is only a partial view of 
how the mayor-CAO relationship operates representing only that which can be seen and 
collectively explained. There remains the manner in which leadership approaches of both 
leaders: the mayor and CAO play a part in the interpersonal and structural aspects of the mayor-
CAO relationship. 
Complementary relationship. Scholarship, particularly regarding the development of 
the policy/administrative dichotomy, has witnessed a trajectory over time from a strict notion of 
orthodoxy to what Svara (1999b) called a “complementary relationship” (p. 694) between 
political and administrative roles. Svara stated:  
In the final analysis, complementarity is a larger concept than dichotomy because it can 
encompass the separate and distinct roles that a complementary relationship entails and 
the neutrality and insulation that administrators require for accountability. Dichotomy 
cannot encompass the reciprocity, sharing, interchange, leadership, independence, and 
professional responsibility that are clearly present in complementarity. (p. 697)   
 Extensive research has generally accepted that some form of the complementary model 
is in practical use, with the dichotomy being seen as a background objective or an intellectual aid 
for understanding (Montjoy &Watson, 1995; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Nalbandian, 1991, 1999, 
2005, 2006; Overeem, 2005; Siegel, 2010, 2015a; Stocker & Thompson-Fawcett, 2014; Svara, 
1985, 1998, 2001, 2006a, 2006b, 2008; Waldo, 1948; Zhang, 2014; Zhang & Feiock, 2009). 
Stocker and Thompson-Fawcett (2014) stated:  
The Complementarity Model is based on the premise that elected representatives and 
bureaucrats join together in mutual pursuit of good governance, resulting in a high level 
of interaction and reciprocal influence. While the model recognizes distinct roles, 
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backgrounds and perspectives, it highlights the integration resulting from 
interdependence, reciprocal influence and overlapping functions of the groups. The 
interdependence comes from the need of politicians to have expertise within their 
institution and the need of bureaucrats to have their work legitimized and publicly 
supported. (p. 793) 
Svara (1999b) generally defined this complementary relationship as the two groups 
(political and administrative) working together to maximize the public good. This concept 
manifests itself in the two roles of the mayor (policy and political) and of the CAO 
(administrative and management). Mayors will lead the whole organization through their 
strategic direction and manage council and the agenda for policy and political gain.   
The Motivations of the Mayor and the CAO Compared  
Within the complementary relationship, all politicians focus, at some point in their 
elected tenure, on the next election and what policies and politics will win that election. Politics 
is the act of determining winners and losers for a finite set of government resources or benefits. 
In the local government context, policy is the regulation of processes that manage the 
distribution of those resources or benefits without particularizing these policy outcomes 
(Rahman & Seldon, 2016). For example, a parking bylaw (legislative act) will be enacted on a 
particular street (allocation of benefit). The administration of that bylaw will be enforced fairly 
on everyone that breaches the bylaw without fear or favor. The bylaw defines the public interest 
through a democratic legislative act and this interest will need to be administered fairly for the 
legitimacy of the local government to be maintained.  
The CAO, within this complementary relationship, will manage the delivery of the 
municipal services and help council and the mayor in policy development but remain out of the 
active process of politics. At times, the mayor and council will be in alignment in their politics; 
other times they may not be. When a political dis-alignment is present, the CAO will be 
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vulnerable to the mayor trying to use the CAO's administrative authority to particularize the 
delivery of services, for political advantage. 
Continuing with the parking example, the council may have enacted a parking prohibition 
in an area where the mayor has supporters who do not want this prohibition. The mayor may 
attempt to influence the CAO to not enforce the parking prohibition. The CAO's motivation will 
be a careful balance between reducing the mayor’s particularism and applying his or her 
professionalism in implementing the desires of council, who enacted the prohibition in the first 
place. If the conversation regarding what is "best for the local government" takes place between 
the mayor and CAO and a determination between both parties is arrived at, Svara (1999b) would 
consider the outcome part of a complementary relationship. Svara's research indicated that this 
complementary relationship appears to operate in the practical world. This complementary 
relationship between the political group (mayor and council) and the CAO, representing the 
administration, is the area of my research interest.   
Dunn and Legge (2001) looked at three models of relationships between public 
administrators and elected officials: “orthodox politics-administration dichotomy, modified 
dichotomy and a partnership model” (p.401). They suggested that the orthodox                     
politics-administration dichotomy provides “insulation . . . justified and increased administrator’s 
strength by providing justification for their operating without political interference in policy 
implementation” (p. 405). The modified dichotomy, they further argued, indicates that the 
“dichotomy holds for politics and administration but not for policy and administration”.             
(p. 405). And the third partnership model suggests a complementary relationship as argued by 
Svara (1999a, 1999b) and Nalbandian (1999). Jerome and Legge’s survey of 858 local 
government managers found operationally that a mix of relationship models being supported. 
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One notable and relevant finding was “that the partnership model requires a high level of trust 
and a set of expectations on the part of the governing board members that encourage advocacy 
and discretion” (Jerome & Legge, 2002, p. 416). 
Why Investigate the Mayor-CAO Relationship?  
I narrowed my research interest to focus on the mayor as the leader of the elected group.  
He or she will naturally have a direct relationship with the CAO. It is this specific relationship 
that I have investigated. It would have been interesting to investigate other relationships 
involving elected councilors and the CAO, but that is not, in my view, where critical examination 
of the operations of local governments should focus.  Further, the variables and differences in 
investigating mayor and council (usually at least seven individuals) makes the task of such 
investigation too overwhelming. The importance of understanding conflict within local 
government, is tantamount to uncovering the complementarity of the mayor-CAO relationship. 
Local government organizational interactions, many of which fall to the mayor, the CAO, and 
their relationship, are surrounded by conflict, particularly political conflict (allocation of scarce 
public resources). But these interactions also involve structural conflict, structural governance 
conflict, ideological conflict, and other types of clashes (McGuigan & Popp, 2016). 
Structural Understanding of the Mayor-CAO Relationship 
The detailed explanation of the external context in which the mayor-CAO relationship 
operates will help in understanding the structural relationship. I start with the legal structure, 
followed by the organization’s structural understanding of the two positions, and, finally, explain 
how each position is seen from outside of municipal governance.  
History of legal structure and authority. Local governments operate much like all 
governments; they have a legislative group usually elected either by ward or at large, that pass 
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bylaws or ordinances that direct the societies that live within their boundaries. In Canada, the 
laws enacted by local governments must be within the authority delegated by provincial 
governments. Some western states in United States allow “home rule”6 but most local 
governments’ legislative authority is bounded by state legislatures. The significance of this legal 
structure is that it sets firm boundaries of jurisdiction with little opportunity to develop new 
solutions for new problems as they arise.  
Most of the local government legislative frameworks were designed for and delegated to 
local governments, almost as an afterthought in the early 19th century. As both the United States 
and Canada built their nations from a colonial monarchy, little attention was paid to the 
establishment of legal authority for local governments. Colonization of the so-called New World 
was generally an extension of the British philosophy that resources should flow to the benefit of 
those in power, in their case the British crown. Therefore, the early Court of Quarter Sessions 
which had the power of granting authority of the Crown to collect monies for public works (tolls 
for river crossings, roadways etc.) were granted to local individuals. This form of patronizing by 
the Crown solved the early process of providing public goods that in other democratic contexts 
would to be supplied by local governments. Early on, some communities were granted royal 
charters to make the system of governance more efficient, but the nation building period in both 
countries resulted in the federal and provincial or state constitutional drafters amassing all the 
powers of governing and usurping any independent authority for cities and towns that had 
previously organized themselves for collective benefit. After the American Revolution, local 
governments who had played a significant role in the colonies, were left out of state and federal 
constitution building (Herget, 1976).   
                                               
6 Using the residual authority of unused federal or state authority. 
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To some who work in the system of local governance, the present disrespect shown by 
provincial governments towards local objectives and aspirations—which has a long history 
(Tindal et al., 2016)—generates structural governance conflict within local governments (Long, 
2017). This causes troubling unintended consequences, and the thoughtless downloading of 
senior government responsibilities to the local level, without that jurisdiction getting the 
resources or tax revenues.  The amassing of revenues and downloading of costs primarily 
benefits the provincial government and often pauperizes the municipalities.  
Local government purposes. One of the principle purposes associated with local 
governments is legislative—establishing ordinances and bylaws that reflect the needs of the 
community and establishing the legal foundation for all activity undertaken by the particular 
local government. This legislative function is, however, only one part of the purpose of local 
governments.  
The second purpose is the delivery of municipal services such as potable water, local 
roadways, collection and treatment of sewage, fire protection, police protection, plowing of snow 
and many other services. These services are usually called the services to land to differentiate 
them from services to people which are usually delivered by provincial and federal governments 
(Tindal et al., 2016). 
A third purpose of a local government is to represent the community to the outside world. 
Sometimes this involves battling outside forces, like big businesses that want to develop mega 
projects in the municipality; other times it is attracting businesses to the location for the added 
jobs and economic activity. With local governments being governments with less structural 
power than other provincial and federal governments this representative role can be very 
important in the debate for societal equity and fairness (Tindal et al., 2016).   
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The mayor's governing responsibilities. The locally elected officials, usually called a 
council collectively, include a leader referred to as a mayor. The mayor is the chair of the council 
and, depending on the governance system, has no executive power.7 The mayor must lead the 
legislative body through challenged leadership and he or she only has one vote amongst 
councilors on all matters that need a corporate vote of the governing body.  This is why the 
mayor’s leadership is seen as challenged. The mayor also makes meaning for the community by 
symbolically presenting a vision or plans for the community that may be challenged by other 
councilors, the local media, and other groups and individuals. 
The annual budget is the most important yearly policy document and is prepared and 
presented by staff to council for their approval. Once the budget has been reviewed, possibly 
amended, and approved by council, the implementation of expenditures are delegated, by bylaw,8 
to the CAO to expend. There may be additional requirements for expenditures over a certain 
limit or that the municipal corporation is only to be bound by contract by an enactment of the 
legislative body. In British Columbia, two primary pieces of provincial legislation limit the 
operations of local governments. They are the Community Charter and Local Government Act. 
Both have hundreds of sections and, since adoption, have led to case law that clarifies and 
creates more specific interpretations of various sections. Staff is up to date on this case law and 
the principles behind the approximate interpretation of sections of these acts. It is this and other 
staff expertise that the mayor and council must rely upon for good governance.  
The mayor, however, does assume some day-to-day responsibilities to lead the local 
government organization on matters of a political or policy nature. Once the council has passed 
laws the mayor is the traditional position that monitors the implementation of these laws to make 
                                               
7 The power to hire and fire the CAO without reference to council, who usually is the CAO’s employer. 
8 This delegation is usually enabled itself by a “roles and responsibilities by-law naming the CAO. 
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sure they are in alignment with the collective wishes of the council. The responsibility for 
implementing these laws and policy matters is the CAO’s, once council has enacted the policy or 
bylaw. These role responsibilities create the potential for a structural conflict as the CAO may 
understand and proceed to implement the bylaws in a manner inconsistent with the council’s 
expectations.   
The mayor’s leadership also includes his or her symbolic activity that links to the 
meaning-making, strategic direction for the community and perceived9 oversight of the 
administration. Ceremonies such as traditional ribbon-cutting on new municipal works, receiving 
dignitaries, and communicating with the media to explain the actions of the municipality, make 
up most of the mayor’s day. There are times during upheaval or emergency where the mayor is 
called on to make meaning for the community in a symbolic manner (Bolman & Deal, 2009). 
CAO management responsibilities. The CAO is appointed by council to act as the chief 
manager of the municipal corporation. He or she is responsible for the budget expenditures, 
managing the legislative process of council, and supporting the mayor in his duties. This official 
will attend most council meetings and is technically referred to as the council’s only employee.  
This statement is meant to highlight that councilors should not engage in managing any of the 
staff employed by the municipality, because they are likely attempting to unduly influence        
day-to-day activities. Under good governance the elected officials are not to engage the staff that 
report to the CAO because to do so would confuse their accountability. For example, if the 
mayor asks the director of Public Works to improve a particular roadway while the CAO has 
prioritized works on a different roadway, following a budget bylaw, the accountability of that 
                                               
9 Technically, council itself oversees the CAO’s performance, but the common perception of the public is 
that the mayor is the CAO’s boss. In some cases, the mayor is the CAO’s supervisor, signing off on their 
travel claims and vacation, and the like.  However, council collectively is the CAO’s employer’s 
representative. In some “strong mayor” systems of governance the mayor does hire and fire the CAO. 
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director to the CAO has been violated; the director will be left conflicted as to which roadway is 
to be improved (Cuff, 2002). 
Governance problems. The separation between roles of administrative staff and the 
politicians is an ongoing problem in many municipalities. It is perhaps more evident or 
problematic in small and medium size municipalities, where councilors and/or the mayor believe 
they were elected to operate the municipality as opposed to simply making policy. There are 
reasons why elected officials tend to not support the dichotomy between policy and 
administration. The dichotomy is seen as a restriction to particularization that serves their 
political interests. The popular understanding of “government” tends to rely on the private sector 
value of maximizing private (shareholder) benefits.  There are many cultural differences between 
the two methods that society uses to deliver goods and services. Generally, so-called public 
goods are delivered to society through government organizations while private goods and 
services are delivered by the private sector. The clarity and purpose of these two delivery 
methodologies is not clear to the population at large (Mintzberg, 2015).  
The traditional private sector service maxim that “the customer is always right” 
(Grandey, Dickter, & Sin, 2004) has been translated into particularism on the part of citizens 
demanding private benefits from their elected officials. Particularism enacted by elected 
officials, which is in fact partisan corruption, has led to many politicians instructing municipal 
staff to do something that is ill-advised.  For example, an elected official I worked for instructed 
public works crews to drop public gravel on a friend’s driveway, and requested I cancel a 
parking ticket for an acquaintance of the mayor. These are common occurrences in my 
experience. Using the earlier example of roadway improvements, the CAO’s request to the 
director of Public Works is legally constituted because the expenditure is within the budget 
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bylaw; the mayor’s request is illegitimate since the expenditure does not have a legal authority in 
the budget. 
Or, to follow on another example used above, if the council enacted a parking restriction 
in the downtown area to keep traffic moving, the CAO would instruct the bylaw enforcement 
officer to implement the new regulation. The mayor could become involved when a merchant’s 
customer receives a ticket and the merchant appeals to the mayor to cancel the ticket because 
implementation was too harsh or too effective. This particularistic behavior is commonplace and 
can put the mayor and CAO in conflict. Citizen complaints over parking tickets may lead to 
councilors directing bylaw enforcement staff to not issue tickets in a particular area or to council 
directing public works staff to take care of a particular nuisance in one neighborhood at the 
expense of ignoring another citizen’s complaints. 
The Complexity of the Structural Mayor-CAO Relationship 
In recent times, the relationship between mayor and CAO has become both more 
complex and increasingly important to the smooth functioning of every local government. An 
example of this growing complexity is the challenge of dealing with chemical soil contaminants, 
including the difficulty in approving development of brownfield10 industrial sites, which have 
become much more complex (Contaminated Sites Regulations, 2016). Local governments 
manage these regulatory approvals through other governments, private consultants, and 
proponents concurrently, adding tremendous complexity to the process. Since industrial 
                                               
10 A brownfield site is one that has been used for industrial use before being reused for another purpose. 
This is opposed to a greenfield site where the site is in its natural state before being developed. Canada’s 
National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy defined brownfields as “abandoned, vacant, 
derelict or underutilized commercial and industrial properties where past actions have resulted in actual or 
perceived contamination and where there is an active potential for redevelopment” (as cited in BC 
Ministry of Environment, 2007, p. 1). 
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development can be important for the economic well-being of the community, these complexities 
must be managed by the mayor-CAO relationship with the mayor relying on the CAO’s 
expertise. Complexity has been growing within the local government context putting increased 
stress on the mayor and the council, who will be expected by the public to understand these 
technical complexities. 
As the issues of public policy and operational efficiency come together in this mayor-
CAO relationship, the relationship also becomes the focus of local government structural 
complexity. The mayor-CAO relationship is the structural location where problems generated by 
this complexity are solved or managed. This structural complexity does not include the internal 
relationship dyadic meaning-making between the mayor and CAO, which is also highly complex 
and triggered by the issues that arise within this structural complexity. 
The complexities facing the mayor-CAO relationship. Given the complexity of this 
topic, I will attempt to illustrate the nature of the variables that can arise in the mayor-CAO 
relationship. To clarify the terminology, I first define the mayor-CAO relationship’s 
functionality and dysfunctionality, and then move through a real example that I have lived 
through numerous times.  
Functionality within a relationship suggests that any item, issue, suggestion and/or 
statement made may lead to conflict. In turn, this can resolve in an agreement for action, with 
one side acquiescing to an outcome or action, or an agreement to disagree impairing effective 
response on the next issue or conflict faced. Consequently, dysfunctionality arises and grows; 
there is not a resetting of the emotional make-up of the relationship after the conflict, and 
negative emotions generated by the dispute have impact on the next conflict between mayor and 
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CAO. Over time, more and more residual negative emotions accumulate, and the relationship 
will cease to be at all functional.  
Consider a common and realistic example: the mayor suggests to the CAO that a good 
friend of his or hers would be great for a job the municipality has advertised. The mayor 
recognizes that this suggestion is in violation of the orthodoxy of the relationship’s formal 
dichotomy of policy and implementation but believes the greater good is accomplished because 
the municipality will have a new “stellar employee”—at least from the mayor’s point of view. If 
the relationship between the mayor and CAO is based on the structural understanding of best 
practices (Cuff, 2002) then the CAO will reject this suggestion as nepotism (or the appearance of 
nepotism) and, therefore, the possible partisan corruption that could flow from this suggestion.  
If the level of mental complexity of both dyad members is instrumental (Kegan & Lahey, 2009), 
the fact that the CAO is the one with the delegated authority to hire employees based on merit 
should prevail: the matter can be settled based strictly on the dichotomy’s rules.  
Whether this action—which I refer to as structural conflict because the mayor’s higher 
authority to enact good governance for the municipality is in conflict with the CAO’s delegated 
authority to hire staff—will result in functionality or dysfunctionality depends on a number of 
factors. Using my definition of dysfunctionality, it will depend on the residual emotions held by 
either the CAO or the mayor depending on the decision and how it was arrived at.  
Political/administrative relationship and complexity research. Many local 
government studies attempt to understand what actually transpires within the mayor/council and 
CAO/administration structural relationship. Much of this research presents the dichotomy and 
the complementary relationship as functioning automatically and in accordance with these 
structural imperatives (e.g., Demir & Reddick, 2012; Dunn & Legge, 2001; Montjoy & Watson, 
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1995; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Nalbandian, 1994, 1999, 2005, 2006; Overeem, 2005; Siegel, 
1999, 2010, 2015; Stocker & Thompson-Fawcett, 2014; Svara, 1998, 1999a,1999b, 2001, 
2006a,b,c, 2008; Waldo, 1948; Zhang, 2014; Zhang & Feiock, 2009). However, I know 
experientially, based on many years working as a CAO, that this seamless positive functioning of 
council/mayor and CAO/administration relationship is often not what happens in practice but a 
recitation or espousal of the perception of  “best practice” of council-CAO relationships (BC 
Local Government Association Governance Paper, 2015).  
It could be that there are relationships within the municipal world that operate according 
to ideals that as Svara (1999a) and others suggest, however, this view is a structural or 
institutional view (Bolman & Deal, 2009), based on how things are reported. Because much of 
the research on which such generalizations are based involves questionnaires, self-reporting of 
behavior and extrapolating generalizable models from this, may hide many issues and 
circumstances where either member of these dyads is not behaving so ideally. Any mayor or 
CAO who understands what is expected institutionally and legally will likely answer 
questionnaires in alignment with that prescriptive, idealized view.  
In addition, Svara’s (1999b) “complementarity model” leaves out the primary purpose of 
the dichotomy; limiting political corruption, which from my practitioner’s view, is still rampant 
in the system. Using Svara’s idealized model also assumes a functional relationship of CAO, 
mayor and council, high levels of competency in the CAO and mayor, and ongoing success with 
numerous other opportunities for relationship conflict that must be successfully managed.  
Although these and other weaknesses are acknowledged within the complementarity 
model, Golembiewski and Gabris (1995) contend that there is still room in that model “for a 
better conceptualization of relationships” (p. 8). This opens the discussion to more than the 
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structural part of the relationship and suggests research on the relationship itself—the focus of 
my study—may have considerable value. Boynton and Wright (1971) reasoned that “the 
relationship between mayors and managers could be explained as “collaborative or team 
leadership” (p. 28) based on their study of 45 large cities. Other research on cooperative 
relationships between mayors and city managers (e.g., Cheong et al., 2009) concluded that when 
there is a positive relationship between the mayors and city managers, both parties achieve 
increased influence in policy making.  
Some researchers have looked particularly at the CAO’s expected behavior in the mayor-
CAO relationship. Overreen (2005) stated that CAOs should be guided by “the concept of 
political neutrality . . . what administrators should not be guided by [is] personal or party or other 
obligations and loyalties” (p. 315). This implies that the complementary relationship is more 
structural in nature and that the power within the relationship limits the actions of the CAO but 
not the mayor. Since conversations between the mayor and CAO are imbued with the political 
interests of the mayor, or possibly the CAO, “political neutrality” will be negotiated in the 
context of the working relationship.  
 Bolman and Deal (2009) explained an organization through four different leadership 
frames: structural, human resources, symbolic, and political. While their study is not specifically 
focused on local government it can provide useful insights. The structural frame explains the 
operational and governance structure—who does what, how they do it and how does it all link 
together—like a machine. The human resources frame sees the organization mainly in terms of 
the feelings and cognitive capabilities of the organization’s human capacity. The symbolic frame 
understands the organization through its symbols, ceremonies, drama, and rhetoric, and the 
information to help make meaning of the organization’s place in the world. Lastly, the political 
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frame explains organizations in terms of distribution of power and its benefits. This lens 
concerns itself with the conversation about who gets what benefits and who doesn’t. 
Bolman and Deal (2009) suggested, “Many views of leadership fail to recognize its 
relational and contextual nature and its distinction from power and position. We need to reframe 
leadership to move beyond the impasse created by oversimplified models” (p. 365). In the 
mayor-CAO relationship context, the two leaders bring together different structural, political, 
symbolic and human resources frames, to be understood in the collective outputs of their 
positions. Can this relationship, which is bounded by structural roles, be seen from the lens of 
human resources? Can the relationship (mayor-CAO) be seen as a leadership vehicle for both 
participants?  
Although much research has focused on the dichotomy between policy making and 
policy implementation, the relationship between the mayor and CAO has been discussed much 
less and only as a symbolic representation of the two most important roles within local 
governments. The internal thought process of these two positions in making meaning for each 
member of the dyad (McGuigan & Popp, 2016), the organization’s symbolic or meaning-making 
frame (Bolman & Deal, 2009), and the community, is effectively missing from the scholarship.  
Interpersonal aspects within the mayor-CAO relationship. The mayor and CAO are 
the leaders of the process of finding solutions for dichotomy issues. Many times, the mayor acts 
for the policy group (the council) as the representative for the policy portion of the dichotomy. 
The CAO represents the administration portion of the dichotomy and will work with the mayor 
to find collaborative solutions to these structural governance conflicts implied by the dichotomy 
(Svara, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008.)  As Svara (1990) stated in his 
book, Official Leadership in the City, 
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It would be a mistake to analyze the council-manager relationship simply in power terms. 
The structural characteristics permit a cooperative relationship between the council and 
the manager in which responsive and compliant behavior of the manager is not compelled 
but rather a normal expression of the interpersonal dynamics of the form. (p. 159) 
This acknowledgement of interpersonal dynamics suggests the importance of the internal 
workings of the relationship dyad, and the need for meaning-making and identity building in 
addition to the internal and external cultural reality, structural, institutional, symbolic and 
collective aspects to the relationship. There is much more than just the structural understanding 
of how things work based on structural research. The dichotomy, developed to combat political 
corruption, is not enough to explain how mayors and CAOs operate on a day-to day-basis. 
Siegel’s (2015a) case studies come closer than most other literature, to describing the real 
operational relationship between mayor and CAO. However, that work also lacks a broader 
analysis that can explain in a more holistic way the nature and performance of the mayor-CAO 
dyad.  For example, consider a case study interview of one’s CAO’s behavior which concluded:   
Every time she [the CAO] made a connection in a relationship, the people that she was 
connecting to always felt a positive aspect of it so that . . . even if they were on opposite 
sides of an issue, there was respect and . . . a furtherance of not only her objectives but of 
their objectives. (Siegel, 2015a, p. 132)  
This information is not structural, but it does enlighten how this CAO maintains 
relationships and how this part of her identity helps construct her reality. Siegel’s (2015a) case 
study was attempting to delineate the CAO leadership attributes necessary for success, because 
the subject was a successful CAO by all accounts. A qualitative case study can uncover a 
different understanding of the same circumstances understood though a different perspective.  
For example, if a mayor makes meaning in their world using a particular viewpoint, he or she 
may not see particularism as a partisan act or in any way corrupt, but the CAO may see the same 
acts as such and as detrimental to the public interest. This potential conflict of perspectives 
within the relationship needs to be understood and managed through an interpersonal 
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understanding of the many aspects of the mayor-CAO relationship dyad. Case studies, grounded 
theory approaches and other qualitative methodologies can be effective at uncovering these 
interpersonal aspects of any relationship. 
Conclusions Regarding the Structural Aspects of the Mayor-CAO Relationship 
I have presented an historical and contextual understanding of the local government 
world and explained some of the present and past challenges of particularism and structural 
conflict embedded in the mayor-CAO relationship. I have also presented scholarship on the 
dichotomy theory (e.g., Montjoy & Watson, 1995) and the subsequent complementarity 
relationship model (Svara, 2001). I then focused specifically on the structural understanding of 
the mayor-CAO relationship and the relationship’s complexity. It is evident from the research on 
the political/administrative relationship complexity that a deep understanding of the interpersonal 
aspects of the mayor-CAO’s relationship is absent. I turn now to the broader field of leadership 
studies and theory for more perspective on those deeper aspects.  
Leadership Theory and the Mayor-CAO Relationship 
Although there is much research and disagreement on what leadership is and how it is 
understood, there is general agreement that it is important within our society and our 
organizations (Northouse, 2005). Within the context of local government and the relationship of 
mayor-CAO, leadership is a construct and social phenomenon that will help in understanding of 
this dyad.  
The mayor’s leadership. Svara (1994) wrote Facilitative Leadership in Local 
Government describing how mayors of local governments achieve successful leadership. Until 
then, Svara, suggested, mayoral leadership was seen as the accumulation and exercise of power. 
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The “innovator” or “entrepreneur” were the prototypes within this power model of leadership. 
“This model emphasizes power as the essential means of achieving effective leadership” (p. 2).  
The commonly used academic distinction is between “strong mayor” based on the    
mayor-council model and “weak mayor,” usually from the council-manager model. This 
terminology is not a judgment of any mayor’s personal attributes but reflects the editorial views 
of the academics who coined the terms in political science descriptions of different systems. At 
that time in history (1960–1980s) descriptions of mayors reflected the traits-based explanation of 
leadership theory (Stogdill, 1948). Traits or characteristics of leadership at that time, in turn, 
reflected the longstanding “great man” approach to leading and understanding leadership 
(Borgatta, Bales, & Couch, 1954). Pressman (1972) and Sparrow (1984) suggested that mayors 
saw power as their vehicle to become a “great man” (Northouse, 2016). 
Separate case studies of mayors in two large cities—Oakland (Pressman, 1972) and San 
Diego (Sparrow, 1984)—suggested there needed to be a change in the council-manager form of 
governance to help these mayors become more powerful in terms of politics, policy making and 
administration. Pressman (1972) concluded that the manager may manipulate the council, pursue 
a personal or professional agenda, and take cues from influential outsiders, but not provide 
leadership responsive to elected officials or supportive of their exercise of democratic control. 
This was in contrast to Boynton and Wright (1971) and Svara’s (1990) research that 
indicated the need for collaborative or team relationships between mayors and their managers. 
The difficulty in comparing this research to Canadian local governments is that the two cases of 
different American systems of governance (mayor-council and council-manager) are invariably 
used as a basis for comparative political science as opposed to research on the actual practice and 
improvement of leadership. These and other contextual issues may render the U.S. experience of 
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mayoral leadership difficult to apply to Canadian mayors. British Columbian mayors all operate 
under the council-manager model and therefore their leadership will tend towards the 
complementary operational relationship with the CAO, at least in principle.  
In Canada, mayors such as Hazel McCallion in Mississauga, Jean Drapeau in Montreal, 
and Mel Lastman in Toronto, were all seen as strong mayors in terms of their personality and 
public fame—or notoriety—not in the language of structural models of governance (Urbaniak, 
2009). The public perception of these mayors was that they displayed leadership that was             
trait-based, involved strong personalities or notable personas (Urbaniak, 2014). This is relevant 
to the mayor-CAO relationship because the power leadership model assumes a zero-sum 
conception of power—that is, if the mayor gains power through whatever means, the CAO will 
necessarily lose power.  When this concept of interaction takes place between the mayor and 
CAO, conflict is likely. However, “when a cooperative relationship is present among officials, 
the mayor does not need to be an autonomous power wielder who activates and checks other 
officials” (Svara, 2002, pp. 4–5). There is a suggestion that the council-manager model of 
governance is more likely to result in a cooperative relationship between the mayor and CAO 
than is the mayor-council model (Svara, 1990, p. 211).   
In a study of political leadership that includes the relevance of the larger context outside 
the local government organization, Morrell and Hartley (2006) stated: “Political leadership is a 
relatively understudied, though discrete and substantive area of interest . . . political leadership 
involves relationships of interdependence between leaders, the organization(s) and the context, 
separately defining ‘leader’ and ‘context’ can be limiting” (p. 494). 
 From a systems theory perspective (Shaw, 2002), the mayor’s political leadership is 
interconnected and causally connected to all that goes on in the local government. The mayor has 
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four generic roles: executive, scrutiny, regulatory, and advocacy (Stewart, 2003). These roles 
vary depending on context but are fundamentally the responsibility of the mayor and council.  
Leach and Wilson (2002) see it a bit differently; for them, the mayor’s roles are primarily 
maintaining cohesion, developing strategic policy direction, external representation and task 
accomplishments. I would note that two of these roles—policy direction and task 
accomplishment—cannot be achieved without the CAO. Again, this points to the need for a 
workable relationship between the mayor-CAO to exercise these role responsibilities.  
The mayor’s indirect or notional leadership without direct power or authority           
(council-manager model) requires that he or she builds allegiances within council and within the 
appointed staff to actually further his or her political agendas. In spite of these efforts on building 
the mayor’s leadership, it is often constantly under challenge by other elected officials, the 
media, and outside community members.   
The symbolic frame—one of the four frames discussed earlier from Bolman and Deal 
(2009)—is the important frame for this indirect or notional leadership of the mayor. The mayor’s 
political role involves being the chief meaning maker for the community, that is, explaining to 
the community why and how things happen. For example, during an emergency such as an 
earthquake, community members will look to their leaders to explain what these events mean for 
their lives. The effective mayor will communicate in simple but powerful symbols to help the 
citizens understand their circumstances. The mayor who fulfills this symbolic role will often be 
seen at the site of the disaster explaining that the emergency workers are helping those injured to 
assure the citizens that chaos has not overwhelmed the city’s resources (Jong, 2017; Jong, 
Dückers, & Velden, 2016).  
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I believe the mayor’s leadership is partly driven by external input from the constituents, 
council inputs, internal structural role responsibilities (including task and policy development 
responsibilities) and external representational communication. All of these roles and leadership is 
manifest through the mayor’s relationships with each group. For example, the mayor’s 
relationship with the council allows her or him to display and exercise leadership; the CAO’s 
relationship delivers tasks, structural roles, and policy responsibilities; relationships with the 
community constituents make up the follower groups for the mayor’s leadership; and external 
communications delivers leadership within these outside organizational relationships.   
Thus, much research, both Canadian and from the United States, on mayoralty leadership 
indicates a structural grounding, focusing on leadership traits and behaviors. The nature of the 
mayor’s relationships is linked to the relationship between the mayor and the groups and 
individuals that help him or her deliver their political agenda. Yet, research is missing on the 
specific leadership of the mayor and CAO relationship even though these two positions hold 
structural leadership positions in local governments. It should also be noted that most research is 
based in individual case studies of a few mayors.  It is hard to draw strong conclusions or any 
generalizations regarding mayoral leadership given the small amount and specificity of the 
research data. 
The CAO’s leadership. From Bolman and Deal’s (2009) structural frame, the CAO’s 
role can be understood through his or her structural organizational role responsibilities 
(Broussine, 2000; Nalbandian, 1994, 1999). The contingency theory (Donaldson, 2001; Siegel, 
2015b) and situational leadership (Graeff, 1983; McIntosh, 2009; Siegel, 2015b) can be used to 
explain CAO leadership. CAO leadership research has relied on the existing general leadership 
literature to describe CAO leadership. Siegel (2015a) and McIntosh (2009), for example, have 
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used situational leadership (Hersey, Blanchard, & Natemeyer, 1979) and contingency theory 
(Donaldson, 2001). A CAO is a manager and resembles any other manager in any organization. 
Therefore, the general leadership literature may explain a portion of CAO’s leadership. 
However, Siegel (2015a), and McIntosh (2009) writing specifically about leadership of CAOs, 
converge on using contingency theory (Donaldson, 2001) and situational leadership (Hersey et 
al., 1969) to describe their leadership.   
A situational approach to leadership attempts to match a particular leadership style to a 
specific external circumstances or internal strategic contingencies (Hersey & Blanchard, 1996). 
McIntosh (2009) attempted to do this for Canadian CAOs and found that CAOs use different 
leadership styles to match internal and external strategic circumstances. 
In the contingency theory of organizations, leaders change their leadership approach to be 
in alignment with the organization’s dominant paradigm. This alignment or fit is important for 
high performance (Donaldson, 2001). Therefore, it follows, according to McIntosh (2009), that 
CAOs will act as “shapeshifters” (Reed, 2014, p. 109) to align their personal leadership approach 
to the internal and external context they find themselves. For example, Siegel (2015a) suggests 
that a CAO must lead in three different directions; up to their councils and elected officials, 
down to their staff, and out to their community. I believe another dimension may be added to 
Siegel’s framework. This dimension involves leading laterally with police departments and other 
agencies funded by municipal council but for which the CAO has no formal management 
authority. Practically, these areas of leadership require quite a different leadership style; 
therefore, the concept of contingency leadership is used by Siegel (2015a) and McIntosh (2009). 
Siegel (2015a) further suggests that: 
The contingency theory of leadership holds that there is no “one best way” to lead; rather, 
leadership is situational. It is possible that a leader can be highly effective in one situation 
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but completely dysfunctional in another. The municipal CAO’s situation puts a new 
wrinkle in the contingency theory of leadership. The usual prescription of contingency 
theory is that an organization must find the type of leader that fits its current needs, but 
the theory does not address the municipal CAO’s need to take three different orientations 
at the same time. (p. 49) 
 
 McIntosh (2009) divides his situational leadership paradigm of CAO activity into 
strategy/policy and systems/services and discusses the subsequent leadership skills or 
competences that best fit each. Broussine (2000) has suggested that CAOs require five capacities 
to demonstrate leadership in the local government context. These capacities are needed for the 
ambiguities and paradoxes that are present in the local government environment.  These 
leadership capacities, according to Broussine, include: 
1.  The capacity to work with the political dimension, 
2.  the capacity to lead, change, and develop the organization, 
3.  the capacity for maintaining personal perspective and self-knowledge; 
4.  the capacity to develop effective external relationships; and 
5.  the capacity for maintaining focus on strategic and long-term issues. (p. 502) 
 
CAOs will adapt their leadership approach depending on the circumstances they are faced 
with (Siegel, 2015a). This may resemble playing chess in three dimensions with a four-frame 
board. Recognizing that in a CAO’s contingency world, CAOs will represent many different 
leadership styles and strategies based on situations they find themselves in. Some will take an 
authentic approach (Avolio & Gardner, 2005) and deliver this through relational practice; others 
will lead through their capacities to deal with the political dimensions, organizational 
development, self-knowledge, external relationship development and maintaining a longer-term 
focus. This contextual approach implies contingencies and cultural issues will determine the 
CAO’s leadership approaches. Jackson and Parry (2011) have suggested that leadership 
researchers who highlight organizational context have identified seven influential components:  
The goals/purpose of the organization (e.g. its strategy and mission); the composition of 
its people (e.g. its demographics and its capabilities); the organization’s core processes 
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(e.g., its technologies, policies and governance model); the state/condition of the 
organization (e.g. how successful it is); length of time (e.g., what stage is it at in its 
organizational lifecycle); its structure (e.g., size, hierarchy, degree of centralization and 
spatial distance); and finally, its culture/climate (e.g., its norms, values and ethics).         
(p. 69)  
Authentic leadership (Avolio & Gardner, 2005) and relational leadership (Uhl-Bien, 
2006) have been demonstrated by one experienced CAO in Siegel’s (2015a) case study looking 
at CAO leadership. Leadership can be realized through relational practice where the CAO’s 
authentic, relational, situational or contingency leadership is being demonstrated.  
The development of a complete understanding of CAO leadership will likely require 
further research, but from existing limited scholarship the following trend is emerging:  
Contingency (Donaldson, 2001) and situational leadership (Hersey & Blanchard, 1993) require 
CAO shape-shifting, in response to the inconstant context, with Broussine’s (2000) five 
capacities of particular use.   
The strategic contingencies and organizational contextual inputs (Jackson & Parry, 2011) 
will generate an ongoing maze of leadership opportunities for the CAO.  More work is necessary 
to capture all of the different ways CAO’s lead, however, this presents a start.  
Bolman and Deal (2009) would see the CAO’s leadership in the structural, human 
resources and internal symbolic and internal political frames, the mayor presents his or her 
leadership in the political frame, symbolic frame and less so in the structural frame. “Each of the 
frames highlight significant possibilities for leadership, but each is incomplete in capturing a 
holistic picture” (p. 365). 
Bringing Leaders Together: Mayor-CAO Leadership 
Given the thousands of books and articles on leadership, it is surprising that little has 
been written on the leadership that results when two leaders are brought together to accomplish, 
governance, operational outputs and community representation—as is the case in local 
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government. There is research on shared roles (Demir & Reddick, 2012) but not in a leadership 
context. There is literature on relational leadership (Uhl-Bien, 2006) and other forms of 
relationship research; however, there is nothing that I have found specifically focused on the 
relationship itself between mayor and CAO. Concepts of co-leadership (Steinert, Goebel, & 
Rieger, 2006) and shared leadership (Lambert, 2002) have had a recent following in nursing and 
education, but nothing has been seen that applies these ideas to local government. There is much 
literature on the structural relationship of the roles of these two positions, but not with a 
leadership focus. As stated earlier, a small amount of literature exists on the mayor’s leadership 
and even less on the CAO’s leadership. But, to repeat, there is a lack of research on the mayor-
CAO’s collective leadership or how their relationship produces local government outputs. 
There is an argument that outputs from the dichotomy (policy outputs or administration 
outputs) can be separated and attributed to each role (mayor and CAO) independently. Thereby, 
the corruption prevalent during the progressive era (Rosenbloom, 2008) could be stemmed. 
However, few academics believe this separateness within the orthodox dichotomy and its outputs 
happen in reality (Svara, 2001). At certain points in the history of local governments this may 
have been true. However today, in a council-manager model of governance, it is apparent from 
the research (Demir & Reddick, 2012; Dunn & Legge, 2001; Montjoy & Watson, 1995; 
Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Nalbandian, 1994, 1999, 2005, 2006; Overeem, 2005; Siegel, 2010, 
2015; Stocker & Thompson-Fawcett, 2014; Svara, 1998, 1999a,b, 2001, 2006, 2008; Waldo, 
1948; Zhang, 2014; Zhang & Feiock, 2009) that the complementary relationship model (Svara, 
2001) between the mayor-CAO actually produces the leadership outputs for local governments. 
Given that there seems to be no specific literature on mayor-CAO relational leadership, I now 
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investigate the relational leadership literature in a broader multi-disciplinary manner, largely 
relating to other settings than local government.  
Relational Leadership 
Rost (1993) argued that by focusing on the periphery and content aspects of leadership 
(i.e., scientific traits, contingencies, techniques and knowledge about organizations, human 
behavior, etc.) we still do not understand the nature of relational leadership. Cunliffe and Eriksen 
(2011), working on relational leadership argued for “conceptualizing leadership as embedded in 
the everyday relationally-responsive dialogical practices of leaders” (p. 1425).  
Leader-Member-Exchange (LMX) theory (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) and leader-follower 
research had some direct applicability to investigating the mayor-CAO relationship. Other 
relationship research in the area of social psychology including attachment theory (Bowlby, 
1969), relational cultural theory (Fletcher & Ragins, 2007), and relational theory (Lazarus, 
1991), all shed light on the interpersonal motivations of the mayor-CAO relationship. 
I discovered that a transactional relationship or leadership, as used in the LMX 
nomenclature (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995), or a transformative or partnership relationship, can be 
two different ends of a scale of relationship leader styles. According to Graen and Uhl-Bien 
(1995), definition of these two relationship dyads or leadership styles, transactional involves the 
hierarchical, economic based exchanges, whereas the transformative relationship involves a 
relationship that involves reciprocal growth and mutual development. McLean (2014) suggested 
that within this concept of relational leadership, the relationship dyad produces a separate entity 
“the relationship” that co-creates this collective leadership. 
Within this leadership literature, others have studied the attributes or behaviors that 
support relational leadership. Substantial research has been done on trust and, specifically, on the 
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trust in leadership in organizations (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), concluding that it is an important 
dimension or aspect of the mayor-CAO relationship. McAllister (1995) discussed two 
demonstrated constructs for trust: cognitive trust and affective trust. Both fit the structural and 
interpersonal dimensions of the mayor-CAO relationship. Trust within a relationship empirically 
points to improved organizational outputs on a number of dimensions of organizational life 
(McAllister, 1995).  
These dimensions can be understood in terms of the earlier example I gave of the mayor 
wanting the CAO to hire a friend, I further analyze this example in leadership terms. In a 
transactional leadership relationship, as discussed by LMX scholars (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) 
the relationship resembles the interaction between a sex trade worker and his or her client; there 
is an exchange of activity for cash. There are no emotions invested by either party and both are 
satisfied with their part in the bargain. However, in the example of the mayor wanting a friend to 
be hired, if the transactional relationship is based on the structural dichotomy, the mayor-CAO 
outcome resulted in relationship leadership functionality. For purposes of discussion imagine that 
the job candidate the mayor requested is not hired by the CAO and, therefore, the mayor has 
negative emotions towards the CAO. Can we explore why the mayor may hold on to negative 
emotions?   
Seeing this circumstance of dysfunctionality, we could question how this decision deals 
with the mayor’s identity needs, worldview or meaning-making. I suggest that of the five identity 
needs described by Redekop (2002)—recognition, security, connectedness, action, and       
meaning-making—recognition, and meaning-making will be most significant. Recognition will 
be important because the mayor has brought forward what he believes is an excellent suggestion 
for the greater good of the municipality, but the CAO has not recognized this suggestion or 
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acknowledged the mayor’s place of leadership within the municipality. Meaning-making is 
significant because the mayor may be testing the boundaries of his or her authority, the power 
within his or her leadership, and what “being the mayor really means”. 
If the ending, instead, had been that the CAO did hire the mayor’s friend, the CAO would 
have to deal with his or her own identity needs, particularly the need for security, if he or she felt 
this individual had more influence over the mayor on administrative matters. Recognition would 
be important as an identity need because the CAO’s role of hiring based on merit could be 
questioned; understanding what the mayor’s ultimate intentions were, could lead to the CAO 
probing the meaning of this interference. 
Exploring the manner in which the mayor-CAO relationship should function based on 
best practice and dichotomy’s conventions, or the complementary relationship model, is 
probably why these orthodoxies do not have consistent outcomes and certainly do not explain the 
growing numbers of CAO terminations and dysfunctional mayor-CAO relationships. 
Investigating the internal processes of the mayor-CAO relationship may help to explain both the 
mayor and CAO’s behavior as a part of their reaction to their identity needs and meaning-making 
because the intervention of an issue, action, suggestion or statement within the relationship dyad 
will cause or trigger identity construction and or meaning-making (Kegan, 1995; Redekop, 
2002).   
In light of these circumstances in the context of the mayor-CAO relationship, the 
transformative relational leadership platform (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) appears to be a useful 
platform to explain how it is that numerous mayor-CAO dyads actually stay functional. As noted 
earlier, this transactional/transformative dimension provides another way to understand the 
structural relationship differences between functional and dysfunctional leader relationships.   
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In contrast, if the relationship between the mayor and CAO is seen mainly as 
transactional, there is little opportunity to understand the many internal matters of               
meaning-making and identity needs. However, the transformational relationship (Graen &       
Uhl-Bien, 1995) is designed for growth and mutual learning as is the relational cultural theory 
(Fletcher & Ragins, 2007). Both suggest learning and healing our emotions within a relationship, 
or as a result of a relationship, will allow the honest, intimate conversation that may explain the 
manner in which each member of the dyad constructs their meaning and their identity. A 
transformative relationship allows for the exploration of each person’s worldviews and their 
individual nuances. This is a case where understanding each other’s level of mental 
complexity—or even being aware of the notion that there are variable capacities for dealing with 
complexity (Kegan, 1995; Kegan & Lahey, 2009)—is possible and even encouraged so as to add 
to a mutual understanding of how each person constructs their meaning and identity, and, 
therefore, their leadership. 
Within this social construct of a transformative leadership relationship, a conversation 
about what is in the best interest of the municipality can take place, regardless of structural 
realities. For example, the mayor could explain, within the relationship, the internal reasons why 
he or she wanted to have a close friend hired. They could further explain that they understood 
and cared what identity needs were uppermost for the CAO. If the mayor had built trust11 within 
the dyad, and made commitments to the CAO that satisfied his or her worst case scenarios of 
                                               
11 Trust has been defined differentially depending on discipline. I have hesitated to use the word because 
it has so many different meanings. Generally, in a dyadic context trust relates to the absence of 
malfeasance towards the other party, but the question remains if this attribute is mutual and if so how is 
that measured? In the mayor-CAO dyadic context there can be a transactional relationship that does not 
assume trust, but it is implied if the relationship is to become transformative. Likewise, trust is assumed 
in a transformational relationship since this type of relationship is a safe place to be vulnerable. Given the 
variability and lack of agreement on meaning I have used the word sparingly. 
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political corruption and chain of command issues, and the mayor acknowledged that the friend 
would be treated the same as everyone else in both the merit hiring and after the hiring, then the 
CAO might more seriously and willingly consider the mayor’s friend as a municipal employee. 
In this way, the dyad could remain functional even if the issue represented serious structural 
conflict. This is, in fact, a positive conflict outcome that would maintain a functional leadership 
relationship.   
I believe that the relationship between mayor and CAO is dynamic and starts with a set of 
defined roles and responsibilities for each member of the dyad. These structural roles are defined 
externally but they are also interpreted internally by each, based on their past experiences, 
education, ideology, worldviews, role models within the local government fraternity and culture 
(Ashton et al., 2007).  These structural responsibilities are then interpreted individually to make 
meaning and develop a new identity by each person in the dyad. Subsequently, a dyad develops a 
process for exchanging information and supplies a place for the testing of thoughts, ideas, 
preferences, worldviews, ideologies, feelings, and identities. From there the leadership of the 
dyad emerges. 
A large part of the mayor-CAO dyad’s work is embedded in structural conflict or 
emerges within a conflict inducing context. Therefore, how the mayor and CAO dyad engage in 
conflict, is considered one of the important variables of the relationship. Additionally, the level 
of mental complexity (Kegan & Lahey, 2009) and other evolutionary identity construction, 
meaning-making and reality forming factors will help or hinder the functionality of the 
relationship.   
Many of these issues may significantly impact the functionality of the relationship. But 
this has not been tested in academic research. My study of the influences on relationship 
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functionality within the mayor-CAO dyad, uncovered approaches that ultimately improve the 
functionality. 
Given that many mayor-CAO relationships are failing throughout North America, a better 
understanding of the reasons for this failure or an understanding of the reasons or attributes of a 
functional relationship is very important. Democracy at the local level is at stake given that the 
efficient and effective delivery of collective local services is a pillar to the operation of 
communities throughout North America, if not the world. Understanding what causes these 
relationships to fail or prosper will help tremendously to right the ship of local state. 
Chapter Conclusion 
I have presented the existing scholarship that focuses almost entirely on a positivist view 
of the nature of the mayor-CAO relationship. The literature of the dichotomy, structural 
investigations of local governments, and their actors’ behavior, all focus on what these actors do, 
not why they behave in a particular way. This positivist literature involved the dichotomy 
between policy and administration, structural conflict and the context and history of local 
governments. Recognizing that the research gap in the literature was mainly missing 
consideration of interpersonal dynamics, I considered the leadership literature, including mayor 
leadership literature, CAO leadership literature, and numerous relational leadership theories, to 
explore what is known and could be of help in researching the interpersonal aspects of a 
relationship.  
This is not to suggest that my research has been primarily aimed at testing others’ 
theories for validity; they are only investigated to determine what the research world can 
generally transfer to our local government context of structural and interpersonal aspects of the 
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relationship between the mayor and CAO. My empirical research has examined “what all is 
going on here” within the mayor-CAO dyad.  
Given that I have chosen a grounded theory approach for my research methodology this 
literature review may be frowned on in certain grounded theory circles because of the possible 
generation of bias, a criticism I addressed at the beginning of this chapter. However, given that 
present scholarship focuses almost entirely on the mechanistic structural understanding of the 
mayor-CAO relationship, this grounded theory study went deeper, and looked at the everyday 
realities of the CAO’s working relationships with mayors, what might be called the “inner life” 
of the dyad.    
In the next chapter I explain the rationale and nature of the academic methodology that 
best discovers the answers to the research questions. 
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Chapter III: Methodology 
This chapter presents the methodological approach for the research agenda, problem and 
question. In it, I explain why I chose the qualitative approach of grounded theory as the 
methodology for probing the relationship between mayors and CAOs. Subsequently, this chapter 
provides an overview of how I used this approach. 
My research focused on relationships between mayors and CAOs in local governments in 
North America, particularly Canada. The mayor is the primary elected official with a democratic 
mandate and the CAO is the chief appointed officer, who operates local governments. To narrow 
this research agenda, I first look at the structural relationships—including the statutory roles of 
each actor in the mayor-CAO dyad—and then examine the relevance of leadership theory to the 
interpersonal dimensions of the relationship. 
Quantitative and Qualitative Research Compared 
Embedded within the epistemology of scientific learning, the study of methods allows a 
somewhat standardized way of understanding research. For example, quantitative research 
methods use standards of inferential statistics to convey research understandings of a 
phenomenon. This positivist approach uses and tests hypotheses for correlation, analyzing 
relationships among variables to understand data collected that answer research questions and 
obtain the supposed truth regarding a phenomenon.   
Qualitative research on the other hand focuses the researcher on understanding, at a 
detailed level, what is going on within the subject under inquiry. Much of the research involving 
human subjects and their behavior uses qualitative methods to understand the internal (the 
unseen internal construction of reality and meaning) and external (that which can be observed) 
meaning of a subject.  
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From new studies on the human brain (Sylwester, 1995) it became apparent that how we 
see the world and interpret our visual data sets is different for each person based on their 
experiences since birth. Sylwester stated: “Learning becomes a delicate but powerful dialogue 
between genetics and the environment: the experience of our species from eons past interacts 
with the experiences we have during our lifetime” (p. 21). Given that we all have different 
experiences since birth we may then interpret what we see differently. In this way of thinking, 
we construct our own reality through what we see and subsequently interpret (Mills, Bonner, & 
Francis, 2006). This would also be true of all sensory data. For example, at one time or another, 
we all have had to interpret sounds at night without the aid of visual cues, likely making mistakes 
in interpretation particularly when we are young.   
Sensory data will also take on a different meaning based on the context in which we are 
situated. For example, on the ocean I have visualized watercraft at quite some distance only to 
find, when I was closer, this “data” was just floating logs, mistaken because of my poor context 
reference. My brain tries very hard to interpret this visual data and fails to construct the actual 
truth because of a lack of the appropriate context references. The realization that our realities are 
constructed by our experiences and our contexts has led to a new understanding of scientific 
epistemology and subsequently a new set of methodological approaches generally referred to as 
qualitative research. Generally, Creswell (2009) argued, “Qualitative procedures demonstrate a 
different approach to scholarly inquiry than methods of quantitative research. Qualitative inquiry 
employs different philosophical assumptions; strategies of inquiry; and methods of data 
collection, analysis, and interpretation (p. 173).  
 As a later construct in academic research, qualitative research is searching for the 
understanding of the human experience as opposed to predicting outcomes or the relationship 
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between variables. Sometimes in qualitative research, theories are tested against new studies to 
determine the explanatory abilities of these theories. Whereas quantitative methods usually 
collect data from multiple circumstances and investigate the relationships between these 
circumstances and variables, qualitative research focuses on in-depth understanding of the 
perceptions of individuals embedded in the social phenomenon of interest.  
Qualitative research is designed to better understand a phenomenon with no particular 
interest in generalizing the data to predict behavior in a larger population as in quantitative 
research.  The value of qualitative research is its transferability to other cases and similar 
circumstances where information from one study is transferable to another.  If truth is socially 
constructed then differing contexts will influence what is considered the truth and it may not be 
the same in different cases (Wergin, 2018, p. 6.). 
The methodology for this study uses a number of research assumptions, questions and 
tensions that interact to help explain the focus of the research agenda and subsequently the 
research question.  Recognizing that qualitative research approach is better suited to my research 
agenda, I have chosen a grounded theory approach as a qualitative methodology, this choice will 
be discussed in much greater detail later in this chapter. 
Research Rigor 
Wergin (2018) suggested three criteria for meaningful dissertation research. The research 
should be rigorous, credible, and useful. Rigorous means the absence (as much as possible) of 
abling or disabling bias. Gadamer (1975/1989) described abling bias as bias researchers bring to 
the research when they base observations on their prior experience and meaning-making 
regarding the research. Disabling bias is the bias brought to the research as “the unwanted 
influence of personal or professional interests in the outcome” (Wergin, 2018, p. 5). These biases 
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are controlled by steps that check the trustworthiness of statements used to confirm interview 
data collected. Credibility can be confirmed by sharing the collected interview data with other 
colleagues or with experts in the field to confirm the believability of the data on its face value.  
I hope the conclusions and insights of this scholarship will resonate within other contexts.  
As Wergin (2018) suggested, the utility criterion of research should be its transferability to other 
similar contexts. For example, learning from some mayor-CAO relationships that one studies, 
should transfer to other broadly similar mayor-CAO relationships. The transferability may also 
be to any relationship with structural roles that are ambiguous and sometimes difficult to 
understand. This scholarship should also be transferable to other political/administrative 
relationships. 
As a practitioner becoming a scholar, I have focused on the “scholarship of practice” 
(Wergin, 2018, p. 6), using existing theories, concepts, and scholarship to better understand the 
relationship between the mayor and CAO. I started with the research question: what aspects of 
the relationship between the mayor and the CAO are necessary to create and maintain a 
functional relationship? In other words, what factors lead to a functional relationship between the 
mayor and CAO, resulting in positive local government outcomes?  These questions do not lend 
themselves to quantitative methodology because the nature of any relationship involves the 
amalgam of thousands of experiences of each person within the dyad and their separate meaning-
making and their fluid and evolutionary identity construction.    
Research Purpose 
The analysis of the mayor-CAO relationship is not intended to be generalizable, but to be 
transferable to other relationships. I understand that each relationship is individual in its 
complexity, context, evolution, and performance. It can be transactional or transformative, for 
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example, using Burns’ (1978) well-known distinction. In a constructionist worldview, truth is 
socially constructed and therefore not intended to be used to predict the future, or suggest a 
knowable set of behaviors (Wergin, 2018). The research in this dissertation was used to 
understand the mayor-CAO dyad and developed a number of theoretical propositions on how 
this relationship operates, uncovering the key concepts that help this relationship function. This 
study was not intended to prove anything definitive in the positivist sense. It does, however, aim 
to be systematic, demonstrate research rigor, and contribute to understanding of the mayor-CAO 
relationship.   
Given all the realities of the mayor-CAO relationship, my research area lends itself to the 
qualitative aspects of academic research. I did this work to gain understanding of what is 
happening within a relationship with structural and interpersonal dimensions. As a CAO, I also 
believe the functionality of the mayor-CAO relationship can and does have a tremendous 
influence on the operations of local governments and subsequently local democracy. Therefore, I 
determined the appropriate qualitative methodology to capture the phenomena of the mayor-
CAO relationship functionality is the qualitative methodology known as a grounded theory 
approach. 
Choosing Grounded Theory 
I considered using auto-ethnography (e.g., Chang, 2016) to present my personal story, but 
such studies are not inductive, only narrative. As interesting as my story might be in my opinion, 
one case example will not attract the credibility necessary for my fellow CAOs to take the 
research seriously. My colleagues have all heard many stories of both functional and 
dysfunctional mayor-CAO relationships. Grounded theory methodology adds multiple 
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perspectives and detailed analysis of social processes that are experienced by those engaged in 
the relationship. 
I also considered using qualitative case studies (Yin, 2013) as a methodology. This 
approach has a substantial academic following and has been used in local government research to 
consider a number of issues, including CAO leadership. Case studies have been reported in the 
literature (Siegel, 2015a) and provide a foundation of understanding the interpersonal 
functionality in the relationship. However, the direct purposeful collection of interview data 
across a number of individuals in the mayor or CAO role, has the advantage of assessing 
different perspectives within different local contexts. This expansion of view allows for a more 
comprehensive analysis that ultimately resulted in numerous theoretical propositions that can be 
further tested through a generalizable methodological approach.  
After rejecting auto-ethnography and case studies I concluded that using grounded theory 
would be the “methodological fit” (Edmondson & McManus, 2007, p. 1115) for extending and 
deepening the empirical literature on this topic. 
The nature of grounded theory. Grounded theory generates testable concepts from data 
that is original and observable. Key attributes of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 1978) 
are as follows: 
• Fit and relevance—how well the data conceptualize to the areas of theory 
development; 
• Workability—the integration of discovered areas of interest or concepts feeding into 
the developing theory; 
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• Modifiability—refers to ensuring all the concepts discovered are integrated into the 
theory by a constant comparison process. A developing theory can be modified when 
new data are discovered. 
There are two major approaches to grounded theory; one is Glaser and Strauss’s original 
objectivist or classic method (Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998) that uses a post-positivist perspective as the researcher attempts to be separate and 
detached from the research process and the interpretation of the data. Holloway and Schwartz 
(2018) explained the next iteration; “The second generation of grounded theory methodologists 
has evolved the method from a post positivist stance (Glaser, 1978) to a constructivist (Charmaz, 
2006) and post-modern (Clarke, 2005) approach to meaning-making” (p. 499). 
According to Charmaz (2006), as a later less structured process, recent grounded theory 
research needs to use a constructivist perspective; she suggested that all interviews are                
co-constructed between the interviewer and the interviewee. The research data are seen as 
socially constructed and influenced by both the researcher and the subjects of the research. 
Holloway and Schwartz (2017) presented the further evolution of the method, describing Clarke 
(2005) as having taken a post-modern approach to grounded theory. 
She moves beyond the understanding of co-construction of data and reflexivity to 
recognizing the importance of macro and meso political, social, and cultural forces that 
impact the micro-social processes of the human experience. She provides us with a series 
of maps that draw attention to those human and nonhuman factors in phenomena that 
may be salient to explaining and interpreting the events. (p. 499) 
Grounded theory suggests that the researcher proceed to investigate a phenomenon by 
asking the question, “what all is going on here?” The researcher’s curiosity with respect to 
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phenomena that are not understood fuel the passion to understand a particular set of events, 
leading to a foreshadowing question.12  
Positionality. Grounded theory as a constructionist approach requires the researcher to be 
aware of their worldview and particular biases that may influence the collection and 
interpretation of the research data. For example, I have puzzled about my own ability to maintain 
some relationships with mayors where others have failed. My terminations that resulted from 
these failed relationships were hurtful for me and my family; therefore, this leads to both 
cognitive and affective questioning. My use of grounded theory as a method, recognizes this 
possible bias in the research and uses a transparent presentation of my motivations, history and 
meaning-making to alert the reader to these possible biased outcomes. My extensive experience 
in the local government arena suggests an affective interpretation of CAO marginalization at the 
hands of elected officials. Throughout Chapters I and II, I have made every effort to share my 
views on the mayor-CAO relationship and to be transparent about my own experiences in the 
role of CAO. Nonetheless, I must be vigilant in striving for objectivity, making sure that the 
work reflects as accurately as possible the participants’—not my—meaning. Ultimately, the 
reader will judge whether I have successfully used the tools of grounded theory to protect the 
meaning of participants and suspended my own partiality. 
According to some grounded theorists (Glaser, 1978) even a research question can be 
seen as premature. Here, I have done the literature review and crafted a foreshadowed research 
question, therefore, I present a number of theoretical proposals “grounded in the experiences of 
                                               
12 A foreshadowing question is one that comes to mind at the beginning of casual conversations with 
colleagues, cohort members and researchers regarding the matters that the researcher is passionate about 
(Holloway & Schwartz, 2017). 
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both CAOs and mayors” that emerged and lent itself to a better understanding of the social 
processes embedded within the relationship.   
Plan for the Study 
In this section I present my study in more detail including the choice of a purposeful 
sample, how interviewing was undertaken, analysis, including coding, the constant comparative 
method, coding team, coding software and other methodological issues. 
For a pragmatic practitioner, grounded theory is a methodology that allows the 
interviewing of mayors and CAOs within an area that is both known to me and geographically 
close. As a practicing CAO, I have access to mayors and CAOs for the in-depth interviewing 
necessary to collect enough data that determined numerous constructs and theoretical 
propositions of how and why the relationship dyad between mayor and CAO functions.  
The choice of interviewees can have an inherent bias; however, interviewing both mayors 
and CAOs separately balanced the two perspectives (political and administrative) and resulted in 
a broader view of the mayor-CAO dyad. This interview data resulted in meaningful constructs 
and theoretical propositions. 
Purposeful sample. The data collection interviews were of mayors and, separately, 
CAOs. I interviewed some of these officers of British Columbia’s medium-sized municipalities 
with populations of approximately 5,000 to 100,000 persons with a few interviewees from both 
larger and smaller communities. The interviewees were chosen by requesting their participation, 
starting in the communities most accessible to me. There are very few municipalities in British 
Columbia that are over 100,000 in population; therefore, this size is a pragmatic sample. This 
purposeful sample reflects my interest in local municipalities in British Columbia, the province 
in which I live and work. Thus, I had reasonable accessibility to participants and have a more 
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homogeneous population from which to draw conclusions. There is no reason to believe that this 
purposeful sample is not generally representative of most working mayors and CAOs in British 
Columbia. I chose this range of population because it excluded the small villages where 
relationships may be long term before either the mayor or the CAO were in their roles. I am 
looking for relationships that were built on the platform of local government roles as opposed to 
a relationship from settings such as a past sport team affiliation or a high school commonality.  
I did not use pairs of mayors and CAOs who are presently working together, because 
these relationship pairs will continue working together after the interview. An honest interview 
with both parties present could cause embarrassment or worse—long term relationship damage.  
Although there may be some loss of understanding around the comparison of perceptions of an 
ongoing relationship, I believe that the risk of damaging or impacting an existing relationship is 
of greater significance. Furthermore, because many of the mayors and CAOs had a number of 
past working relationships on which to draw their experiences, I gained from the richness of 
comparison across individuals’ experiences. For example, I have worked directly with 13 mayors 
and most mayors I know have had numerous CAOs work with them. 
Ten mayors were interviewed. My research assistant transcribed the interviews using 
INVivo transcription after we used actual transcribers on the first three interviews. 
Eleven CAOs were interviewed, two had technical problems and failed to record, and one was 
redone and one interviewee requested to be removed from the interview process, which I did. 
That left 9 CAO interviews transcribed. The demographics are as follows (no one was asked 
their age): 
Mayors: 8 males 2 females, total collective period of being an elected official 113 years 
(average 11.3 years), total collective period of acting as Mayor 58 years (average 5.8 
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years), total collective number of CAOs in a working relationship, 36 (average 3.6 
relationships). 
CAOs: eight males, one female, total collective period working in local government 270 
years (average 30 years), total collective years as a CAO 135 years (average 15.0 years), 
total collective Mayoralty relationships 41 (average 4.5 relationships). 
In addition, I have 34 years working in local governments, 25 years as CAO, and have 
worked with 13 mayors.   
Coding. The interviews were coded by the researcher and confirmed by a coding team 
that has experience in grounded theory coding. This team of two independently coded the first 
three to five transcripts, followed by a coding discussion. Then, along with another coder (a 
research consultant), I coded the remaining transcripts independently until the axial coding was 
completed. I then had one other member of the coding team check my assumptions and 
interpretations as the final steps of developing primary dimensions and explanatory matrices.  
Using INVivo software, the interview data was categorized, first under issues, and on 
common themes embedded in the issues, with the underlying social phenomena based on these 
themes and concepts. This is an iterative process referred to as constant comparison (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). I used the interview data in a continuous feedback loop where the data are tested 
using fit and relevance, workability and modifiability as criteria in an attempt to discern themes, 
constructs and theories. After 12 each of mayors and CAOs, the interviews started to mainly 
repeat the same issues and themes, reaching what grounded theorists call saturation.13  
Axial coding, dimensions, and explanatory matrix. As the coding and interviewing 
proceeds, themes in the data emerge through axial coding, which means “coding the dimensions 
                                               
13 For a discussion of the use (and misuse) of the concept of saturation, see Bowen (2008). 
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of a category” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 19). Common experiences, attitudes or expressions were 
placed under a single heading so that ultimately, as more data are accumulated, these themes can 
be placed in a framework of social behavior; in my work, for example, lines of,  “dichotomy 
between policy and administration,” suggesting relationship realities, meanings, or stories when 
speaking about that theory. These frameworks started to codify the relationship among the more 
dominant aspects of the data. The data was then arranged into dimensions for further analysis 
and understanding. Schatzman (1991) suggested, 
Dimensionality thus calls for an inquiry into its parts, attributes, interconnections, 
context, processes, and implications . . . Dimensionality was conceived as a property and 
variety of human thinking that turn language towards interrogative and analytic processes 
in the face of cognitive problems with phenomena, that is, when recognition and recall 
fail to provide situationally sufficient understanding. (p. 310) 
Holloway and Schwartz (2018) explained that the “explanatory matrix [is where the] 
dimensions are organized to explain the relationship and action of context, conditions, social 
processes, and impact” (p. 515). Schatzman (1991) described, 
[the] matrix as providing a structure of terms that totally frame and give direction or 
methodological perspective to analysis, particularly in the context of explanation. . . . one 
needs at least one perspective to select items for the story, create their relative silence, 
and sequence them.  Thus “from” perspective, “in” context, “under” conditions, specified 
actions, “with” consequences, frame the story in terms of the explanatory logic embedded 
in the [matrix]. (p. 308)  
The data was constantly rethought from different perspectives using these tools for 
analysis and as more data from more interviews were completed. 
Theoretical sampling. Often, once the issues, themes, and underlying social phenomena 
have been suggested and, if a subset of the purposeful sample indicates a separate phenomenon is 
worthy of investigating, a second group of invited interviewees called “the theoretical sample” 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 45) are interviewed. However, in my research there was no indication 
of the need for a theoretical sample.  
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Holloway and Schwartz (2018) suggested, “Theoretical sampling is a distinct process in 
GTM [grounded theory method] and promotes rich detailing and saturation of conceptual 
understanding” (p. 518). Charmaz (2006) suggested that theoretical sampling means “the 
researcher seeks people, events, or information to eliminate and define the boundaries and 
relevance of the categories” (p. 189).  In my research interviews issues and new perspectives on 
the dichotomy theory, and other issues reached saturation.  
Memoing. Grounded theory methodology requires the researcher to write memos to 
themselves to capture their thoughts and observations as the interview data are being collected or 
at other times when ideas or prejudices come to mind. This process serves a number of purposes.  
Contemporaneous note-taking is more accurate and helps the mind remember, in that moment, 
something that can be blurred later by the multi-tasking necessary when doing interviews. The 
researcher can be conscious of their privileged interpretation of the interview data and note that 
privilege in the memos. Memoing, which I used sparingly, also allowed me to iterate between the 
memo and original data as a mnemonic to help remember. In this way, I added to the research 
data and was mindful of my privileged perspective resulting from the act of being the researcher 
and my natural positionality. My natural writing style included memoing within the body of the 
dissertation rather than it being separate.  I reread the interviews many times to make sure the 
correct interpretation was captured within the body of the writing.  As an older student, I used 
my memory of the interview data rather than relying on the computer program.  
Building a theory. From the explanatory matrix, the concepts that emerged began the 
foundation for the development of a theory. As Schatzman (1991) explained, “attributes, 
interconnections, contexts, processes, and implications” (p. 309) make up the process of theory 
development. I developed a heuristic of the mayor-CAO relationship model of the social 
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processes that described the interconnectedness, processes, nuances and implications that came 
together in a whole understanding of the mayor-CAO relationship phenomena. 
Visual modelling. I developed a visual heuristic model to help explain the findings. This 
use of a visual aid is very helpful in understanding and portraying complex processes and allows 
another way to present the research data and conclusions. Many of us are visual learners and 
therefore this helped the dissertation to be more accessible. 
Reporting out. I reported out to the participants and colleagues along with other thought 
leaders in the local government arena. I hope to present my research findings to the International 
City Manager’s Association, the Canadian Association of Municipal Administration, the Local 
Government Managers Association of British Columbia and other similar associations. I have 
discovered in this study that such presentations add knowledge about some ways of improving 
the present state of mayor’s and CAO’s relationships. I have presented my research findings to 
small groups of municipal employees and students to aid in confirming the findings or finding 
any gaps in the research. Some minor gaps were suggested, and I closed them with further 
research and included them in the dissertation if applicable.  
Limitations of the Methodology 
There are limitations to this methodology. The data are difficult and time-consuming to 
gather. The data involved perceptions and opinions of the interviewees. Additionally, the test by 
which a researcher believes he or she has obtained all the data available is the limiting concept of 
saturation (Bowen, 2008). A theory or set of constructs emerged and was developed and tested 
against existing data and tested with the next set of interviews in an iterative process until 
saturation was reached and no new concepts or explanations were offered. There are obvious 
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limitations to using saturation to determine whether you have captured all the necessary data to 
develop a theory.  
Also, some interviewees may have misrepresented issues to skew the data to follow a 
certain ideological approach. Or, the interviewees with the most unusual perspectives may be 
reluctant to share their perceptions for a number of reasons. Since the interviewees are             
self-selected14 they may self-select to not be included and therefore the researcher may miss data 
that may be important in making sense of the findings. 
Ethical Considerations 
Interviewing mayors and CAOs has inherent risks. Within the research, possible 
disclosure of feelings and observations may not be well received by the other member of the 
mayor-CAO dyad. This may cause relationship difficulty. Many mayor-CAO relations are 
ongoing and represent the livelihood for the CAO and harmonious relations for the mayor. For 
this reason, I chose not to interview matched pairs of mayors and CAOs. I interviewed a mayor 
or CAO from a particular local government, but not both. As an example of why these matched 
pairs have ethical considerations, a CAO may wish to comment on the benefits of using the 
orthodox dichotomy, whereas the mayor may see that conversation in a negative light and 
perceive such support as restricting the mayor’s ability to satisfy his or her political desires. 
Therefore, I chose to forgo matched pair investigation. 
Chapter III Conclusion 
Having considered other methods of qualitative research investigation such as             
auto-ethnography and case studies, I concluded that grounded theory was best for this research.  
                                               
14 Self-selected means the interviewees will choose to be part of this research, once the researcher 
requests by email interviewees to come forward.  The interviewee criteria will include a number of 
relationships with mayor, if a CAO, and a number of CAOs, if a mayor. The rigor of grounded theory as a 
methodology will minimize the bias inherent in this method and self-selecting interviewees. 
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The method lends itself to the investigation of relationships between mayors and CAOs, 
especially in terms of the breadth of perspective from a number of mayors and CAOs.  Although 
other methods have been used to investigate the structural relationship between these two local 
government actors, little research has investigated the experience of the relationship between 
these two actors, which includes both structural and interpersonal components.   
Grounded theory allowed the gathering of data from the direct sources of local 
government activity. The local government actors interviewed were ones with first-hand 
experiences in their roles as mayors and CAOs therefore are well qualified and shared rich and 
detailed experiences of the operational and interpersonal aspects of this relationship. I believe 
this research is relevant, useful and transferable to other similar circumstances to help improve 
the relationship landscape of mayors and CAOs.  
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Chapter IV: Findings 
All of us have had relationships with others, it is the social nature of our species. These 
relationships are varied and serve different purposes. For example, purposes such as child 
rearing, gathering food, being part of a team etc. all adding to our experience as members of a 
community. Some relationships have clear purposes, expected behaviors and rewards.  
In this research, I have chosen a very complex relationship that has ambiguous outputs, 
many purposes that are subject to personal interpretation, and goals that are holistic and at times 
difficult to understand. Because the Mayor-CAO relationship has been failing regularly with 
substantial human and financial costs to many local government communities (McIntosh, 2009), 
I was particularly interested in those elements that may contribute to a productive and functional 
relationship. This research was designed to uncover aspects of the relationship of a mayor-CAO 
dyad within local governments throughout British Columbia, who encourages a functional 
relationship. The stories of each participant represented many mayor-CAO relationships because 
all participants had numerous relationships with either CAOs (if Mayors) or mayors (if CAOs).  
The 10 mayor’s interviews represented relationships with 36 CAOs and the nine CAOs 
represented 41 mayoralty relationships. I have my own stories from 13 relationships with 
mayors. This chapter analyzes 19 interviews of approximately one hour in duration, divided 
almost equally between mayors and CAOs (10 mayors and 9 CAOs), the coded data have been 
analyzed to understand “What is happening here” (Glaser, 1978, 1998; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).   
 The interviews were randomly selected based on the population criteria (municipalities 
having a population of 5,000 to 100,000). Interviewees were self-selected on a first come first 
interviewed basis. I was careful not to interview all the mayors then all the CAOs, interviewees 
were interviewed based on their random availability, who ended up being interviewed were a 
          
  
71 
few in each category at a time.  This helped me conceptualize the perspectives of the two 
different types of interviewees, mayors or CAOs, because I didn’t jump back and forth as often. 
To better understand the complexity of the mayor-CAO relationship I have deconstructed the 
relationship into its discernible constituent parts by looking at the primary and core dimensions 
of the relationship in accordance with constructivist Grounded Theory Methodology.  
This chapter is organized to present the primary and core dimensions of the grounded 
theory dimensional analysis (Schatzman, 1991). The dimensions represent the social processes 
that the mayors and CAOs perceived as a part of their ongoing relationship with each other.  
These processes are also conceptualized within the context of explanatory matrix and thus the 
context, conditions, processes and impacts or consequences and their particular relationship to 
the social processes is conceptualized. (Bowers & Schatzman, 2009; Kools, McCarthy, Durham, 
& Robrecht 1996; Schatzman, 1991). Context for this research is common for all the explanatory 
matrix’s primary and core dimensions. The reason for this common context is that the mayor-
CAO relationship dyad is bounded by its own context and operates internally to establish its own 
dyadic outputs.  Context is therefore common to all dimensions within the relationship. Excerpts 
from the lived stories of mayors/CAO are used to illustrate the meaning of dimensions and to 
describe the complex and nuanced behavioral patterns that emerge in these relationships. The 
temporality or growth of the relationship is also presented as four stages of the mayor-CAO 
relationship found within the data.  
The Dimensional Analysis 
As Schatzman (1991) stated: 
Dimensionality thus calls for an inquiry into its parts, attributes, interconnections, 
context, processes and implications . . . However, context is not a “wastebasket” category 
or structure for all observation. Rather it is a repository of analytical useful dimensions, 
initially retained as “background” and later selectively assigned as conditions, processes 
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and consequences.  In short, through providing boundaries or parameters, context (along 
with perspective) controls inclusiveness and relevance. Finally, the concept of context is 
further complicated . . .  by its generally having abstract, conceptual and physical 
properties”. (p. 312) 
By using dimensionality within the data I construct the explanatory scenarios 
(Schatzman, 1991) from these dimensions and ultimately find within these many stories the 
complex social phenomenon (Kools et al.,1996) embedded within these dyadic relationships. 
Context encompasses the mayor-CAO relationship and will have a tremendous impact on the 
relationship because the outputs of this specific relationship is representative (in a democratic 
manner –since the mayor is elected) of the context that the relationship is surrounded by. 
Therefore, I begin by presenting the context in which the mayor-CAO relationship is bounded. 
Context: the pool in which all Mayors and CAOs swim. Local governments are where 
mayors and CAOs practice their roles. They are bounded by both a physical location (municipal 
boundary) and a conceptual community (statutory authority) from which both positions operate. 
The dichotomy between the role of policy development (mayor’s role) and the role of 
administration of these policies (CAO’s role) is found repeatedly within the data. To be clear, the 
mayor-CAO dyadic relationship is hierarchal, the CAO reports notionally to the mayor (as the 
council’s representative). The Council is the CAO’s employer of record, however, by practice 
the CAO reports on a day-to-day basis to the mayor. This is the central conversation when 
participants are asked to tell the stories of their relationships with each other. For example, one 
mayor stated:  
 I guess my role, or how I view my role, is if it's political in nature then I want to be 
apprised and updated and things like that. But if it's internal in terms of internal 
workplans or hiring’s and firings or whatever else, the day-to-day operations, that's not 
something I play a role in. Now again, because we have a good relationship, the city 
manager may ask me, hey I'm thinking of doing x, what do you think? But at the end of 
the day that's his decision to make, as long as, again, it's helping council achieve that 
vision. But if it's politically based, you know, it's something where a decision of council 
is required, then yeah, he does a very good job of keeping me updated in terms of hey 
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here's where things are in the process, here's what the outcome is looking like. Just 
wanted to let you know. (participant M3) 15 
Another mayor’s perspective was: 
I think people need to understand in a government organization that there are two parts. 
There is the policy where the elected board or council makes policy. And there is the 
operational side of things. And when you understand governance properly, while there 
may be friction between the two sides, the reality is that the council has that authority to 
either change the policy or find a new CAO. (participant M5) 
Yet another mayor stated: 
It's where very well intended people, and some not so well intended, who may have 
strong business backgrounds or strong personalities, see that things may not be operating 
in a manner that maybe appear to be the most efficient. So want to get involved and want 
to get in and want to fix it and don't understand the difference of the role of being in 
governance versus management or operational. (participant M1) 
The conversation that takes place between mayors and CAOs regularly involves who 
is in control of the municipal corporations. The mayor’s perspective obviously leans towards the 
political interests of the community, where the CAO’s will lean towards administrative 
efficiency and a lack of political interference in the operations of municipal services to minimize 
political corruption.  The mayor-CAO dyad manages the resolution of these issues of control and 
what control means. 
The world outside local governments, where the rules for mayor-CAO dyads and many 
resources are controlled, is important to the mayor-CAO dyad. The dyad will spend many hours 
managing these outside forces. The elected council, the group that the mayor and CAO answer 
to, is also an important parameter to understand. For example, from the data, in regard to 
influence for Council: “In our legislative structure, our only boss is council and council is the 
only determinant of the public interest. I don’t believe that for a minute. But that’s what the 
legislation says” (participant C1). 
                                               
15 Mayors are signified by participant M1 to M10; CAOs are signified by C1 to C10 
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The global world of democracies, nation states, and other civic governments can also cast a 
distinct influence on the context and culture of local governments. A CAO recounted this 
situation to exemplify global influence: 
It’s funny I saw, the guy who is the Chief of Staff for Trump right now, I saw the 
interview with him, Marine Four Star General and he’s saying they were pushing him at 
his congressional reviews about people before him. Well he comes from a different 
culture where he says you know I trust the people that were there before me as marine 
officers would do the right thing. I don’t know their context, I don’t know their 
information, I have a presumption that they did their best with what they were faced with. 
(participant C1) 
Numerous comments within the data suggest that many mayors confuse leadership with 
the process of governance. The lack of leadership in championing the public interest and 
capitulating to populism is also understood as a broader contextual issue. Statements by two 
CAOs illustrate this.  
And the Mayor does have a . . . I mean in British Columbia legislation the Mayor can 
have a very powerful and a very influential position but it’s not by virtue of their position 
as Mayor as much as it’s by virtue of their leadership capabilities and what they do as 
Mayor. The title alone has virtually no power. (participant C1) 
[the Mayor] was an ardent populist, so it was really hard to pick out what her actual 
principles were, because they seemed to be whatever somebody needed that day. Umm, 
so I just started the relationship by trying to build trust, and she very quickly caught on 
that in many ways—the only way she was going to get anything done was through me, 
because the rest of the council trusted me. (participant C3) 
The context within all dimensions are the same. Interviews focused on the relationships 
between the mayors and CAOs and, therefore, the context presented here did not come up during 
the interviews. However, assumed issues about “who does what and how” did come up 
repeatedly, usually through the discussion of the policy and administration’s dichotomy—or who 
is in control. 
 
 
          
  
75 
Primary Dimensions 
The primary dimensions identified in the study are negotiating, strategizing, boundary 
setting, power sharing and harmonizing. The core dimension is shapeshifting. I will first present 
the five primary dimensions and their supporting data, and finish with discussing the core 
dimension and its supporting data.   
I identified five primary dimensions from the data. These concepts represent the issues 
that embody the actions within the mayor-CAO dyad that help me understand what is going on 
within the relationship. Primary dimensions of: negotiating, strategizing, boundary setting, power 
sharing and harmonizing are all used on the day-to-day basis within the mayor-CAO dyad.  
Explanatory matrices frame the structure of the dimensions. Primary dimensions are 
presented within explanatory matrices that show the dimensional data within tables outlining the 
context in which these activities take place; the conditions under which the activity takes place; 
the processes under which they take place and finally the impacts and consequences resulting 
from these activities. 
Primary dimension: Negotiating. The primary dimension (negotiating) is presented in 
Table 4.1. Note that the context is an overarching situational setting and is the same for the all of 
the primary and core dimensions. 
Table 4.1  
Explanatory Matrix for the Primary Dimension: Negotiating 
Context Conditions Processes Impacts & 
Consequences 
Statutory rules Personalities Open dialogue Collective outcome 
Traditional dichotomy      Common beliefs Trade-offs Trust 
Changing perspectives      Compromising Compromising Respect 
Understanding roles Self-awareness Respect Different roles 
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Conditions. For the dyad to negotiate (in its broadest meaning), the members must 
recognize the personalities each dyad member possesses. This makes up one of the conditions 
the dyad must operate within. One CAO described personality in this way: 
They [the Mayor] have a personality type to want to have control. . . . I tried different 
techniques, demonstrating you have a job that you want to get done, I’ll get it done. And 
so let me earn the license to do my job and your trust and respect that I will get it done 
without you going behind my back, blindsiding me, spying on me, micro auditing. 
(participant C2) 
 I think that personality exists on a continuum. So I don’t mean that one is either this type 
or that type I think there’s degrees. So it’s situational. How open is this person going to 
be or how fixed are they in their ways? Are they trainable? Can you affect the behaviour 
through discussion and through gaining trust? And if they’re not then you’re kind of 
SOL. In my opinion it’s best to go on somewhere else and let somebody else deal with it 
and over time things will either sort out or they won’t. But you don’t have to deal with 
that. You can look after your own mental health, and physical health. (participant C2) 
Some negotiations were difficult with the dyad member’s negotiating style being quite 
binary. One mayor presented the matter of their personality this way: 
And I feel, you know, a bit betrayed or burned because here I have opened myself up or 
shared things about me when maybe I, looking back now, shouldn't have. But that's just 
my nature. I go into a relationship fully trusting somebody because I believe in the good 
in people and I'm not going to let one or two bad experiences change how I interact with 
people generally. (participant M3) 
This mayor suggested the ability to negotiate came from their common beliefs: 
I think part of it has to do with the fact that we maybe are aligned in terms of how we see 
the world I guess, I mean not perfectly of course but we share a lot of the same values, 
same ideals, same goals for our community. So, I think that automatically puts you in a 
good position when you are working alongside someone who wants the same things that 
you do. (participant, M3) 
This mayor believed insubordination was the way of negotiating: 
 You would have staff preparing reports that were not consistent with the direction that 
council is given and kept going down the path that they wanted to go down versus the 
path that had been determined by motion and adoption of council. (participant M5) 
Still, another mayor discussed negotiating in this way: 
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And if there is differences of opinion as to what that is or how you want to get there then 
you need to sit down and understand each other's perspective and rationale and at times 
you give in at times you compromise and other times your perspective prevails. 
(participant M1) 
That last quote from participant M1 also presents other conditions for understanding the 
other CAO dyad member’s; self-awareness, ability to compromise, and open dialogue. It also 
acknowledges the required need for a collective outcome resulting from the dyad. 
Processes. The processes taking place within the mayor-CAO dyad will support the 
dimension of negotiating. Using the same M1 example:  
And if there are differences of opinion as to what that is or how you want to get there 
then you need to sit down and understand each other's perspective and rationale and at 
times you give in at times you compromise. (participant M1) 
This quote presents the process of having an open dialogue, compromising, trading off or 
“giving in” obviously within the objective of finding alternatives that are acceptable to both 
parties—this is presented within the broader concept of managing conflict as a true negotiation 
between respected dyad members. 
Impacts and consequences. The forgoing quotes are about the need for trust and respect 
within the dyad. See participant C2 first quote in this section where they suggest a need for such 
attributes to have a workable relationship. Acknowledgement of the need for successful 
collective outcomes and the recognition by participants M3 and M1 of the different roles each 
member of the dyad plays in delivering these outcomes. 
Primary Dimension: Strategizing. The primary dimension of (strategizing) is presented 
within the explanatory matrix in Table 4.2 
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Table 4.2  
Explanatory Matrix for the Primary Dimension: Strategizing 
Context Conditions Processes Impacts & 
Consequences 
Statutory rules  Long & medium 
challenges 
Open dialogue Building respect 
Traditional dichotomy  Changing 
environment 
Balanced 
perspective 
Trust 
Changing perspectives  Roles debate Alignment with 
vision 
Being valued 
Understanding roles  Option discussions Bending rules Moving forward 
Throughout the day-to-day operations of a municipality many issues and outcomes must 
be thought about at the strategic level. Like many dimensions within the Mayor-CAO 
relationship the act of strategizing is not referred to in that manner and must be implied from the 
data. An example is seen in setting up the budget in such a way that they had a significant rainy 
day fund. 
And if the department heads wanted access to it, well, first of all the department heads 
didn't even know what their budgets were until it was presented to council and then if 
they needed any more money for any of the projects, they had to go to him. So another 
control aspect. (participant M5) 
This excerpt explains how a CAO was being strategic without the mayor’s involvement. 
This one-sided strategic act didn’t go well for the CAO but it does point out the desire on the part 
of the other (mayor) dyad member’s interest in the strategic realm of the mayor-CAO dyad. 
One way or the other we have to move forward and we can either have six meetings to 
move forward on one. Like, how am I going to know that I trust you? I think over the 
years the city manager and I have done, and we know each other well enough that we can 
put something in front of the other person that it's not going to be taken personally. And 
we can share our thoughts and feelings and it's like I said it's not take it personally. We 
see it from a professional perspective. If we disagree with the person, you know what, 
you disagree. And it's OK. It's a healthy relationship. (participant M5). 
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In this excerpt, the mayor-CAO relationship itself is being spoken about in a strategic 
manner. 
Conditions. The conditions that encourage strategizing are those that speak to long and 
medium challenges for the municipality and the dyad. Again, the condition from the quote above 
“One way or another we have to move forward” acknowledges that municipality must move and 
change and that that condition must be satisfied by the mayor-CAO dyad. The dyad has an 
ongoing conversation about the roles each member plays within collective outcomes. For 
example: 
[There are] times where the mayor has to back down, and there are times where the CAO 
will accommodate, and recognize that for what it is and that sometimes you got to maybe 
back off on some things because the CAO has done the same some other times and 
there's a balance. (participant M1) 
Processes. The process of this dimension will also include strategic discussions regarding 
how outcomes balance perspectives, roles discussion, and bending the dichotomies rules.  
Impacts and Consequences. The consequence of this strategic dimension involves the 
building of respect, trust, open communications, the increased feeling of being valued and 
moving the collective forward. 
These attributes are illustrated in these quotes: 
I think it's incredibly important [Mayor-CAO relationship] because again it goes back to 
other things we've spoken about in terms of values and ideals and vision and the more 
you get to know somebody the more you understand perhaps why they make the 
decisions they do. You know, their background, you know, all of those things so I think it 
is an important part of the dynamic in understanding. By getting to know me, he [CAO] 
understands why I make the decisions I do and vice versa, I understand. You know. 
Yeah. I just think it's beneficial. (participant M3)  
Interviewer: I'm hearing in here is that it's a fairly wide-open field for creativity for both 
of you in kind of choosing your own path and being able, as long as the test is that you're 
moving the collective forward, is that fair? 
Correct, absolutely. Yes. And being mindful that yes, at the end of the day, while this is 
all well and good, the organization comes first. (participant M3) 
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Everybody's different but you've got to find a way to communicate in an effective 
manner. And that's what builds a trust for the CAO to come in here and feel like, I got 
his, I'm going to support him at Council, on the street in our community, because I want, 
our best day is when he's successful because that means our community is going to be 
successful. (participant M4) 
The strategic dimension inter-weaves within the mayor-CAO relationship with regularity 
as the relationship sets agendas, strategies and accomplishes outcomes. This dimension helps 
give meaning and direction to the complex problems the dyad sets out to accomplish. 
Primary dimension: Boundary setting. The primary dimension of (boundary setting) is 
presented within the explanatory matrix in the Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3  
Explanatory Matrix for the Primary Dimension: Boundary Setting  
Context Conditions Processes Impacts & 
Consequences 
Statutory rules  Personalities Preferred behavior Building respect 
Traditional 
dichotomy 
 Ambiguous roles Dichotomy’s debate          Building trust 
Changing 
perspectives 
 Roles debate Boundary exchanges Member capacity 
Understanding roles Complex outcomes  Focus on certain role 
 
Relationships have boundaries. For example, try and give your dog new dog food without 
first starving them. Now you know what boundary setting is. The establishment of a pattern of 
behavior that represents the area in which there is meaningful engagement and an area where 
there is not.  In this context, the data shows the boundary of a “personal” and “professional” 
relationship within the Mayor-CAO relationship. For example: 
You know, I'm taking my mayor to [a football game] in December. He's never been. So 
I'm taking him. He deserves to go. And yes, I've been over to his [house] for dinner.            
. . . but when you have a good mayor, relish it and it's a small town. In small towns, it’s 
impossible not to be involved. It's impossible. (participant C7) 
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Conditions. Conditions involve personalities, ambiguous roles, political culture, complex 
outcomes and traditional rules-based roles. Statements from two CAOs and a mayor illustrate 
this.  
When there's a time when there's a major change over in senior staff [political culture], a 
lot of people leave because it's, it's uncertain and it's toxic, and it's unsettling and so 
people leave. (participant C7) 
I probably was thrust (at that time) into a situation that a city manager really doesn’t want 
to y’know [ambiguous roles]. Moving far into the political realm, to be the deal maker, to 
be the let’s get—y’know—let’s keep council working, right. (participant C3) 
I go into a relationship fully trusting somebody because I believe in the good in people 
and I'm not going to let one or two bad experiences change how I interact with people 
generally. (participant M3) 
Processes. Boundary setting processes involve the dyad member’s conversations about 
behaviors they prefer and don’t prefer. Most of these conversations involve the dichotomy’s 
division of labor. For example, 
I guess my role, or how I view my role, is if it's political in nature then I want to be 
apprised and updated and things like that. But if it's internal in terms of internal work 
plans or hiring’s and firings or whatever else, the day-to-day operations, that's not 
something I play a role in. Now again, because we have a good relationship, the city 
manager may ask me, “hey I'm thinking of doing x, what do you think?” But at the end of 
the day that's his decision to make, as long as, again, it's helping council achieve that 
vision. But if it's politically based, you know, it's something where a decision of council 
is required, then yeah, he does a very good job of keeping me updated in terms of hey 
here's where things are in the process, here's what the outcome is looking like. Just 
wanted to let you know. (participant M3) 
Here, the mayor (M3) suggested that the CAO would ask the question that illustrates the 
process of boundary setting, as the CAO sets a boundary saying, “I am thinking of doing x; what 
do you think?” 
Impacts and consequences. The impacts and consequences of boundary setting involve a 
better understanding of dyad member’s capacities, focusing on certain roles, and building trust 
within the dyad. For example, 
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We seldom have to touch base anymore [with the CAO] but it's really just, this is what 
we're doing, do you think that fits, is that what council's intentions were and I say yes that 
was or no, I don't think so, we should bring that back. (participant M5) 
No council members don’t hire their daughter and send them off to North Korea. Those 
kinds of issues where you need to be really firm because council members come from a 
business environment, they come from different cultures, they don’t necessarily fully 
understand public sector values. So one of our jobs is to keep them out of trouble. 
(participant C1) 
On the relationship, one of the Mayors who I had a long term relationship with, did tell 
me in some candour that he was kind of embarrassed about how he had started [as 
Mayor] and learned lots of things. (participant C1) 
When I say “trust” it could be I trust that when you say you’re going to do something 
you’re going to do it. That when we have made a commitment to the public we are going 
to follow through on that, that you’ve made a commitment to other council members to 
communicate with them. Those are all kind of relationship issues but there’s a negative 
side to trust too. Negative in the, I expect them to understand that if they are going to do 
something that might be unethical or improper or illegal, they can trust me to be 
absolutely like no. And vice versa. (participant C1)  
Primary Dimension: Power Sharing. The primary dimension of (power sharing) is 
presented in this explanatory matrix in Table 4.4 
Table 4.4  
Explanatory Matrix for the Primary Dimension: Power Sharing 
Context Conditions Processes Impacts & 
Consequences 
Statutory rules Personalities         Appropriate roles Respect 
Traditional 
dichotomy      
Respectful 
relationship 
Regular 
communication    
Trust 
 
Changing 
perspectives      
Need for effective Maintaining respect Team feeling   
Understanding roles Collective outcomes  Less rules/role  
Conditions. Conditions include collective outcomes, personalities of dyad members, need 
for effective seamless outcomes, respectful relationship. The following quote speaks to what 
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happens if the collective outcomes are not a condition and the personality of the mayor does not 
allow the honest exchange of role responsibilities such that the outcomes are seamless. 
(The) Mayor would have hands in all of those [department head matters] operations and 
not infrequently without telling the CAO and in some cases with the CAO not ever 
finding out or even being purposely left out of the discussion. (participant C2) 
The quote explains what takes place when power is not shared. This suggests conflict as 
the outcome of the working relationship with this mayor. Yet the same CAO also stated:  
There’s also respect for the person as a person, as a professional, treating people 
respectfully and competence in human beings is also important. It comes down to a good 
respectful relationship to the person as well as to the roles. (participant C2) 
  Processes. Processes include regular communications, maintaining a respectful 
relationship and a clear confirmation of the appropriate roles of each dyad member. Several 
comments illustrate aspects of the processes for both mayor and CAO.  
And it really comes down to one thing that our current mantra is no surprises. And no 
surprises is no surprises from staff to council and no surprises from council to staff. 
(participant M1) 
There’s also respect for the person as a person, as a professional, treating people 
respectfully and competence in human beings is also important. It comes down to a good 
respectful relationship to the person as well as to the roles. (participant C2) 
I have certain duties as the CAO, the Mayor has certain duties and roles and functions as 
a governor as a chair person. And our legislation is a little bit messed up, it’s a lot messed 
up, it’s not very clear and it can allow for misunderstandings in terms of what the roles 
are in terms of duties, authorities. (participant C2)  
What I found made the relationships work in both instances is complete open line of 
communication. Our offices are side by side, so we just have easy and regular access to 
each other. (participant M2) 
Impacts and consequence. Impacts and consequences include respect for each other 
within the dyad, team feeling within the dyad, and less rule-/roles-based outcomes. Several 
comments made in interviews pertinent to impacts and consequences include:  
I thought that I could gain trust and license to be the CAO in the role by getting the job 
done. And for a couple years it was very successful. (participant C2) 
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There’s also respect for the person as a person, as a professional, treating people 
respectfully and competence in human beings is also important. It comes down to a good 
respectful relationship to the person as well as to the roles. (participant C2) 
  It’s on how to be the best professional you can be like that's in the work context but in 
another way it's how to be a better human. Because I mean this stuff [executive coaching] 
doesn't only affect you and work. It also affects you and your other relationships. 
(participant C5) 
Primary dimension: Harmonizing. The primary dimension of harmonizing is presented 
within the explanatory matrix in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5  
Explanatory Matrix for the Primary Dimension: Harmonizing 
Context Conditions Processes Impacts & 
Consequences 
Statutory rules  Not all top priorities        Human 
understanding     
Relational knowledge 
Traditional 
dichotomy      
Day-to-day decisions       Collective outputs             Increasing trust 
 
Changing 
perspectives      
Common beliefs              Informal 
opportunities 
Working together   
Understanding roles   Successful outcomes 
Conditions. The conditions for harmonizing include the following: recognizing not all 
issues are top priority, that day-to-day decisions must be made, and that outcomes can come 
from within common beliefs. Several of the comments in interviews were illustrative of issues 
about conditions.  
The Mayor-CAO relationship is] very strong, and I think part of it has to do with the fact 
that we maybe are aligned in terms of how we see the world I guess, I mean not perfectly 
of course but we share a lot of the same values, same ideals, same goals for our 
community. So, I think that automatically puts you in a good position when you are 
working alongside someone who wants the same things that you do. (participant C2) 
The day-to-day operations, that's not something I play a role in. Now again, because we 
have a good relationship, the city manager may ask me, hey I'm thinking of doing x, what 
do you think? But at the end of the day that's his decision to make, as long as, again, it's 
helping council achieve that vision. (participant C2) 
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Processes. The processes include conversations regarding human understanding within 
the dyad, acknowledgement of the collective outcomes from the dyad, looking for opportunities 
for informal interpersonal interaction. 
There’s also respect [within the dyad] for the person as a person, as a professional, 
treating people respectfully and competence in human beings is also important. It comes 
down to a good respectful relationship to the person as well as to the roles. (participant 
C2) 
You know, I'm taking my mayor to [to a football game] in December. He's never been. 
So, I'm taking him. He deserves to go. And yes, I've been over to his [house] for dinner. 
(participant C7) 
So let's [Mayor and CAO] find a way to maneuver so that you get what you want I'm able 
to get what I want and together we're able to achieve the objectives of the organization. 
(participant M1) 
Yeah maybe a couple of instances where we're just like Oh my God this day is crazy 
where we're just kind of relating as two humans. (participant M2)  
Impacts and consequences. Impacts and consequences include increased non-work 
interpersonal knowledge, a feeling of working together, increased trust, acknowledging 
successful outcomes. Relevant comments from the interviews include:  
There can be some flexibility over roles that there is a commensurate amount or 
increasing respect. It’s a two-way thing, it’s a relationship. (participant C2) 
So, in the central leadership Mayor relationship with myself, I might provide them 
information or they might provide me information and we would have a good working 
relationship in terms of a correct understanding of roles and responsibilities. (participant 
C1) 
Yeah, I think mutually supportive is a key part of the relationship. (participant M2) 
Core Dimension: Shapeshifting. The final core dimension is shapeshifting and is 
presented in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6  
Explanatory Matrix for the Core Dimension: Shapeshifting 
Context Conditions Processes Impacts & 
Consequences 
Statutory rules                  Self-awareness                Regular contact      Relational 
Traditional 
dichotomy      
Ability to see larger 
perspectives         
Understanding 
conflict 
 
Changing 
perspectives       
Common beliefs              Seeing flexibility as 
positive 
Working together   
Understanding roles   Successful outcomes 
 This core dimension is the one most commonly recognized in the interviews whereby the 
mayor-CAO relationship can best be understood. I borrow a word from the metaphysical 
realm—shapeshifting. It describes a social process and ability to adapt to a new context, attitudes 
or perspectives. Shapeshifting suggests the capacity to change or modify one’s attitude, 
perception, or point of view to better align with another person’s. This term has been used by 
McIntosh (2009) to describe a reordering of structural realities, for example as after the election 
of a new mayor requiring a change in the CAO‘s behavior to adapt to the new reality. My use of 
the term, shapeshifting, is somewhat different. I use it to describe, how members of a dyad adapt 
and change to maintain relationship functionality.  
In this usage, the mayor-CAO dyads’ attitude, perspective, or point of view is changed or 
modified without holding any residual affective resistance to an earlier perspective. Another way 
of explaining shapeshifting is to recognize a lack of emotional festering as a result of changing 
one’s perspective. For example, a CAO described shapeshifts without an affective residual: 
Now she was the mayor, and she was the mayor with the minority, it was really just her, 
and so it was an interesting. So I approached her and said—‘cause I knew I needed to 
build trust with the mayor and that that was really important—‘Here I’ll rip it up [his 
CAO contract] If I can’t be the city manager with confidence, I can’t do the job.’ 
(participant C3) 
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One of the common social processes that is used within this hierarchical relationship data 
are shapeshifting. The data shows numerous circumstances that requires such a capacity.     
Primary relationship dimensions such as strategizing, or boundary setting can be the prelude to 
shapeshifting or shapeshifting may require the primary dimension of harmonizing before the 
shapeshifting capacity is engaged. A highly flexible process, shapeshifting, is used to allow what 
neuroscientists refer to as homeostatic state of emotional wellbeing (Cozolino, 2014). Mezirow’s 
(1997) work on transformative learning and disorienting dilemmas, where adults learn by 
changing their perspective resulting from a disorienting dilemma, is another way of 
understanding shapeshifting.    
Either member of the mayor-CAO dyad can use this core dimension to change the 
dialogue, collective outcome or collective point of view of the dyad. For example, within the 
interviews the word “shapeshifting” was not used; but the actual social process of shapeshifting 
is familiar and used, though not by that name, by both CAOs and mayors. For example, the 
shapeshifting as I use the term here is just about changing attitude within new relationships to 
deal a changed future, such as after an election (a common moment for CAOs to shapeshift 
within their new relationships). One CAO stated:  
But the Mayor was an ardent populist, so it was really hard to pick out what her actual 
principles were, because they seemed to be whatever somebody needed that day. So I just 
started the relationship by trying to build trust, and she very quickly caught on that in 
many ways –the only way she was going to get anything done was through me, because 
the rest of the council trusted me, so the Mayor was kind of . . . the Mayor needed me in 
some sense. And I was always fair with her, always extremely respectful. And every day, 
just trying to build that trust. It was very difficult, I probably was thrust (at that time) into 
a situation that a city manager really doesn’t want to be in, you know. Moving far into 
the political realm, to be the deal maker, to be the let’s keep council working, right. If it 
breaks down into petty fights, we’re not going to get anything done. (participant C3) 
There is a substantial amount of information in this statement. The CAO is attempting to 
build trust with their new mayor. The CAO is also changing their perspective on the Mayor as a 
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populist given that the new mayor will be there for at least four years. The CAO shapeshifts 
towards finding a way of seeing the new mayor as worthy of respect.  
In this narrative, the CAO is moving into uncharted territory and acknowledges that he is 
crossing the line into the policy realm with some trepidation. He has shapeshifted towards being 
more politically active. He does acknowledge, however, that it is for the greater good of the 
corporation and ultimately in the best interest of the new mayor. In this way, he is rationalizing 
his earlier perspective of not being involved in active politics and thereby reducing the angst of 
his earlier perspective. A clear example of shapeshifting.  Another is seen in this comment by a 
CAO.  
I found it [the relationship with the Mayor] incredibly frustrating, but persevered, 
persevered, I just found ways to make it work, and worked really hard to shield that 
council from staff, I mean I was ruthless about them not talking to my staff because often 
I needed the time to go back, with my favorite line was “That’s a really interesting idea 
your worship but maybe you could help me by trying to explain the problem you’re 
trying to solve; that [the mayor’s idea] may be the solution, but there might be other ones 
as well”—and that would buy me some time to try to figure out why I can’t do that, like 
we can’t do that.  So anyways, tough relationship, but still good friends—not friends but 
she respected me, and I think we had shared a lot of laughs. I would say I tried very hard 
never to say no and be a bureaucrat, I always tried to find ways so that she saw things 
were moving or didn’t move but sort of understands. I did a lot of work explaining and 
taking a step back and trying to buy some time and that kind of thing. (participant C2) 
Shapeshifting is not a binary process as can be seen above, but a process of changing our 
attitudes, perspectives and points of view in a way that lets go of our earlier perceptions and 
opens our worlds to other ways of seeing the same circumstances.  
There are issues that do not require shapeshifting because they are not important enough 
to generate an affective concern with the other member of the dyad. For example, which hotel 
the mayor and CAO would be staying in when travelling for business is not likely important 
enough to require shapeshifting.  
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Other issues that speak to the manner in which a person defines themselves would not 
likely be available for shapeshifting. For example, someone’s ethics or values would not likely 
be open to shapeshifting. Shapeshifting ability, notwithstanding the personal levels of               
self-awareness, may be easier the more the individual goes through life’s experiences or 
accumulates disorienting dilemmas. For example, a CAO draws the line in this circumstance: 
We [mayor and CAO] couldn’t agree on [inaudible] actually a discussion but we quickly 
agreed to disagree, and I went on [resigned the CAO position] to other positions. I had a 
strong sense that that was going to happen when I had the discussion, but it wasn’t viable 
to me. (participant C1) 
The hierarchy of the dyad’s relationship may also influence either party’s ability to 
shapeshift. The data suggests that CAOs, as subordinates to the mayor, may be required or 
choose to shapeshift more often than mayors. However, there are clear examples of mayors 
shapeshifting within their dyads. The interviews showed shapeshifting as taking place to 
maintain functionality within the dyad relationship in both directions. The data points to this core 
dimension as somewhat necessary for functionality within the mayor-CAO dyad. As one mayor 
said, “[A successful Mayor-CAO relationship] depends on the personality of the person [CAO], 
and I think that's one of the biggest challenges for CAOs around the province is adjusting their 
styles to accommodate to the [mayors’] personalities and agendas” (participant M1). 
 Adjustment and accommodation are the hierarchical perceptions of shapeshifting. If a 
CAO is required to shapeshift as a result of a democratic election, can they do it without some 
residual emotional response? Or do they choose to shapeshift within the new dyad and build the 
functional relationship between mayor and CAO?    
In this case we see personalities as a condition of shapeshifting. This mayor implies that 
the CAOs must shapeshift to adapt to the new mayor, however, for these dyads to become fully 
functional there is a reciprocal need for the mayors to also shapeshift. I describe the ability to 
          
  
90 
shapeshift as a capacity. A capacity is like a container or bowl that allows the individual to 
choose any number of skills and abilities they hold within the bowl. 
Choosing the correct approach to a given circumstance or information is what the 
capacity of shapeshifting allows. Given the variability of context, the possibility of different 
dimensions of the relationship being engaged at the same time using shapeshifting as a capacity 
is as strategically important as the act itself. For example, the CAO, quoted below, is presented 
with a circumstance where they have been surprised with a newly elected mayor because the last 
Council had just appointed the speaker as the city manager prior to the election. The CAO must 
reach into their capacities and shapeshift to keep the position. 
So I approached [the newly elected mayor] and said—cause I knew I needed to build 
trust with the mayor and that that was really important and I knew in the back of the 
[mayor’s] mind (at least) [they] saw me as [the last mayor’s] guy, right. So it was a very 
dangerous situation to be in as a city manager, not one where I wanted to start. So I 
actually went back to the [new mayor] and handed –in November, cause I wasn’t really 
going to be appointed till June –I handed her my letter of offer and I said “Here, I’ll rip it 
up. If I can’t be the city manager with confidence, I can’t do the job” (participant C3) 
Self-awareness, both internal (how you see yourself) and external (how others see you) 
can be important in exercising the capacity of shapeshifting. Eurich (2017) suggested that society 
operates on a substantial deficit in self-awareness. Recognizing why the mayor-CAO dyad 
demonstrates high levels of self-awareness and the capacity for shapeshifting may be an 
interesting research objective for further studies.  
These primary and core dimensions in addition to the creation of the explanatory 
matrices, helped me understand the mayor-CAO dyad. Dimensions and matrices allow some 
explanation of the reasons functionality within the dyad is so important. The structural aspects of 
the mayor-CAO relationship require some process to solve or manage the structural conflict 
embedded within the mayor-CAO dyad. The data suggests the roles of mayors and CAOs and 
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how they are performed, are an important part of this puzzle. Temporality is also a variable 
within the relationship that is seen as an important aspect of functionality 
Stages of Temporal Relationship Development 
Over time, most relationships change. Within the local government context, the          
mayor-CAO relationship will also change. These changes are not directly lineal but there is a 
trend for the relationship to grow in stages. These stages were discovered in the narrative data 
here, from the CAOs and the mayors I interviewed. These interviewees tended to recount the 
experiences from the beginning of their careers to the present.  
Within the data, some dimensions were not as actively used in some of the mayor-CAO 
stories and this caused me to become curious as to why. Although this aspect of temporality is 
not used in the standard grounded theory methodology, I felt temporal explanation revealed more 
of the actual dynamic in the stories presented by the interviewees. After carefully reading the 
transcripts it was apparent that some behaviors were not evident in certain stages of the 
relationship. Since all mayors and CAOs had multiple relationships with their counterparts, this 
“staging” was subtlety presented. For example, when a new mayor was elected the dialogue 
would not reflect the more complex relationship dimensions, such as power sharing or 
shapeshifting, but would include negotiating. Within the data, I could follow the progression of 
each relationship as the data focused on different dimensions. For example:  
So I just started the relationship [with the newly elected mayor] by trying to build trust, 
and she very quickly caught on that in many ways—the only way she was going to get 
anything done was through me, because the rest of the council trusted me, so the Mayor 
was kind of . . . the Mayor needed me in some sense. (participant C3) 
This process of growth and change or staging was also experienced with CAOs when 
they were first hired into the position. This is important understanding of the relationship 
because from a practical perspective it will be good to understand how a relationship grows and 
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changes for both mayors and CAOs. In this way CAOs who had reached a relational growth 
stage in the relationship with a mayor in their last position, would recognize that the new 
relationship would need time and understanding before it could may reach such a stage again. 
Four stages of temporal relationship development were uncovered in the data: The 
Orientating-Learning stage; the Test Driving stage: the Task Performing stage; and the 
Interpersonal Growth stage. These stages each bring out different dimensions of the relationship 
although each stage will show some degree of all the dimensions. For example, the 
Orientation/Learning stage will reflect the newness of either the mayor or CAO. The mayor may 
be newly elected, or the CAO newly hired to the position. These new actors will also have to 
understand their respective roles, the culture of their organization, the culture of the community, 
and many other pieces of information embodied within the relationship. Within each dyad the 
progression of the temporal stages of development may be rapid or slow. The following 
discussion looks at each stage in this developing dyad.  
Orientating-Learning stage. Within these developmental stages the context of the 
situation will focus the dimensions of the relationship on some aspect or another. For example, 
orientation/learning stage may require the establishment of interpersonal boundaries. In one 
interview, a CAO questioned: should a newly hired CAO attend the mayor’s annual barbeque at 
his house? During this stage of the relationship both parties will establish interpersonal 
boundaries within the relationship to sort out what they believe is personal or professional. 
However, even in the later interpersonal growth stage the mayor or CAO may request a personal 
favor that tests the boundaries of the relationship. Interestingly, a number of mayors and CAOs 
believed that their interpersonal relationship boundaries did not include what they characterized 
as a personal friendship.  
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For example, both mayors and CAOs stated that having drinks at a municipal convention 
was within their professional relationship boundaries but having dinners including the spouses of 
both in a social setting, was out of bounds. A smaller number of those interviewed believed the 
personal relationship was part of the mayor-CAO dyad and that a “friendship” was necessary to 
allow higher levels of intimacy within the relationship. This may correspond with later stages of 
the relationship or reflect the lack of anonymity afforded either position in smaller communities.  
One CAO said, 
You know, I'm taking my mayor to {name of other larger community] in December. He's 
never been. So I'm taking him. He deserves to go. And yes, I've been over to his [home] 
for dinner . . .  but when you have a good mayor, relish it and it's a small town. In small 
towns, it’s impossible not to be involved. It's impossible. (participant C7) 
The data on the orienting-learning stage was minimal because most interviewees focused 
on the stages of the relationship that they felt was the most relevant to them. Given that all 
interviewees had been through this early stage a number of times it was not the focus of the 
interviews. 
Test Driving stage. The test driving developmental stage will be engaged for a period 
when the dyad is discovering how collective dyad outputs are more effective than acting within 
the individual structural roles of either the mayor or CAO. For example, one CAO stated: “So I’d 
say by this time [the mayor] now fully trusted me and realized that she needed a good city 
manager who could make things happen” (participant C3). This period of test driving would also 
be a period where the two individuals within the mayor and CAO roles would work together on 
joint outcomes. There are times when the mayor will focus on political matters and not see the 
dyad as a constant operational necessity.  
This period of vigilance and cognitive trust building will culminate in reaching the task 
performing stage. This stage will also reflect on functionality as trust is being built. 
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Task Performing stage. As the dyad develops, different dimensions of the relationship 
come into focus, based on the context at that time. For example, during the task performing 
stage, success from collective dyad functionality establishes a feedback loop of positivity thus 
reinforcing the dyads behavior. In the data, a mayor commented:  
I recognize that there are times where the mayor has to back down, and there are times 
where the CAO will accommodate, and recognize that for what it is and that sometimes 
you got to maybe back off on some things because the CAO has done the same thing 
other times and there's a balance. And that's just respecting the individual's position and 
not sort of challenging or putting them in a corner saying well you did it last time so now 
you've got to do it again and then you've completely undermined the CAOs authority. 
(participant M1) 
These stages may also reflect non functionality in the relationship or a resistance to 
moving forward after the Orientating-Learning or the Test Driving stage. This was reflected in 
one data set where the mayor and CAO did not speak to each other and functioned structurally 
through the Council thereby effectively suspending the mayor-CAO’s relationship. As the CAO 
said, at the end of these two years of conflict,  
[I had] come to the end of my rope, you know, and that was basically, I don't want to do 
this for another two years. This isn't fun for me; it can't possibly be fun for her [the 
Mayor]. And sooner or later she's got to discover that she's wrong. But I stopped at 
saying that I'm right. (participant C5) 
All temporal stages were somewhat fluid; for example, circumstances may cause the 
relationship to move back to the Test Driving stage after a particularly conflictual issue between 
the dyad members. The data describes a circumstance where a particularly positive interaction 
within the dyad allowed the relationship to move rapidly to the Task Performing stage and 
subsequently to the interpersonal growth stage.  
Interpersonal Growth stage. The Interpersonal Growth stage is a time when the dyad 
has operated collectively and successfully and found the functionality embedded within the dyad.  
The relationship grows in intimacy and reciprocation in all aspects of the dyad functions. As the 
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dyad produces better outcomes with less emotional energy both parties are capable of working 
through conflict within the dyad and outside the dyad. One mayor described it this way: 
I think over the years the city manager and I have done, and we know each other well 
enough that we can put something in front of the other person that it's not going to be 
taken personally. And we can share our thoughts and feelings and it's like I said let's not 
take it personally. We see it from a professional perspective. If we disagree with the 
person, you know what, you disagree. And it's OK. It's a healthy relationship. (participant 
M5) 
The Interpersonal Developmental stage of the relationship is the culmination of a 
functional dyad.  These developed relationships are referred to in the data as “healthy 
relationship[s]” that result in high quality municipal outcomes. 
 To further understand the relationship, I looked at the temporality of the relationship, 
specifically, how the stages of development of the relationship may affect its functionality. The 
general staging of temporality within all four stages did hold true for most relationships with the 
speed of movement between stages being compressed or elongated.  
Chapter IV Conclusion 
Analysis of the interview data has identified five primary and one core dimension as 
depicted in the explanatory matrixes. The data further presents a temporality to the mayor-CAO 
relationship providing a better understanding of what is going on within the relationship. The 
next chapter will discuss the research question, integrate the above information into a model of 
the mayor-CAO relationship and explain the important issue of relationship functionality and its 
possible causality. 
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Chapter V: Discussion and Implications 
Chapter V presents my understanding and meaning of the data’s findings, combined with 
the applicable academic literature on the dissertation’s subject. First, I present my personal story 
that initiated the quest of this dissertation. After reviewing my research questions, presenting a 
behavioral model and explaining it, I propose three theoretical propositions and link them to the 
existing literature. The research has limitations that I discuss concluding with the implications of 
this research for practice and leadership.  
But first a short digression as I reflect on my role as CAO and the genesis of this 
research: I started this journey because of my personal experience as a CAO. This experience, 
over 35 years, included both positive and negative mayor-CAO relationships. The negative ones 
were painful and as a result I felt I needed a better understanding of how these relationships 
function. I hope this research will help others in the local government world to better navigate 
the mayor-CAO relationship.   
As a student of local government, I, like many others, focused my attention on the 
dichotomy between policy and administration, the conventional wisdom on the nature of the  
mayor-CAO relationship. For years, I advocated for a clean separation between what I did as the 
CAO and what mayors did in their role. Yet, over those years, I recognized that the attempt to 
keep a separation between policy and administration was futile. Mayors were more and more 
insistent on day-to-day involvement in administrative matters regardless of my protest. At times, 
I sympathized with the mayors, but held fast to my belief that separation was correct set of 
behaviors. 
In 2009, I received my master’s degree in Political Science and began acquainting myself 
with the academic research on local governments. During that period, I was introduced to the 
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complementarity model of Svara (1999b). Although that model seemed intuitively correct it still 
required the mayor and CAO to behave within a set of boundaries I was not experiencing in the 
field. Why then did mayors and I not follow the model presented by Svara? This question stayed 
with me until I entered this PhD program. 
As a pragmatist, I worked with mayors on an intuitive basis using whatever talent I could 
muster to survive the local government world. Over the years, I had learned quite a bit about how 
to build a team or how to run a municipality, but the most difficult part was always the mayor 
and council.  Why, even though they had marginal management skills, and questionable 
understanding of the public interest, were they constantly attempting to wrestle control from me 
and our staff team? Because they were the bosses, I complied with their wishes rationalizing that 
democracy cannot be wrong. I moved from issue to issue always attempting to satisfy what 
seemed like a mayor’s insatiable appetite to interfere with administration for what looked like 
political purposes. No amount of coaching, cajoling, lecturing or training made any difference. 
For example, one excellent presentation by an expert in governance in the city where I worked 
was immediately followed by a councilor’s request to issue a parking ticket to someone in that 
councilor’s neighborhood. 
Eventually, I started to rethink how the system of local government works with specific 
reference to the mayor-CAO relationship. My thinking was augmented by rereading the existing 
literature on mayor-CAO, council/CAO, politicians, and staff. Although this material was 
interesting and applicable, nothing explained my on-the-ground experience. Certainly, the 
models and suggestions, rules and roles, and empirical data supported the concept of separation 
of policy from administration, although a notional concept for behavior, was not being followed.  
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As the complementarity model suggests, the mayor and CAO work together for good 
governance, theoretically integrating the two positions to develop interdependence, reciprocal 
influence and overlapping functions. Given that the dichotomy was developed to combat 
political corruption at the turn of the 19th century, what has changed? Or what did we not see 
before that was driving behavior that could better explain the mayor-CAO interactions today?   
Certainly, corruption has not skyrocketed, although populism has; municipal services are 
being delivered and, on the whole, the system of local government has operated relatively well 
over the years compared to the times in the 1890s where political partisan corruption was 
rampant. However, the trend towards CAO terminations both voluntary and involuntary, are on 
the rise. Why is that happening? Does it have something to do with the rules or roles or the 
individual mayor’s and CAO’s dyadic behavior? 
Anecdotally, since my experiences with the old rules of separation of policy from 
administration or mayors changing their roles to integrate the two functions for good governance 
isn’t happening, then why? My thinking was: what else is happening within the mayor-CAO 
relationship that may cause it to function or not? Was there more going on within these 
relationships that may better explain the observed behavior of mayors and CAOs? Is the 
interpersonal relationship a larger part of this puzzle? 
This digression now leads me to the present moment as I have completed my study of 
CAOs’ and mayors’ relationships as experienced by those individuals who have graciously been 
willing to tell me their story. 
Review of the Research Questions 
The overarching question of this qualitative study was, what aspects of the mayor-CAO 
relationship results in a functional relationship as perceived by those individuals who have 
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experience in these roles? As discovered in Chapter IV the answers to this question lie in the 
interaction of a number of relationship dimensions both primary (negotiating, strategizing, 
harmonizing, boundary setting, power sharing—and the core dimension of shapeshifting)            
—within the mayor-CAO dyadic relationship. These dimensions or social processes emerged 
under specific conditions with particular types of consequences on the relationship. The 
explanatory matrices of Chapter IV (Tables 4.1 to 4.6) describe the details of these findings. 
Further, the relationship was described as unfolding across time and this perception led me to 
embed the dimensions in the context of temporality, a context that was dynamic and fluid in 
relation to the conditions and social processes that ensued in these relationships. The addition of 
the temporal context provided an opportunity to understand this highly complex relationship 
from the perspective of relationship growth and repair across time. In this specific local 
government context, perceived relationship functionality between the mayor and CAO was a 
consequence of the social processes discovered within the data.  
Model of the Mayor-CAO Relationship  
Figure 5.1 is the visual representation of the relationship among the various elements 
derived from my grounded theory analyses. It depicts the many moving parts within the mayor-
CAO didactic relationship. The reader will note the presence of the context, social processes, 
conditions and impacts, discussed in the explanatory matrices of Chapter IV. The model takes 
the analyses further by considering all the findings as a whole. The purpose of the visualization 
of the grounded theory findings is to gain a level of understanding of this relationship that has 
meaning and relevance to the working experience of CAOs and mayors as well as providing 
guidance in creating functional relationships that serve the community.    
          
  
100 
Figure 5.1. Graphic model of the operation of the mayor-CAO relationship.  
 
Structural and Interpersonal Conditions 
Fundamentally, from this study, the mayor-CAO relationship is conceived as living 
within two role related frameworks, structural and interpersonal. Note that the upper part of the 
Figure 5.1 shows the primary structural elements while the lower part comprises interpersonal 
elements. These frameworks are not mutually exclusive but rather, are intertwined on the daily 
basis as the players interact with each other to produce collective municipal outcomes. For 
example, at times the interview data suggests structural roles are the key to understanding what 
the dyad must produce as an outcome. A mayor stated: 
I guess my role, or how I view my role, is if it's political in nature then I want to be 
apprised and updated and things like that. But if it's internal in terms of internal work 
plans or hiring’s and firings or whatever else, the day-to-day operations, that's not 
something I play a role in. (participant M3)  
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Other times the interpersonal aspects are important although less clear. For example: 
 [The mayor] took every bullet for you; the mayor, always stepped in front of the bullet. . 
.  staff wouldn’t take bullets that we should’ve, but he wouldn’t let that happen, so, [he 
was a] wonderful leader. (participant C1). 
Within the environmental and temporal context, social processes take place under certain 
conditions. These structural conditions such as: roles, traditions, governance and policies set the 
conditional boundaries of the structural relationship (the uppermost ribbon of Figure 5.1). 
Whereas the interpersonal conditions such as: personalities, self-awareness, meaning –making 
and dialogue set the conditional boundaries for the interpersonal conditions (the bottom ribbon of 
Figure 5.1). 
 Structural Conditions 
As depicted in Figure 5.1, three sets of structural conditions were identified in this 
analysis: roles, traditions, and governance and policies.  
Roles. Within this structural relationship’s framework, the data presented the statutory 
roles and responsibilities of the mayor and CAO as the conditions for the relationship. How they 
execute these responsibilities and where each role starts and stops for each position was a 
common theme of the data. For example, one mayor explained, 
I don't want to be somebody that's involved in the day-to-day operations of managing the 
organization and/or the senior management team I did that for a long time. I want to be in 
the role of strategic. I want to be in the role of governance of policy and I don't want to be 
involved in the day-to-day operations of the organization. (participant M4) 
Similarly, another mayor surmised, 
I guess my role, or how I view my role, is, if it's political in nature then I want to be 
apprised and updated and things like that. But if it's internal, in terms of internal work 
plans or hirings and firings, or whatever else, the day-to-day operations, that's not 
something I play a role in. Now again, because we have a good relationship, the city 
manager may ask me, hey I'm thinking of doing x, what do you think? But at the end of 
the day that's his decision to make, as long as, again, it's helping council achieve that 
vision. But if it's politically based, you know, it's something where a decision of council 
is required, then yeah, he does a very good job of keeping me updated in terms of “hey 
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here's where things are in the process, here's what the outcome is looking like. Just 
wanted to let you know. (participant M3) 
The data focused on this issue of roles and responsibilities because the meaning of these 
statutory roles and responsibilities are not clear on the face of them. I discovered that embedded 
within the data, was an ongoing dialogue about “who is in charge and of what?”—and this is one 
of the roles conditions of the relationship. Therefore, this condition limits the social processes 
within the mayor-CAO relationship. 
Traditions. The second structural condition is traditions. Each municipal organization 
will have within its culture some specific traditions. These traditions will set boundaries on what 
and how the mayor-CAO dyad will take action. For example, one mayor stated:   
So [about] that the committee system: I wanted to get back to [the committee system] 
because previous councils were being accused of nothing being debated at the public 
table and it was all made behind closed doors . . . in the basement that nobody ever 
showed up. (participant M9)  
Traditions set the way municipal activities take place or in this case, how they took place 
in the past and represent the structural conditions that allow the processes to emerge, for 
example, the process of ‘boundary setting” (the process on the second ribbon from the top - 
under social processes in Figure 5.1) and results in consequences such as collective outcomes or 
common beliefs (under “outcomes” in Figure 5.1).  
In the example above, the collective outcome is the establishment of an older tradition of 
using a committee structure rather than a committee of the whole (the entire council); this 
committee structure was successful for this mayor in the past. This condition can be understood 
as a process of setting a structural boundary or boundary setting (on the second ribbon from the 
top under social processes in Figure 5.1) for the municipality’s committee structure. The mayor-
CAO dyad will use this committee structure regularly to obtain corporate decisions and will be 
the subject of discussions between the mayor and CAO. 
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 Governance and policies. Governance and policies are two other conditions (see 
uppermost ribbon in Figure 5.1) within the structural framework. These conditions set structural 
boundaries for the dyad to operate within. Governance is the broader term which includes 
policies. These policies will include statutory legal obligations and limits set by other 
governments (provincial, state and federal) and internal policies established by the local 
governments themselves. Policies may include, for example, purchasing policies, budget bylaws, 
or bylaws limiting the CAO’s powers and responsibilities. Governance is a more abstract term 
that means the system as a whole that local governments operate within that delivers both 
democratic representation and municipal services. All these conditions limit or contain the 
structural aspects of the mayor-CAO relationship. One CAO put it this way: 
From a technical point of view. . .  They [council] appreciate the fact that I understand 
that they have a governance role. They don’t quite understand what that means but I have 
taken every opportunity to explain that. (participant C4) 
Interpersonal Conditions             
The interpersonal conditions require further explanation because some are more complex. 
Conditions include personality, self-awareness, meaning-making and dialogue (see lowest ribbon 
in Figure 5.1) 
Personality. Personality is to a significant extent, an interpersonal condition implying a 
set of behavioral boundaries or a set of expected behaviors. Academic research suggests the “Big 
Five Personality Dimensions” (extraversion, emotional stability, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness and open to experience) as described by Barrick and Mount (1991, p. 1) will 
predict a number of behavioral outcomes. For example, an extravert will be expected to be 
gregarious. 
Personality was expressed within the data suggesting certain “givens” or fixed parts of a 
person’s behavior. Although there is other evidence in the data to show growth and change by 
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both CAOs and mayors, the term “personality” was often used to explain the behavior of the 
individuals within the dyad. For example, CAO participant C4 when asked if it was common 
among his mayors to not like to follow rules, replied: “It depends . . . I think it’s always an 
individual’s personality”. For another example: a highly populist Mayor was described as having 
no particular core political or ideological beliefs, but to have a populist personality. Other 
mayors were described as having a “strong” personality because they focused on the long term 
vision for the community and left the administration to do the managing of the community. One 
mayor, participant M5, suggested: “You need to be adaptable to the different personalities that 
are involved, whether it's the CAO or the mayor”.   
The use of the word personality in this context suggests that both members of the dyad 
must be adaptable to these different personalities. Personality was used in the interviews to 
describe certain behaviors in a somewhat prejudicial manner, likely attempting to make meaning 
of certain behaviors or wanting to be able to predict expected behavior. 
Sometimes the data appeared to reflect Barrick and Mount’s (1991) Big Five but other 
times the data had its own definitions. In interviews, personality seemed to be used to describe a 
different but consistent set of behaviors expected by each of the dyad’s participants. For 
example, when one mayor (participant M7) described them-self as “easy to get along well with 
others” the CAO could expect agreeableness in their day-to-day interactions.  
Other academic research has used the Big Five  personality dimensions for predicting job 
performance. Agreeableness was a predictor of successful job performance for management and 
sales (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Based on this research, an agreeable Mayor could be predicted to 
have a successful dyad performance with CAOs. Although personality was talked about quite 
often in interviews, it is likely a mask for many other interpersonal aspects of the relationship.   
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Aston et al. (2007) in their paper, “Personality Traits of Municipal Politicians and Staff,” 
stated: 
Maintaining the proper relationship between elected officials and public servants is one 
of the most important and at times one of the most difficult tasks in democratic political 
systems. . . .because the roles of the two groups are not defined precisely and because 
some members of the two groups work together closely that personalities and personal 
relationships play a major role in how well the system functions. If the relationship works 
well, they have a positive impact on governing process, if not, the governing process 
suffers accordingly. (p. 274) 
Looking at Canadian local government politicians and staff Aston et al. (2007) further 
stated: 
We found significant differences between the groups [politicians and staff] in broad 
personality characteristics of extraversion and openness to experience, and in the more 
specific personality trait of “sociable”.  Other personality differences between the groups, 
although in the predicted direction, were small and did not reach statistical significance. 
Overall, the pattern of results indicate that politicians and public servant do differ 
appreciably in some major personality characteristics. (p. 286) 
In this vein, Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981) also argued that politicians differ 
from public servants in that their dominant trait is energy, while the dominant trait of public 
servants is equilibrium”. 
The term personality was also used to describe what definitely seemed like a personality 
problem. One CAO recounted, 
One Mayor thought that the mayor’s role was the Chief Building Inspector, Chief 
Planner, Chief Engineer, Chief Law Enforcement Officer, Chief Parks person and would 
get their hands . . .  that Mayor would have hands in all of those operations and not 
infrequently without telling the CAO and in some cases with the CAO not ever finding 
out or even being purposely left out of the discussion. Micro-managing by personality 
type. . .  they (the Mayor) have a personality type to want to have control. (participant 
C2) 
In the above story, after many discussions whereby the CAO tried to curtail the Mayor’s 
behavior, they agreed to disagree on the role of the mayor-CAO within a municipal organization. 
This description of personality comes much closer to personality problems than personality 
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dimensions. It is acknowledged among CAOs there are personality disorders (narcissism, 
Machiavellianism, or psychopathy) within the elected officials that can be experienced from time 
to time. The converse of CAOs having personality disorders is possible, however, less likely to 
be a long term issue because the mayors and councils have the power to terminate the CAO, this 
was not discussed in the data. 
Academic research suggests there are differences between elected officials and staff 
members that may cause a difference in perspective that may lead to tension between the groups. 
Some dysfunctionality was referenced to in terms of personality, but these definitions were not 
the from the Big Five personality dimensions (Barrick & Mount, 1991) and therefore could not 
be used for comparative evaluation. Some research suggests Mayors are more likely to be open 
to new experiences than are CAOs (Ashton et al., 2007). 
Generally expected behaviors referred to as personalities, are interesting in that they are a 
condition of the interpersonal relationship framework that will limit the emergence of social 
processes (second ribbon from the bottom of Figure 5.1) 
Self-awareness. Self-awareness as the second interpersonal condition (bottom ribbon of 
Figure 5.1) has been defined as “the ability to see ourselves clearly—to understand who we are, 
how others see us and how we fit into the world” (Eurich, 2018, p. 3). The levels of                   
self-awareness within the members of the dyad are important because they are fundamental and 
limit the capacity of the dyad to produce collective outcomes. For example, one CAO 
(participant C5) recognized their own contribution to a particularly difficult conflict with their 
mayor after many months of reflection and pain. It was this self-recognition (self-awareness) of 
the CAO’s own contribution to the relational dysfunctionality that, in turn, caused a 
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corresponding reflection by the mayor to on their own conflictual behavior; subsequently, the 
relationship moved to becoming functional. 
Another mayor pointed to the importance of this attribute, saying, “because the only way 
to do some self-growth is to look at yourself and how it is you're managing things” (participant 
M5). A further example of the significance of self-awareness was seen in one mayor (M7) 
suggesting that they regularly requested honest feedback from their CAO after a public 
engagement. This allowed for monitoring his performance and making changes for the next 
event if as a dyad, they believed it would improve the outcomes. This mayor described his 
relationship with his CAO as excellent. “I recognize that I’m a blue-collar worker that gets along 
well with people and he (CAO) knows everything there is to know about operating a 
municipality- together we make a great team” (participant M7).   
This level of self-awareness was a prelude to reciprocal influence and trust in each 
member of the dyad. This further demonstrated that the common belief regarding the 
municipality’s best interest (mutual pursuit of good governance) had become the dyad’s test for 
positive performance.  
Self-awareness is an interesting concept and can represent a deep understanding of our 
behavioral motivations or a more superficial and sometimes erroneous understanding of our 
behavior. Eurich (2018) suggested: “Self-awareness is a remarkably rare quality . . . for most 
people, it’s easier to choose self-delusion—the antithesis to self-awareness—over the cold, hard 
truth” (p. 5). 
Self-awareness, at least the internal awareness, was present in some of the interview data. 
Mayors and CAOs often appeared to leverage this internal self-awareness to at least help 
facilitate social processes taking place within the relationship. In one specific case -relayed by 
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participant C5)—conflict management was the social process and catalyst that resulted in 
increases in self-awareness (second ribbon from the top in Figure 5.1). As mentioned above, 
social processes are intertwined with both structural and interpersonal frameworks and 
conditions. Each condition works in its own way to either limit outcomes or, in this case, cause 
an increase in an interpersonal limit of self-awareness. As another condition of the dyad’s 
relationship is that it helps in understanding of how the interpersonal conditions may impact 
relationship functionality. 
Meaning-making. Meaning-making (bottom ribbon in Figure 5.1) is an interpersonal 
framework condition within the mayor-CAO relationship for understanding highly complex 
activities and the social processes that are taking place. Kegan and Lahey (2009) suggested that a 
person’s level of mental complexity16 affects capacity for meaning-making. The dyad member’s 
level of mental complexity will in turn determine the capacity for the dyad to deal with complex, 
ambiguous and paradoxical problems, all of which are common within the local government 
environment.   
Dialogue. Dialogue is the simplest condition to understand of all the interpersonal 
framework conditions presented. The amount and quality of dialogue within the dyad will affect 
the amount of output that can be expected to be produced. More and better dialogue will 
encourage social processes to function more often and therefore produce more positive 
relationship outcomes. For example, one mayor who was asked about the level of interaction 
between CAO and mayor, stated: “High levels of interaction, communication and engagement 
between the CAO and the mayor . . .  that’s information and discussions that he [CAO] and I 
would have on a daily basis” (participant M4).  
                                               
16  Kegan and Lahey’s (2009) hierarchy of the higher levels of mental complexity are: Level 3, the 
socialized mind; Level 4, the self-authoring mind, and Level 5, the self-transforming mind.  
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Structural Relationship: Social Processes 
 Understanding relationships’ social processes is one of the more important concepts 
within the grounded theory methodology and helps link the conditions and context to the 
relationship outcomes or consequences.  In the relationship’s behavioral model (see second from 
the top ribbon in Figure 5.1) the social processes are presented. It is again important to remember 
that these social processes are intertwined within the structural and interpersonal social processes 
and can be used by the dyad to solve their day-to-day challenges. For example, negotiating is 
present in both frameworks because it takes place in both structural and interpersonal dimensions 
of the relationship as the dyad moves towards solutions to their challenges. A specific example 
came from a mayor who stated: 
The role [mayor to CAO] was exactly same [with] as high level of engagement, high 
level of communication, high level of interaction, both from him [CAO] to me and me to 
him in terms of issues, impacts that we’re dealing with as it related to the overall 
operation of the city and execution on the intended results. (participant M4) 
Boundary setting. Boundary setting is a social process of the dyad’s ongoing processes 
of determining what each member of the dyad does within their role of either mayor or CAO. As 
stated above, because the roles of both mayor and CAO are ambiguous it will take a period of 
time to determine where the boundaries are between each dyad member. This social process of 
boundary setting arose in the interviews as the determination of how each dyad member sets 
work or role boundaries. For example, a mayor stated: “So, I’m taking a real hands-on approach 
with the new CAO much different than with (former CAO) because some of the core 
competencies and behaviors are still being developed in a new CAO” (participant M4).  
Managing conflict. Managing conflict is a common social process within the mayor-
CAO dyad. In this setting, it is mostly structural conflict: determination of who is doing what 
within the dyad is not clear. Dyad members will, over time, manage their roles within the dyad 
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and execute these with minimum conflict (assuming they agree or negotiate the outcomes). 
However, the fundamental reconciliation of these conflicting roles will take place within the 
social process of the structural responsibilities each dyad member performs.  One extreme 
example of conflict was when a mayor campaigned directly to terminate a CAO’s employment 
(not an uncommon local government occurrence). The CAO, who had been receiving executive 
coaching, reflected: 
It takes two to tango . . . the coach asked the right question . . .  what are you bringing to 
the table? But, after coaching, I also convinced the mayor, and it wasn’t terribly easy, but 
I convinced them to also get coaching 
Conflict within the mayor-CAO dyad can be managed in a functional relationship, 
through the social process of “managing conflict”. 
Power sharing.  Power sharing is a social process that allows the two members of the 
mayor-CAO dyad to share the powers each member holds, given the structure of their roles. The 
mayor will usually take a leadership role in public communications and this role can also benefit 
something the CAO is tasked to do.  For example, one mayor stated: 
The CAO team went ahead and started going forward with this referendum and 
everything that was involved in informing the public. I had my hand in it because I was 
also involved representing council in distributing information. (participant M6) 
In this case, the mayor and CAO were sharing their powers to result in a successful 
outcome. This is a social process that allowed the structural relationship to benefit the dyad 
collectively. 
Negotiating. Negotiating—seen in the second ribbon from the top and bottom of Figure 
5.1—is a social process found in both structural and interpersonal frameworks because the dyad 
negotiated outcomes in both frameworks. Negotiating involves a process of exchanging 
information within the dyad where the member’s perspective or attitude is not in alignment and 
needs to be worked through to arrive at a common perspective or position. This process implies 
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that at least one member of the dyad will change an earlier position for another more beneficial 
and agreeable position; often, this may mean dealing with another matter and arranging                
trade-offs. The dyad operates with many issues and over long periods; therefore, negotiations can 
use these multiple realities to solve conflicting perspectives. In the structural framework, one 
mayor recounted this circumstance. 
He [the CAO] was in a bad situation because there had been a strike and then he was 
hired to review all the staff. . .  so the staff hated him. He couldn’t get anywhere with 
them. . .  he just couldn’t connect with them. . .  Then he picked a few favorite staff 
members and that made it worse. . .  I tried to support him. . .  we tried to work with the 
staff to them back on board, which was difficult. . .  [the mayor led] an in-camera session 
and [asked the CAO] . . . you need to tell us what we need to do to get this to work. So he 
gave us a whole list of things, and we said OK-- what’s the timeframe? He said July we’ll 
get it done by July, we said you can’t get all this done by July, but he said he could. 
(participant M9) 
Of the interpersonal framework a CAO participant explained, 
So I wanted that cut off at the beginning [developers coming to the mayor to lobby him], 
and then the next one [developer] is about process. So I’m finding . . . why isn’t [the 
mayor’s developer friend] coming to see the staff? . . . we could avoid the mayor always 
being in my office on the defense . . . that way we can get the developer to come in here 
and have it percolating up through the staff . . . he [the developer] is coming in because 
he doesn’t like following the rules. (participant C4) 
The social process of negotiating positions and perspectives takes place in both the 
interpersonal and structural frameworks of the mayor-CAO dyad. The differences are nuanced 
but they reflect the context of either the structural responsibilities (the example above from M9) 
or the emotional impact of the C4 example where the behavior of one dyad member (the mayor) 
was not structural but was causing great frustration within the CAO’s interpersonal relationship 
with that mayor.  
Interpersonal Relationship: Social Processes 
The social processes of negotiating, harmonizing, strategizing and trading off (on the 
second ribbon from the bottom of Figure 5.1) are found within the interpersonal framework of 
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the mayor-CAO dyad. As was seen with the social process of negotiating, sometimes these 
processes take place in both frames, an intertwining of the activities of the dyad’s processes. The 
nuanced differences between the social processes of the interpersonal framework and the 
structural relationship framework is seen in the interpersonal framework not relying on the 
specific structural roles within the dyad. For example, behavior of one dyad member that is not 
bounded or defined by their structural roles, can be seen as emerging from an interpersonal 
frame. 
Harmonizing. Harmonizing is an interpersonal social process that takes place between 
dyad members to align the collective dyad outputs. If the outputs of the dyad are not aligned, 
they will not produce the coordinated outputs that are the most effective in the municipal 
environment. Each dyad member has their own independent authority to act on certain matters; 
however, since the interdependence between roles is great, these independent actions are less 
than optimal. The social process of harmonization emerges to maximize the collective output of 
the dyad. As participant one mayor stated: 
So, we [mayor and CAO] basically wrote her [the CAO’s] job description together . . .  
like a provincial mandate letter . . . so I’m saying generally that I think you know that, in 
an effective relationship, my job as mayor is to support the CAO to do their job to the 
best of their ability and if I think they need some feedback to do their job better, then my 
job is to give them feedback that they need. (participant M2).  
Strategizing. Strategizing within the interpersonal relationship framework emerges 
collectively and interdependently between the two dyad members. The social process requires 
substantial dialogue to understand the circumstances that the municipal organization is either 
heading towards, or already finds itself within. The dyad will be required to choose a path 
forward for the organization that maximizes collective benefits. For example, one CAO said,  
You’ve got to find a way to work with people right . . . I’d kind of lay it out there and let 
him [the mayor] kind of chew on it a bit and I knew if I pushed him that he’d get his back 
up . . . lots of times he’d come back and say OK . . . here is what you wanted to do . . . I’ll 
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bring it to Council and recommend it, maybe I’ll run it by some councilors, and they 
would tweak it a bit and it would go well. (participant C6) 
In this circumstance, strategizing was a longer process of allowing the mayor the time he 
needed to think through something. The CAO would then “run it by some councilors” and then 
get back to the mayor. The CAO was relying on their interpersonal relationship with both the 
mayor and the councilors to strategize an issue for the mayor-CAO dyad’s collective output. 
Trading off. Within the interpersonal relationship framework (second ribbon from the 
bottom ribbon in Figure 5.1), the social process of trading off is taking place within the         
mayor-CAO dyad. Many times, in the complex world that the mayor and CAO operate in, there 
are issues or perspectives not in alignment with the wishes of one or the other member of the 
dyad. At times, the dyad members need to trade off these issues or perspectives against other 
issues or perspectives. Each dyad member will have their own perspectives on how the dyad 
should solve their day-to-day challenges and these perspectives will be discussed regularly 
within the dyad. Trading-off one issue for another reflects the understanding of dyad members 
that the relationship’s operational time frame is quite long and will give whichever member 
accepts the other’s position, substantial leverage when the next issue is dealt with. 
Temporal and Interpersonal Context 
As discussed earlier in this study, the environmental context is established primarily by 
the structural or statutory framework for both mayor and CAO, and influences and sets 
boundaries for the manner in which the relationship functions. There is also an interpersonal 
context which includes the general nature of the relationships within the local governments’ 
group of mayor-CAO relationships. This relationship landscape was not discussed (maybe 
implied or assumed) explicitly during the interviews. The interpersonal context includes the 
nature of the interpersonal capacity of each member of the dyad. For example, each dyad 
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member’s psychodynamic paradigm for understanding how people behave “draws attention. . .  
to the inner world of individuals, including their emotions—and relationships between 
individuals” (Neumann & Hirschhorn, 1999), their levels of mental complexity (Kegan & Lahey, 
2009), as well as personality and other internal characteristics of the individuals involved. 
Personality was presented as a condition of the model of the relationship (bottom ribbons in 
Figure 5.1). Further data for this specific interpersonal context was missing and has to be 
inferred from the data; therefore, it was not included in the model. 
Certainly, mayors and CAOs cannot ignore the higher profile conflicts that are reported 
in the media which may color their understanding of the mayor-CAO relationship they are 
involved in. For example, the CAO of the City of Nanaimo in British Columbia, was ejected 
from the City Hall and arrested due to allegedly threatening the mayor with bodily harm (Stueck, 
2017).   
Temporal context. The temporal context of the mayor-CAO relationship (central ribbon 
in Figure 5.1) establishes a trajectory of developmental stages for the relationship. The 
relationship starts in the orientation/learning stage (middle ribbon in Figure 5.1); becoming a test 
driving stage (where the dyad attempts to make collective decisions); evolving to a task 
performing stage (where collective decisions and outcomes become common practice); and lastly 
transforming into the interpersonal growth stage for both members of the dyad (where the 
relationship can be seen as transformational.)   
The relationship does not necessarily evolve through all developmental stages and may 
arrest at any one of these stages. The interviews indicated that a number of mayor-CAO 
relationships did proceed to the personal growth stage. For example, participant M7 said, “Yes, I 
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trust him [CAO] immensely”. An indicator that this mayor-CAO relationship had reached the 
personal growth stage. 
Based on the data, most of the mayor-CAO relationships do change over time. The 
relationship matures probably because of experiences (or the exercising of the dimensions within 
the relationship outlined in Chapter IV).Within other dyad relationships these changing 
developmental stages of a relationship are well documented using a metaphor of  romance:  
relationships start in the honeymoon stage and mature over time resulting from the relationship’s 
experiences. As Fox and Anderegg (2014) stated: 
Many theories suggest that romantic relationships develop in stages. Typically, these 
models suggest a progression wherein individuals meet, become acquainted, establish 
romantic interest, date, and then enter into an exclusive relationship that escalates in 
commitment over time. (p. 686) 
The mayor-CAO relationship often exhibits a similar developmental trajectory—just not 
(usually) in an actual romantic context. The temporality of the mayor-CAO relationship also 
allows for the repair of the relationship; this is tied to the maturity of the relationship. The 
fluidity of the mayor-CAO working relationship is also tied to the maturity of the relationship 
and its ability to exercise the relationship dimensions particularly the social processes identified 
in the explanatory matrix. For example, a mayor is more likely to accept proposals from the 
CAO if the relationship has developed affective trust in the two more mature developmental 
stages of task performing or personal growth. For example, one mayor said, “I see that 
challenging each other [mayor and CAO] as well, in a good way challenging each other . . . and 
making sure we are always holding our own feet to the fire but the entire corporation” 
(participant M5). 
This temporal context means the relationship will focus on certain aspects at one stage of 
the relationship, shifting later to other aspects. For example, A CAO suggested, 
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In fact, you, as an individual, aren’t going to do anything, quite frankly; your job is to get 
along with everybody else, so, to me, loyalty and building up that [mayor-CAO] 
relationship is [about] a lot of empathy, like really putting myself in their shoes, stepping 
out of my shoes, and trying to see the world from their [the mayor’s] perspective, and 
then slowly bringing them [the mayor] into my [CAO] world. And, all the while 
respecting that they can have the dumbest idea in the world, [but] never saying “That’s 
the dumbest idea in the world,” never working to thwart them either, . . . which I think 
sometimes city managers might get caught in the crossfire . . . So to me, building trust is 
—I really see is to get the collective priorities done, and maybe massaged, maybe 
changed, maybe you have to change it a bit to get it done, but always putting their – the 
needs of council first. (participant C1) 
The temporal context is therefore important in understanding the mayor-CAO 
relationship as the stages of development will point to the manner in which the relationship is 
functioning, focusing on certain aspects of the relationship dimensions and producing certain 
collective dyadic outcomes. As the relationship matures the dyadic outcomes will become more 
fluid and effective, and capable of using the core dimension of the relationship: shapeshifting. 
Core Dimension: Shapeshifting 
Shapeshifting emerged as the core dimension from the data to explain the manner in 
which dyads may stay functional in the face of complexity, ambiguity, conflict and paradox. For 
actors within these mayor-CAO dyads, there must be a way to move the municipality forward 
even in the face of conflicting beliefs, ambiguous ideologies and ethics, confusing public 
messaging and other paradoxical realities.   
To understand this core social process, I designated the process as “shapeshifting,” 
borrowing the name from the mythical genre. In Campbell’s (1949/2008) classic, The Hero with 
a Thousand Faces, shapeshifting is part of the mythic representation of beings that change to 
reflect a different image, attitude or approach within the hero’s path. It is one of eight archetypes 
Campbell suggested are to be encountered in heroic quests. The finding and usage here is 
somewhat consistent with of Campbell’s use of the term. Although shapeshifting has been 
occasionally in management studies such as Reed’s (2014) application to research on public 
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relations consultants. Reed defined shapeshifters as “someone who shifts between different 
identities in order to build relationships with relevant audiences” (p. 111). This kind of 
ephemeral transformation is not close to my usage in this dissertation. In my definition I define 
and apply the term shapeshifting as the act of changing an attitude, perspective or point of view 
relatively quickly for strategic advantage so as to maintain or result in a functioning relationship 
without generating ongoing emotional angst. Shapeshifting can happen within our primary 
relationships and also where a concern one holds towards an attitude, perspective, or approach 
can be changed to maintain a good friendship or a marriage. This “right” way of understanding 
or making meaning of our circumstances must change in the shapeshift. Changing our attitudes, 
perspectives or approaches requires a particular reflection on the circumstances and a “letting 
go” of our earlier perspectives and attitudes adopting a newer and likely broader perspective 
(Siegel, 1999).  
In the municipal context, dyads shapeshift to maintain the working relationship within the 
dyad. In a cognitive way this process is measuring the value of two different outcomes: being 
correct in this moment and risking the deterioration of the mayor-CAO relationship or: changing 
your perspective in this matter to align with the dyad partner and to benefit from maintaining the 
equilibrium in the long term17 relationship. 
           The affective response to this act of changing one’s perspective can be negative. There 
can be emotions of angst or anger from changing one’s perspective to make someone else 
content or happy. By my definition, shapeshifting requires the shapeshifter to change their 
attitude, perspective, or point of view without residual emotional festering (never wanting to say 
“I told you so” when your earlier perspective is proven correct). The shapeshifter does this by 
                                               
17 Note that mayor-CAO relationships are usually, at a minimum, for a 3- or 4-year electoral term. 
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finding a new perspective that fits within their wider set of perspectives that they believe they 
can live with. Certainly, some perspectives are fundamental to how a person defines themselves, 
these perspectives will not likely be open to shifting.  
            The data reflects this shifting of perspectives by both mayors and CAOs on a regular 
basis. Shapeshifting may also be a part of what Cozolino (2014) termed “affordance”.  Cozolino 
expanded on this as follows: 
When we encounter something or someone in our environment our brains activate pre-
existing implicit memories, which provide us with options for engagement. These 
systems create affordance, our ability to engage meaningfully . . . with the people around 
us. An affordance is neither subjective nor objective but emerges from the interface of the 
two. . .  We now know that perception involves constructing experience within our 
brains. . .  affordance strategies are unconscious, multimodal memories that are 
automatically activated by situations we encounter in our day-to-day lives. (p. 221) 
This dynamic can be seen, for example, in one CAO’s statement,  
And so, I told my coach; no she's [the Mayor won’t take coaching] not going to, 
whenever she says I'll think about it, she won't. And my coach said, “well yeah you never 
know”. So then the next week when the Mayor didn't bring it up I said to her, so what do 
you think? I laid it all out there and said you know, even people like me who have been in 
the business for over 30 years even I need coaching on how to be a better CAO and how 
to grow in my profession. So I said, it's not a bad thing, it can be a really good thing. To 
my surprise [the Mayor] said yes to her getting coaching too. (participant C5) 
          In this example, probably both the CAO and the mayor shifted their perspective on 
coaching and afforded each other. This was a reciprocal exchange of information but in all 
likelihood and more importantly, the reciprocal exchange of emotions allowed both parties to 
shapeshift within their dyad. In another example the same CAO stated: 
I think that personality [Mayor as micro-auditor] exists on a continuum. So I don’t mean 
that one is either this type or that type I think there’s degrees. So it’s situational. How 
open is this person going to be or how fixed are they in their ways. Are they trainable? 
Can you affect the behavior through discussion and through gaining trust? And if they’re 
not then you’re kind of SOL. In my opinion it’s best to go on somewhere else and let 
somebody else deal with it and over time things will either sort out or they won’t. But 
you don’t have to deal with that. You can look after your own mental health [inaudible] 
health, physical health. (participant C5) 
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In this case the CAO presented the options available for him to shapeshift but chose to 
protect his mental health rather than shapeshift.  
 Shapeshifting is not a binary process but a process of changing our attitudes, perspectives 
and points of view in a way that lets go of our earlier perceptions and opens our worlds to other 
ways of seeing the same circumstances. Therefore, what Kegan (1995) considered one’s level of 
mental complexity may limit who within the dyad is capable of shapeshifting, thereby possibly 
reducing this activity until after a mayor-CAO relationship is at least into a task producing 
relationship stage. 
  The hierarchy of the mayor-CAO dyad’s relationship may also influence either party’s 
ability to shapeshift. The data suggests that CAOs as subordinates to the mayor, may be required 
or choose to shapeshift more often than mayors. However, there are clear examples of mayors 
shapeshifting within their dyads. The data presents shapeshifting as taking place to maintain 
functionality within the dyad relationship in both directions. 
 Shapeshifting is the core dimension of all aspects of the mayor-CAO dyad. The interview 
data points to this core dimension and social process as somewhat necessary for functionality 
within the mayor-CAO dyad, at least in the task performing and personal growth stages of the 
relationship. As dyads move through the relationship model (Figure 5.1) these relationships use 
the dimensions, context and social processes within the relationship to solve the conflict, 
ambiguity, paradox and uncertainty that is inherent within the positions of mayor and CAO. The 
temporality and the ability to shapeshift results in the positive collective outcomes necessary for 
the dyad to operate functionally within their municipal organizations. 
 As one mayor suggested that a successful mayor-CAO relationship “depends on the 
personality of the [CAO], and I think that's one of the biggest challenges for CAOs around the 
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province is adjusting their styles to accommodate to the [mayor’s] personalities and agendas” 
(participant M1). This mayor implied that the CAOs must shapeshift towards the new mayor; 
however, for these dyads to remain functional there is a reciprocal need for the mayors to also 
shapeshift.  
 It is clear from this research that the co-constructed understanding of the mayor-CAO 
dyad relationship includes more than the heretofore structural understanding of the relationship, 
complete with roles and rules developed by outside (Provincial) and inside (Council) authorities. 
 Even acknowledging the use of relationship dimensions, there is much more to 
understand about the functionality than just “what is going on”. Siegel (2015a) noted within the 
structural context, 
It is essential that a municipality have a professional CAO, and it is essential that the 
CAO have the tools and the ability to carry out the duties of the position. An important 
part of the ability to carry out those duties is a positive relationship with council. This 
positive relationship will only develop when both parties in the relationship understand 
their respective roles and are able to carry out those roles in a competent manner.                   
(p. 424) 
  The interpersonal matters presented in the relationship model (Figure 5.1) are important 
in understanding why, how, and if a mayor-CAO relationship is or stays functional. The 
structural lens of the relationship cannot effectively reveal the meaning-making and subjective 
aspects of the mayor-CAO’s relationship to effectively understand the salient aspects of 
relationship functionality. 
Outcomes from the Relationship Model 
 The relationship model (Figure 5.1) presents all the outcomes or results from the context, 
conditions, primary social processes, and core process of shapeshifting of the mayor-CAO 
relationship. The social processes that emerge within the mayor-CAO relationship use a number 
of concepts and abstract phenomena that are highly complex, ambiguous, and context, specific to 
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the relationship. Factors such as the capacity of each dyad member for self-awareness, their 
capacity to shapeshift, and their somewhat fixed personality, the stage which the relationship is 
in, as well as the environmental and temporal context, all play a substantial role in affecting 
relationship functionality. The mayor-CAO relationship model (Figure 5.1) also presents the 
outcomes of the dimensions, conditions, social processes, and temporality of the dyad. Many of 
these outcomes are straightforward, however trust, common beliefs, and functionality need 
further explanation. 
Trust. Within the data, “trust” is the word most often used to describe a functional 
relationship.  
Trust . . . tends to be somewhat like a combination of the weather and motherhood; it is 
widely talked about, and it is widely assumed to be good for organizations. When it 
comes to specifying just what it means in an organizational context, however, vagueness 
creeps in. (Porter, Lawler, & Hackman, 1975, p. 497) 
 
The difficulty with trust is that it means many things in different contexts. Psychological 
research suggests two distinct types of interpersonal trust: cognition-based—which means trust, 
grounded in individual beliefs about peer reliability and dependability—and affect-based trust, 
grounded in reciprocated interpersonal care and concern (McAllister, 1995).  
Interestingly, some level of cognitive trust is required before affective trust can be 
engaged but after the affective level is obtained there is less questioning of reliability implied in 
cognitive trust even in the face of evidence to the contrary (McAllister,1995). This is likely why 
spouses whose partners are having extramarital affairs are the last to believe this is taking place. 
It seems love and affective trust make us somewhat blind to other realities. 
  The affective trust demonstrated in the data also suggests transformational aspects 
besides reciprocal interpersonal care and concern. For example, one CAO (participant M3) who 
disliked a mayor because of their populist approach, intentionally overlooked this and worked 
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hard to see the positive attributes this mayor brought to the City. When this mayor was defeated 
electorally, the mayor was hurt when the CAO suggested that he (the CAO) would now work 
just as hard for the new mayor as he had for the defeated one. The defeated mayor saw the 
relationship with the CAO as a relationship which ought to include enduring political loyalty and 
affective trust. The CAO had both shapeshifted with the defeated mayor early in their tenure and 
transformed the relationship after the election.  
In another example of building trust and demonstrating the ability to shapeshift, one CAO 
(participant C5) was able to alter a non-functioning relationship with her mayor by working to 
better understand her own motivations within the dyad. She posed the key question: “What did I 
bring to the table to enable this ongoing conflict?” This insight in self-awareness was a first step 
on the road to building trust.  
Using her shapeshifting ability, heightening her self-awareness, and understanding her 
own personality better, she was able to first develop cognitive trust and, subsequently, affective 
trust, thereby transforming her way of being, as she suggested by “being vulnerable and letting 
go of the need to be right”.  
Trust is therefore an important outcome of the social processes outlined in the behavioral 
model presented (Figure 5.1). Building cognitive trust points to the first step that reflects the 
“reliability” of each partner within the mayor-CAO dyad. Affective trust follows as the 
relationship reflects the interpersonal aspects of the relationship (McAllister, 1995). Trust, as an 
outcome of the many social processes within the mayor-CAO relationship, is a companion to the 
functionality resulting from the same collective social processes. 
Common beliefs. Common beliefs within the dyad are less complex and prevalent within 
functional relationships. For example, one mayor stated the following regarding his CAO:  
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[We are] aligned in how we see the world . . . we share a lot of the same values, same 
ideals, and same goals for the community . . . [this] puts you [the Mayor] in a good 
position when you are working alongside someone who wants the same things as I do. 
(participant M3) 
Other common beliefs within the dyad may not be directly related to the work but will 
make the conflict within each issue more easily managed. For example, a CAO said, 
First and foremost, [the Mayor] understood his role. He understood his role as chairman 
of the board, and not as the guy who runs the city. Uh so he, totally respected the fact that 
the city is run by a competent city manager and that we set priorities, we set budgets and 
we provide oversight, those are our jobs. [The Mayor], um, very entrepreneurial, so as 
staff we had the freedom to explore, and try new things with his backing and being an 
entrepreneurial, if [the staff] failed it was ok, he had a lot of businesses that failed over 
the years and dumb things he did and so we never had this “what you get in the civil 
service is fear that everything admin does is wrong. (participant C3)  
 Thus, these common beliefs of the roles within the dyad are very helpful in managing or 
avoiding conflict. This would be a sign of functionality within this particular type of dyad and is 
a part of the social processes present within the relationship model (Figure 5.1). 
Functionality. Functionality is the most important aspect of the mayor-CAO relationship 
research, and therefore, is important to define and explain. The dyad’s functionality can be 
defined as the ability of producing positive dyadic outcomes for the municipal government the 
mayor-CAO work for. The nature of the aspects of the relationship that point to a functional 
relationship has been the primary question for this research. 
 Effective mayor-CAO dyads seamlessly use both structural and interpersonal strategies to 
develop functionality on a daily basis. This functionality is reflected in the relationship model 
(Figure 5.1) along with trust, respect, relationship growth, collective outcomes and common 
beliefs. I will say more on functionality below in discussing the theoretical propositions. 
 The themes that the relationship focuses on interpersonally sometimes define the 
functionality within the relationship. Sometimes one aspect is the crucial focus of the 
relationship. For example, if one member of the dyad has low levels of self-awareness and 
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cannot understand the importance of understanding themselves emotionally within a conflictual 
circumstance, the dyad may focus on the disagreements at the expense of other dimensions and 
possibly functionality. On this, one CAO stated: 
So, if you want to survive with a bad mayor, don't start picking sides with council 
because that's suicide. You just need to throttle back and become more of a bureaucrat 
and just take orders. And do not offer any opinion and just play it safe. Just neutral. 
(participant C7) 
  A number of aspects are at play in this. The CAO’s advice to other CAOs in the 
circumstance of a “bad mayor” will be to change their leadership approach from active to 
passive. There is an implication in this quote that, within the dyad, the structural aspects of the 
positions of both mayor and CAO should be adhered to. The relationship is then operating 
without the reciprocal influence suggested by scholars such as Svara (2001, 2006), Mouritzen 
and Svara (2002), and Stocker and Thompson-Fawcett (2014).  
 I suggest this was a survival mode for CAO operations. The functionality of the          
mayor-CAO dyad in this case is not operating as in other more satisfying relationships reported 
in the data. In an attempt to better understand the dyad’s functionality, I investigated more 
deeply into the social processes displayed (Figure 5.1) within the data using the perspective of 
interpersonal understanding. Using an analogy to the onion, I needed to peel deeper into the 
motivations, meaning-making, and the behaviors that cause functionality within this particular 
relationship’s dyad. 
Theoretical Propositions  
Interpersonal understandings are more suggestive of the dyad’s interstitial                 
spaces—the “hows or whys” of the dyad, rather than the “what” that is taking place. For 
example, how does the dyad negotiate a structural outcome? In answering this through the data, I 
created the model (Figure 5.1) that explains relationship functionality; from that, I posit three 
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theoretical propositions that warrant further exploration. In brief, the theoretical propositions are 
about the following topics: 
1. Relationship understanding: Interpersonal aspects nested within structural and 
temporal context. 
2. Relationship functionality: Intersectionality and reconciliation of structural and 
interpersonal aspects 
3. Shapeshifting capacity: Core relationship dimension that builds and supports 
functionality 
I now consider each in this sequence.  
Theoretical proposition one: Relationship understanding. The mayor-CAO 
relationship dyad is best understood as an interpersonal relationship encompassed within a 
structural and temporal context. The structural context is supplied through statute, internal 
policy, and traditional understandings of the roles and responsibilities of both the mayor and 
CAO (Jerome & Legge, 2002; Nalbandian, 2006; Svara, 1999b). The temporal context is 
supplied through the growth stages of the relationship and the interpersonal context through a 
number of interpersonal conditions such as personality, self-awareness and meaning–making 
(Lazarus, 1991). 
This proposition is designed to restructure the way we understand the mayor-CAO 
relationship, to place the interpersonal aspects of the relationship at the center of the conceptual 
understanding of this particular relationship. In past research, the interpersonal aspects of the 
mayor-CAO relationship have at best, been an afterthought, rather than a central focus. To better 
understand this proposition, I present the academic literature’s historical context of our 
understanding of this theoretical proposition. 
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 The dichotomy. Many scholars have investigated the structural aspects of the mayor-
CAO relationship: the dichotomy of and differences between policy and administration. Most of 
this research focusses on the structural rules, as first presented by Woodrow Wilson in 1887. As 
Svara’s (1999b) and other later research has discovered: the relationship of separation between 
policy and administration embodied within the mayor and CAO’s structural responsibilities, is 
not as straightforward as Wilson had hoped. However, many academic articles have been written 
to either prove or disprove this notional separation between policy and administration.  
In this dissertation research, all interviewees were well versed in the theory of the 
separation between the mayor’s role of policy and the CAO’s role of administration. Everyone 
spoke eloquently about how they followed the so-called “separation rule” and the “one employee 
model”—meaning the mayor and Council only interact with the CAO and no other employees 
thereby not interfering politically with administration) and did not interfere in administration (if 
a mayor) or have personal policy attitudes (particularly regarding populism) if a CAO. 
As each interview proceeded, it was apparent that adherence to the hard rules of 
separation on the mayor’s part, were influenced by their political interests. For example, when 
talking about something that had reputational risk (understood as the mayor’s political or 
leadership reputation) to the municipal corporation, many mayors asserted that they should be 
involved in management decisions. One mayor stated that, 
There is no rule that works for everything. If it’s political in nature, there’s a 
communication strategy that I need to be involved potentially on various issues. We 
operate on the one employee model so I should only be technically, again speaking to the 
City Manager (CAO) and no one else . . . in theory. But we know that it doesn’t always 
or nor is it practical for that to always be the case. I have the flexibility, for example to 
speak to our director of communication directly. (participant M3) 
Another mayor said it as follows:  
There are sometimes where I kind of crossover. And it's only because of how we've 
established the relationship where I will give my observations of how things are going in 
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certain areas and certain departments. And that's because of my years of administrative 
background. But I don't have any expectations. I'm only sharing thoughts. And very clear 
that’s it. And the relationship is at a level where it's understood that that's all I'm doing 
and I'm not implying that this should be done or not. (participant M1) 
Many times in my career I have heard a mayor say “you (the CAO) do things that I must 
be accountable for [meaning at election time]. Therefore, in fairness, I must at least be part of the 
decision”. The data hinted that most mayors had this view, although most made only oblique 
references, likely because they knew that such involvement was against the rules.   
Additionally, CAOs were very professional in their understanding of the rule of staying 
out of policy debates, the purview of democratically elected officials.  However, several CAOs 
made comments on populism and the need for staff to inject their longer, and, by implication, 
better perspectives on council policy.  
As stated above, the structural frame of the mayor-CAO relationship is the frame most 
talked about in the academic literature. There is extensive research and commentary on the 
dichotomy of policy and administration (Ashton et al., 2007; Demir & Reddick, 2012; Dunn & 
Legge, 2001; Montjoy & Watson, 1995; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Nalbandian, 1994, 1999, 
2005, 2006; Overeem, 2005; Siegel, 2010, 2015; Stocker & Thompson-Fawcett, 2014; Svara, 
1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2006, 2008; Waldo, 1948; Wilson, 1887; Zhang, 2014; Zhang & 
Feiock, 2009). This literature presents a generally accepted model (referred to as the 
“Complementarity Model”) that suggests the separation between policy and administration is 
notional and meant to stem the use of partisanship and to combat local government political 
corruption.  
As Stocker and Thompson-Fawcett (2014) summarize:  
The Complementarity Model is based on the premise that elected representatives and 
bureaucrats join together in mutual pursuit of good governance, resulting in a high level 
of interaction and reciprocal influence. While the model recognizes distinct roles, 
backgrounds and perspectives, it highlights the integration resulting from 
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interdependence, reciprocal influence and overlapping functions of the groups. The 
interdependence comes from the need of politicians to have expertise within their 
institution and the need of bureaucrats to have their work legitimized and publicly 
supported. (p. 793) 
 
Both members of the mayor-CAO dyad must first understand their roles or operational 
rules of the position through the structural frame. The structure of the roles is taught in most 
academic and training courses and is understood by the general public as the norm of behavior 
for both mayor and CAO.  
My data suggests that many mayors wrongly believe the mayoralty position holds at least 
symbolic power that translates into directing the municipality in terms of both policy and 
administration. Some data suggested members of the public also believe the mayor has the 
absolute power to direct the municipal corporation. My data suggested these public 
misperceptions of the structural roles of democratically-delivered power, demands clear 
deference on the part of the CAO. There may be times where this misperception of structural 
power is used by mayors to override a CAO’s professional responsibilities; this causes structural 
dysfunctionality within the mayor-CAO relationship.  One mayor commented during interview: 
“If there is any little thing, [I say] ‘hey CAO I really think we should be looking at this instead 
[of what the CAO was doing]. Can we do that please?” And [the CAO will} do that” (participant 
M7). 
This statement shows that there are competing perceptions of the structural rules for each 
member of the mayor-CAO relationship dyad. However, my data confirms the work of 
Mouritzen and Svara (2002), Stocker and Thompson-Fawcett (2014), and Svara (2001, 2006), in 
suggesting that a “complementarity relationship” between these mayor and CAO in the operation 
of a municipal organization will take place for better or worse. If the dyad of          mayor-CAO 
is focused on good governance, they will use the relationship to reconcile these differences in 
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perception of the rules and deliver positive outcomes. On the other hand, the different 
perceptions and the structural conflict embedded in these positions may cause interpersonal 
conflict that will likely result in negative outcomes.  
Therefore, structural rules sometimes cause conflict that can only be resolved through the 
relationship’s interpersonal functionality. For example, the complementarity model (Svara, 
1999b) suggests that interdependence and reciprocal influence may be the mechanisms to solve 
these structural misconceptions. In this way, reciprocal influence and interdependence may then 
reduce the apparent conflict since each member of the dyad will be able to call upon the other to 
reconcile the conflicting rule. This may then reduce the tension within their ambiguous roles 
(Svara, 1999b). 
Within the structural roles of both mayor and CAO the interviews identified a number of 
social processes (second ribbon from the top in Figure 5.1) that were used to establish the 
operational aspects of the mayor-CAO relationship. If the actors in the mayor-CAO dyad do not 
follow the structural roles as formally defined by most statutes, how can they get the public’s 
work done?  This question leads to considering the interpersonal frame to find the relationship 
dimensions that may answer this question.  
Data here suggested that the strongest relationships between mayors and CAOs operate at 
high levels of both the structural and interpersonal frames of the relationship. High levels of trust 
are repeatedly cited as resulting from a functional relationship within the dyad. Understanding 
the social processes embedded within this specific mayor-CAO relationship must include the 
structural and interpersonal aspects of the relationship (McAllister, 1995; Siegel, 2015).  
 I do not discount the structural aspects of the relationship; however, much research has 
been completed in this positivist endeavor and points to the need to better understand the  
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structural conclusions of Mouritzen and Svara (2002), Stocker and Thompson-Fawcett (2014), 
and Svara (2001, 2006),  and others.  What does the integration of interdependence, reciprocal 
influence, and overlapping functions of the Complementarity Model mean in the practical world?  
Some have concluded that the dichotomy between policy and administration, although useful, 
does not help explain the shared responsibility of governing. (Aston et al., 2007). How then do 
we understand the link between this relationship’s integration and functionality within the 
mayor-CAO relationships? 
 The complementarity model’s integration of functions can be understood in both a 
positivist and constructionist manner. I am proposing in my theoretical proposition one, that the 
intersectionality of these perspectives will allow a more complete understanding of the mayor-
CAO relationship and may elucidate the functionality of the relationship more clearly. 
 Leadership within this new conceptual understanding of my theoretical proposition one 
will need to focus on the leadership of the both the structural understanding of the mayor and 
CAO positions and a relationship understanding of leadership (Fletcher & Ragins, 2007; 
Lazarus, 1991).  
 Bolman and Deal’s (2009) research on leadership frames, where combining different 
perspectives better explains leadership, could be used to bring both the structural and 
interpersonal frames to the combined mayor-CAO leadership. Golembiewski and Gabris (1995) 
contended that there is still room in the complementary model “for a better conceptualization of 
relationships” (p. 8). Other structural interpretations of leadership for the individual positions of 
mayor and CAO have been studied. 
 The contingency theory (Donaldson, 2001; Siegel, 2015b) and situational leadership 
(Graeff, 1983; McIntosh, 2009; Siegel, 2015b) can be used to explain CAO leadership. CAO 
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leadership research has primarily relied on the existing general leadership literature. Siegel 
(2015a) and McIntosh (2009) for example, have used situational leadership (Hersey & 
Blanchard, 1969) and contingency theory (Donaldson, 2001). However, relational leadership 
involving CAOs in relationship with mayors is not available. 
Mayoral leadership is seen in the accumulation and exercise of power (Svara, 1994). In 
1960s to1980s, descriptions of mayors reflected the traits-based explanation of leadership theory 
(Stogdill, 1948). Traits or characteristics of leadership at that time, in turn, reflected the 
longstanding “great man” approach to leading (Borgatta et al., 1954). Pressman (1972) and 
Sparrow (1984) suggested that mayors they studied saw power as their vehicle to become a great 
man. 
Academic research on mayoralty leadership has mostly emulated from U.S. literature and 
therefore it confuses or disregards the two different models of local government governance, 
council-manager and mayor-council. This confusion makes the use of the bulk of the research 
difficult at best for leadership study because what is colloquially referred to as “strong mayor 
system” (mayor-council model) immediately confuses its leadership qualities. My research was 
within the council-manager system of governance and therefore cannot be compared too much to 
the U.S. research. 
 More research to broaden the applicability of this twin perspective of structural and 
interpersonal frames for the mayor-CAO relationship could be done quantitatively to hopefully 
reach a generalizable theory. Questionnaires investigating the relative importance of these two 
frames, sent to mayor-CAO dyads, would be helpful in understanding the foundational aspects of 
structural and interpersonal frames to the relationship’s functionality.  
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Theoretical proposition two: Relationship functionality. Ongoing mayor-CAO 
relationship functionality is based on the dyad’s capacity to reconcile the ambiguous roles, 
responsibilities, expectations, and complex contexts within the structural and interpersonal 
capacities in which the mayor-CAO dyad operates. To more clearly focus on functionality of the 
mayor-CAO relationship, I propose the theoretical proposition that combines the intersectionality 
and reconciliation of these two parallel perspectives (structural and interpersonal) into a single 
understanding of functionality. Within this proposition, research on the two separate perspectives 
can then be weighted to understand when and how each perspective takes precedence. For 
example, are there contexts, roles and or interpersonal challenges that cause functionality or 
dysfunctionality within the mayor-CAO relationship? How does the intersectionality of structural 
and interpersonal perspectives come together to deliver outcomes for the dyad? 
 The data of this study presented the social phenomena that allows what seems like a 
seamless integration of disparate and conflictual challenges within the mayor-CAO relationship 
that results in effective outcomes. The numerous factors (trust, personality, personal boundaries, 
self-awareness, common beliefs, shapeshifting ability, context, negotiating, strategizing, 
harmonizing, power sharing) allow an immediate dyadic response to the municipal problems of 
the day. According to Cozolino (2014), the human brain is designed for such complicated 
computations in responding to external stimuli to effect survival and develop homeostats for 
emotional stability and effective relationships. Certainly, the mayor-CAO relationship is 
complicated, complex, ambiguous, and context driven, but not too much for our brains to handle.  
To better understand functionality within proposition two I present a detailed understanding. 
 Functionality.  I designed and undertook this research to answer the questions: how does 
functionality within the mayor-CAO relationship operate? What aspects of a relationship result 
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in functionality within the dyad? Can this research provide guidance to the mayor and CAO to 
develop and sustain a functional relationship in service of the community? From the data it is 
apparent these are not a simple to answer. In fact, the data suggested there may be numerous 
different answers to these questions. The complexity of the mayor-CAO relationship is likely 
because of the many variables that are at play in any given moment.  
 In the past, most literature has looked at t the mayor-CAO relationship as a structural set 
of roles and responsibilities to solve (Nalbandian, 2006; Svara, 1999b). If the right rules were 
followed and everyone within the dyad believed in the same reasons for these rules, then the 
outcomes of the relationship would be predictable and good. This is a world view that reflects 
the mechanical process of building a vehicle or an aircraft. If we follow the plan and the rules of 
physics we can fly our aircraft at some point in the future (Bolman & Deal, 2009; Siegel, 2015; 
Svara, 2001). 
 The data of many narrative experiences of mayor-CAO dyads do not support this 
explanation of how the relationship dyad functions. Although there are many important and 
necessary structural aspects to the roles and responsibilities it seems to be the mixing of the 
relationship dimensions, temporal stages, and affective environment within the dyad that allows 
the functionality of the relationship over time. 
 The definition of a mayor-CAO functional relationship is that the dyad relationship 
continues to produce successful municipal outcomes. For example, the mayor makes symbolic 
speeches, gets re-elected, and the CAO manages the municipality; within the dyad, they solve the 
daily conflicts common to every municipality.  
 In contrast, dysfunctional relationships do not produce successful outcomes, but result in 
CAO terminations or internal battles between the mayor and councilors supporting the CAO, or 
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helping the mayor terminate the CAO. Dysfunctionality can take time to manifest within the 
municipality. During these times, the mayor-CAO relationship will not advance through its 
developmental stages and likely be suspended at a very early stages of development.  
 Although not discussed nor the subject of this research, third party intervention may help 
the functionality of the mayor-CAO relationship. In one example from the interviews, 
“coaching” took place individually (mayor and CAO separately) and resulted in moving the 
relationship through a number of stages of development. Intervention in the mayor-CAO 
relationship may have some promise for future research. 
 Understanding functionality requires several factors: an understanding of structural 
realities of the dyad roles and responsibilities (Nalbandian, 2006; Svara, 1999b); understanding 
and optimizing the many different social processes going on within the dyad (Figure 5.1); dyad 
members to develop the emotional homeostatic environment (Schore & Schore, 2008; 
Siegel,2015a); and self-awareness and the ability to shapeshift, necessary to deal with many 
challenges and changes within the municipal environment.  
 Internal capacities or skills of each dyad member will play a part in success, as will 
attitudes towards the relationship, the work and the outcomes of the municipality. For example, 
one mayor said of the relationship: “that just kind of sets the tone as to being open, being 
respectful and understanding the role that each other has to play” (participant M1). 
 Some interviewees suggest functionality “really comes down to one thing that our current 
mantra is ‘no surprises.’ And no surprises mean no surprises from staff to council and no 
surprises from council to staff” (participant M5). This was a common comment by mayors and 
speaks to a number of aspects surrounding functionality. On the face of it “no surprises” suggests 
that maintaining constant communications is an expected norm; however, it also speaks to the 
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emotionality of being surprised, not knowing, the locus of control being somewhere else, or 
other emotional reactions. In this context being surprised has a negative meaning and would 
likely cause an autonomic response of “fight or flight”.  
 Cozolino (2014) stated: “When surprise is evaluated to be negative the right amygdala 
activation dominates and responds in a fearful way. The amygdala is also the location in the 
brain that is the core of our fear circuity” (Cozolino, 2014, pp.193–194). By inference, the 
opposite of a surprise emotionally is a homeostatic state of emotional wellbeing. Does this 
expression “no surprises”, which was commonly used by most mayors, a code for a dyad that 
operates without fear? Maybe. 
 The data also speaks to the results of many of the relationship’s dimensions. For example, 
according McAllister (1995), trust is developed over time first starting with cognitive trust and 
later, after reliability has been confirmed, may become affective trust where interpersonal care 
and concern is the definition of trust. Trust was mentioned numerous times in the interviews to 
describe a functional relationship. One mayor stated: 
I would say the two that came to mind first are, trust, honesty, and by trust, I mean all the 
things we've already talked about with respect to trust and honesty. Same thing. All of the 
things I don't know if I can think of a third if you don't have those two things the trust and 
the ability to kind of ruthlessly honest. I think those are the two building blocks. 
(participant M2) 
          Relatedly, from neurobiology research, Cozolino (2014) asserted that “we develop trust 
based on attunement and reciprocal interactions and are untrusting of those who appear 
unresponsive or mis-attuned to our state of mind” (Cozolino, 2014, p. 86). This suggests that 
attunement within the dyad’s common beliefs and self-awareness, will enhance the level of trust 
within the dyad. 
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Another mayor described trust without using the word as follows:  
That's the give and take and that's the balance and that's how a healthy relationship can be 
sustained because you have to have it where both parties are feeling that they are being 
able to fulfill their own personal agendas to a certain degree, and within reason. And the 
goals that they had set out to accomplish for both the CAO and the mayor. And so, the 
best way to do that is to have a healthy open dialogue. And when you don't agree, say so. 
Don't try to circumnavigate through a back channel or back door. (participant M1) 
According to this mayor, honest and transparent communications within the dyad seems 
necessary for a functional relationship. The advice “don’t agree, say so” also speaks to the 
possibility that either party in the dyad could shapeshift; shapeshifting is implied by speaking 
your own truth or changing your perspective to maintain homeostatic emotional balance. This 
also implies a low level of fear and therefore low amygdala activation (Schore & Schore, 2008; 
Siegel, 1999, 2007).  
 Functionality can be seen as a continuum from fully dysfunctional to fully functional. 
Like all relationships there will be an ebb and flow to the reality of interacting day-to-day. Some 
days our emotional selves are wrestling with completely external concerns which blind us to 
things happening in the here and now. Some days, due to the context of the issue, we are more 
focused on the present situation (Siegel, 1999). 
  The data suggests that mayor-CAO relationships ebb and flow; this may logically 
correspond with the relationship functionality’s variability. How then do we isolate the necessary 
ingredients for a functional relationship? The role of the mayor and the role of the CAO combine 
to provide organizational leadership to the council, the organization, and the community 
(McIntosh, 2009; Siegel, 2015a, 2015b). This collective leadership is communicated individually 
and collectively in the mutual pursuit of good governance through interdependence, functional 
overlap and reciprocal influence (Svara, 1999b). From the structural perspective, good intentions 
in reciprocal influence, functional overlap, and interdependence, should result in positive 
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outcomes which in turn should create a fully functioning relationship (Svara, 2001). However, 
this is not my understanding from the interview data nor the fullest explanation of a functional 
relationship.  
             Relationship functionality is multifaceted and requires an understanding of both the 
structural perspective and the interpersonal reality without privileging either perspective. For 
example, numerous mayors interviewed here, had been involved in terminating CAOs but few 
would discuss these events.  
              Clearly, there are legal issues in discussing terminations that may have inhibited 
discussion in the interviews; but more importantly I believe, there were emotional reactions to 
my asking for an explanation of what happened. One mayor flatly refused to discuss a               
well-publicized CAO termination. Others brushed off the issue of termination during the 
interview. However, one mayor did speak about a termination stating:  
They [the CAO] control not only the operations of the city but they also control how the 
council is making decisions, and when council realized what was going on it was a bit of 
a cold water splash in the face. But there was nothing you could do because if you 
changed your decision, you're in the middle of a lawsuit. It was very controlling. We 
didn't realize that it was actually impacting the morale of staff in a significant way. 
(participant M5) 
            This circumstance speaks to the structural issue of who is really in charge—the council 
and mayor or the CAO?  These types of discussions are difficult because the perception of who 
is in charge is significantly in the eye of the beholder. However, the most important statement in 
the quote above, in my view, is the comment about staff morale. Structurally, the staff’s morale 
is a matter for the CAO to deal with, but from an overall organizational point of view, the 
council and mayor are calling on their empathy for the staff as a reason for the subsequent 
termination of the CAO.  
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             From the interviews in this study, emotions had a large part to play in this relationship’s 
dysfunctionality. If the CAO is seen by the mayor as a controlling person, and, as a result, the 
other staff’s morale is low then it follows that the mayor-CAO dyad is dysfunctional. I conclude 
this without making a judgement about any party. It just points out the importance of the 
emotional aspects of maintaining a functional relationship dyad (Fletcher & Ragins 2007).  
Using my earlier data, this could be considered a personality issue related to the CAO’s need for 
control as was the explanation of the mayor who wanted to be all the department heads rolled 
into the mayor’s position. Again, this comes back to the central theme of who runs or is in 
control of the municipal government (Siegel, 2015) 
           It has become apparent that functionality and its relationship aspects are not easily 
described or understood. It is easier to understand what dysfunctionality is and what it results in. 
However, this research has attempted to focus on the positive outcomes of a functional 
relationship and what aspects lead to such outcomes. The data suggest that a functional 
relationship between a mayor and CAO should include an understanding of and willingness to 
operate within each member of the dyad’s structural roles and responsibilities; trustworthiness 
within the dyad, honest open communication; some common beliefs; the ability to shapeshift; 
and the importance of trust that implies “no reciprocal surprises”. The data also suggest that this 
functionality evolves over time and subject to its internal experiences, following generally four 
distinct stages where certain dimensions of the relationship focuses on one aspect of the 
relationship over another (center ribbon of Figure 5.1).   
Theoretical proposition three: Shapeshifting capacity. The capacity to shapeshift is 
used to build and maintain functionality within the mayor-CAO relationship dyad. One of the 
aspects that appears to affect functionality within the mayor-CAO relationship is dyad member’s 
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individual capacity to shapeshift. Shapeshifting as the core dimension of the relationship, is the 
ability to change one’s perspective, attitude or point of view without a negative residual affective 
result.   
Shapeshifting capacity was identified as the core dimension of the mayor-CAO 
relationship. Both mayors and CAOs used this capacity to resolve and reconcile conflicting 
perspectives, attitudes and points of view on the many issues that are raised day-to-day within 
the local government context. This capacity was repeatedly observed within the interviews of 
both mayors and CAOs. An explanation of the motivation for this process is the underlying 
theory of Redekop’s (2002) identity needs theory where the dyad actors behave to satisfy their 
identity needs. A similar framework is seen in Kegan’s (1995) levels of mental complexity, 
where different levels of complexity may be necessary for shapeshifting.  
Sometimes this capacity is used in combination with primary dimensions, either before or 
after the intended outcome. For example, I could contemplate that before a policy is harmonized 
within the dyad, a discussion regarding each dyad member’s perspectives on the issue at hand 
may cause a shapeshift in one or both dyad members. Likewise, the shapeshifting may take place 
after one member of the dyad uses their independent role to make a decision. 
 Shapeshifting allows for relationship functionality and has been discovered operating 
within plain sight using only a small amount of cognitive recognition. Cozolino’s (2014) 
suggestion that much of our relationship capability is connected to our unconscious attachment 
schema, does support the idea that shapeshifting is taking place somewhat unconsciously within 
each individual’s overall relationship strategy (Schore & Schore, 2008; Siegel 1999). Some 
mayors and CAOs may arrive in their position with high levels of shapeshifting capacity while 
others will not. 
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 Self-awareness may also play a part in bringing one’s shapeshifting capacity more into 
the cognitive operations of our brains. In this way, rather than reacting to a vague or unconscious 
feeling, we may be able to cognitively direct this capacity towards our existing conflicts (Siegel 
1999). Being generally more self-aware in regard to our emotions may also help with 
shapeshifting. 
 Affective trust may also play part in shapeshifting by reducing the risk of psychological 
harm and therefore reducing the “costs” associated with shapeshifting. Trust, both cognitive and 
affective, will allow for shapeshifting or even encourage it (McAllister, 1995). Given that the 
data repeatedly connected trust with the mayor-CAO relationship functionality, it could be that 
interviewees may be inadvertently referring to trust but actually meaning shapeshifting because 
they lack that terminology.  
 Shapeshifting is therefore a powerful tool for relationship functionality within the mayor-
CAO relationship. It acts in many contexts as a methodology for solving conflict and building 
interpersonal capacity within a mayor-CAO relationship. Additional research would help better 
define the social process of shapeshifting and determine how important it is in mayor-CAO 
functionality. 
Research Limitations 
There are limitations to grounded theory methodology. The data are difficult and             
time-consuming to gather. The data will always involve perceptions and opinions of the 
interviewees. Additionally, the test by which a researcher believes he or she has obtained all the 
data available is the limiting concept of saturation. As it emerges, a theoretical proposition is 
then developed and tested against existing data and no new concepts or explanations are offered. 
There are obvious limitations in using saturation to determine whether you have captured all the 
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necessary data to confirm a theoretical proposition. The limited sampling (i.e., drawing 
interviewees only from British Columbia local governments of five to 100 thousand population), 
the many variations of structure of local governments in other locations (strong and weak mayor 
systems), and the possibility of a special culture of local government mayors and CAOs in 
British Columbia, exemplify characteristics that could limit the use of saturation as a boundary 
for further interviewing.    
 Also, some interviewees may misrepresent issues, skewing the data to follow a certain 
ideological approach. Or, the interviewees with the most unusual perspectives may be reluctant 
to share their perceptions not wishing to seem eccentric or outlandish to the interviewer 
(recalling that because of my long career as CAO, many of those interviewed will know that I am 
in their field and professional association). Because the interviewees are self-selected,18 some 
potential interviewees may have self-selected not be included and therefore the researcher may 
miss data that may be important in making sense of the findings.  
A final note on my personal positionality: in constructivist methodology, the data and its 
meaning are co-constructed between the researcher and interviewees. As I am an active and 
practicing CAO, this co-construction will have my positionality deeply embedded within. On 
many occasions during the interviews, I actively engaged the interviewees to probe for better 
understand terms and ideas than initially presented. I even went so far as interpreting some of the 
interviewees’ statements, which I rephrased or reframed and then asked them for confirmation. 
All of this activity suggests the possibility that, from some perspectives, I may have more than 
co-constructed the data to the point of contaminating the data with my own prejudices. However, 
                                               
18 Self-selected means the interviewees choose to be part of the research, once the researcher requests by 
email interviewees to come forward. The interviewee criteria include a number of relationships with 
mayor, if a CAO, and a number of CAOs, if a mayor. The rigor of grounded theory as a methodology, 
will minimize the bias inherent in this method and self-selecting interviewees. 
          
  
142 
all of the participants have been interviewed by the mainstream media many times and are well 
aware of how interviewers can lead the interviewee. Because they had no motivation to 
manipulate either me or the data, I believe this process co-created valid rather than contaminated 
data. Most interviewees were enthusiastic about the data and the need for this research. 
The last issue of potential bias within the data are my natural positionality as the 
researcher. As a CAO I do come to this research from the normative position of valuing 
efficiency and protecting against political corruption; however, I have attempted to hold my 
positionality at bay. I confirm this action because I did find data that was both new and 
interesting and helped me “shapeshift” towards a broader perspective on a number of issues.   
Implications for Leadership and Change 
 Throughout North America, there are hundreds, possibly thousands, of mayor-CAO 
relationships failing or that have become significantly dysfunctional. There are obviously many 
reasons for this unfortunate circumstance. However, I have presented numerous possible reasons 
for this failure. Clearly, focusing on the longstanding idea of a readily distinguishable dichotomy 
between policy and administration, has a limited benefit, according to the data presented here. 
 The cost to local governments, human suffering, and just plain confusion resulting from 
the lack of a full understanding of the reasons for positive functionality, or not, within these 
mayor-CAO relationships is unfortunate. Recognizing the possible reasons for functionality 
should be helpful for practicing mayors and CAOs. The data from this study is not automatically 
generalizable, but this new, broader understanding of the relationship and some of the possible 
remedies, may help mayors and CAOs with existing relationship challenges. At the minimum, 
my findings open lines of discussion that might previously have been overlooked.  
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 The associational organizations such as the International City Managers Association, the 
Canadian equivalents—the Canadian Association of Municipal Administrators and the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities—may take interest in the findings of this research, given 
the cost of such mayor-CAO relationship breakdowns.  
 The issue of functionality within any hierarchical relationship may also be informed by 
these outcomes. The chairs of boards of directors and their CEOs of educational, medical, 
business and other institutions, may also find that there are parallels to the relationship issues 
they face. Given how common hierarchical relationships are within our working world, a better 
understanding of the social phenomena within these types of relationships may be quite helpful 
in the future. 
Rost (1993) argued that by focusing on the periphery and content aspects of leadership 
(e.g., scientific traits, contingencies, techniques and knowledge about organizations, human 
behavior, etc.) we still do not understand the nature of relational leadership. Cunliffe and Eriksen 
(2011), studying relational leadership, argued for “conceptualizing leadership as embedded in the 
everyday relationally-responsive dialogical practices of leaders” (p. 1425). This type of 
leadership was present within the data where day-to-day interactions between the mayor and 
CAO resulted in collective leadership outputs. Given that the very concept of leadership is 
ambiguous in this case, the use of the term, leadership, with other modifiers maybe difficult at 
best. 
 In summing up, I will use what research there is within Canadian leadership literature 
that most closely addresses the roles and positions of mayor-CAO dyad. This research is 
mayoralty leadership, and CAO leadership. I will concentrate on Canadian research since this 
dissertation’s data are collected within a Canadian context.  
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 In regard to mayoral leadership, Urbaniak (2014) concluded, 
There is no inherent reason why a theory of mayoralty leadership has to be specific to the 
national context. Institutional structures may be different, attitudes about government 
may vary, but mayoral leadership in both countries is about establishing a narrative, 
influencing senior levels of government, crisis management, and usually about proposing 
rather than unilaterally promulgating. . . . [In research] determining the relative weight of 
such variables as personality, political culture, interests and institutions is a complicated 
objective and remains considerable confusion over research methods and appropriate 
questions, to say nothing of the difficulty of sorting out facts from groundless popular 
assumptions. (p. 222) 
The mayor’s leadership must therefore be seen as a future academic endeavor.  
The general leadership literature could be adapted for the mayor but that is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. Some other applicable research is discussed in Chapter II.  
 Specific CAO leadership research in Canada has fared better, with research being 
completed by both McIntosh (2009) in his dissertation Defining Situational Leadership for the 
Local Government Chief Administrative Officer and by Siegel (2015a) in Leaders in the 
Shadows: The Leadership Qualities of Municipal Chief Administrative Officers. Both scholars 
have dealt with different aspects of CAO leadership.  
 McIntosh (2009) concluded that CAOs may operate within a situational leadership 
paradigm, influenced by the strategic contexts they find themselves within. Siegel (2015a) 
determined that CAOs lead in three directions: up to Council, out to the community, and down to 
the operational organization. Both of these works focus on the positivist view of CAO leadership 
and explicitly discuss the mayor-CAO relationship only collaterally, focusing more on 
relationships between council and CAO.  
 Siegel (2015a) does write about Judy Rodgers, the highly accomplished, ex-city manager 
of Vancouver, BC, emphasizing her relational abilities to execute her brand of leadership. This 
may have some applicability in the mayor-CAO relationship since Rodgers recounted, within 
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Siegel’s text, her experiences with three mayoralty relationships over her tenure at the City of 
Vancouver. For example, another interviewee states this about Rodgers: 
 [She] somehow turned [a mayor who opposed a project Rodgers was advocating] into 
the biggest supporter of the four pillars drug strategy that Canada knew! . . .  After that. 
[the mayor] was leading the way, he understood the issues, he got what was happening      
—that was Judy! 
 From this quote, it is apparent that the CAO had negotiated/influenced the mayor on a 
major policy issue using her interpersonal leadership capacity of relationship orientation (Siegel, 
2015a) to encourage the mayor’s shapeshifting to this new perspective. 
Leader-Member-Exchange (LMX) theory (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) and leader/follower 
research could have had some direct applicability in investigating the mayor-CAO relationship 
however, the clear hierarchical19 aspects needed to have a leader/follower dyad were missing in 
the data. 
Other relationship research from social psychology, including attachment theory 
(Bowlby, 1969; Bretherton, 1992), relational cultural theory (Fletcher & Ragins, 2007), and 
relational theory (Lazarus, 1991), can further illuminate the interpersonal motivations of the 
mayor-CAO relationship. These theories do help explain the functionality of the mayor-CAO 
relationship by articulating the interpersonal aspects of the dyad. For example, attachment theory 
partially explains the reasons why some dyads do not function well, whereas others do. 
Using the term transactional relationship or transactional leadership, as in the LMX 
nomenclature (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995), or a transformative or partnership relationship, can be 
two different ends of a scale of relationship leader styles. According to Graen and Uhl-Bien’s 
                                               
19 The mayor has a notional hierarchical relationship with the CAO because the CAO’s employer is all of 
the council, who will collectively approve the CAO’s contract and perform a performance evaluation. 
However, the mayor will have substantial influence with the council on CAO performance if the 
relationship between mayor and council is functional, which many times it is not. 
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(1995) definitions of these two relationship dyads or leadership styles, transactional involves the 
hierarchical, economic based exchanges, whereas the transformative relationship involves a 
relationship that involves reciprocal growth and mutual development. McLean (2014) suggested 
that within this concept of relational leadership, the relationship dyad produces a separate entity 
the relationship that co-creates this collective leadership. All of these attributes of transactional 
and transformative relationship can be seen within the data in my study. If the mayor-CAO 
relationship dyad’s outputs are seen as from their joint leadership then the interpersonal 
understanding of the relationship can use these leadership styles as one way of describing the 
data collected. 
Within leadership literature, others have studied the attributes or behaviors that support 
relational leadership. Substantial research has been done on trust and, specifically, on the trust in 
leadership in organizations (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). The data of my study confirm that trust is an 
important dimension or aspect of the mayor-CAO relationship. Trust fits within the interpersonal 
understanding of the mayor-CAO relationship. Trust was mentioned many times in the 
interviews to describe attributes of a functional relationship. Trust within a relationship 
empirically points to improved organizational outputs on a number of dimensions of 
organizational life (McAllister, 1995). This was confirmed by numerous interviews in this study 
that used trust to describe a high output relationship between the mayor and CAO.   
My data needs substantial interpretation to relate to Redekop’s (2002) identity needs 
since interviewees did not speak specifically about their needs during their interviews. I suggest 
that the five identity needs described by Redekop (2002)—recognition, security, connectedness, 
action, and meaning-making—will be significant for the internal workings of the dyad; but 
understanding the mayor-CAO dyad’s leadership in this context was not apparent from the data. 
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Assessment of the interpersonal relationship could be used in subsequent research to investigate 
the latter two stages of the mayor-CAO relationship, their task performing and relational growth, 
since needs will not be as prevalent until the relationship has a pattern of positive dyad outcomes 
to measure needs against. 
Exploring the manner in which the mayor-CAO relationship should function based on 
best practice and the classic dichotomy’s conventions, or the complementary relationship model 
(Nalbandian, 2006; Svara, 1999b) is probably why these orthodoxies do not explain the growing 
numbers of CAO terminations and dysfunctional mayor-CAO relationships.  
Within the data of the mayor-CAO relationship, the transformative relational leadership 
platform (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) appears to be a useful way to explain how it is that numerous 
mayor-CAO dyads actually stay functional in the relational growth stage of the relationship since 
transformational leadership was not noted in the data until the final stages of the mayor-CAO 
relationship. As noted earlier, this transactional/transformative scale provides another way to 
understand the structural relationship and leadership of the mayor-CAO’s relationship.   
In contrast, if the relationship between the mayor and CAO is seen mainly as 
transactional, there was little data to support internal matters of meaning-making and identity 
needs. However, the transformational relationship (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) is designed for 
growth and mutual learning as is the relational cultural theory (Fletcher & Ragins, 2007). Both 
suggest learning and healing our emotions within a relationship, or as a result of a relationship, 
will allow the honest, intimate conversation that may explain the manner in which each member 
of the dyad constructs their meaning and their identity. A transformative relationship allows for 
the exploration of each person’s worldviews and their individual nuances. This is a place where 
understanding each other’s level of mental complexity—or even being aware of the notion that 
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there are variable capacities for dealing with complexity (Kegan, 1995; Kegan & Lahey, 2009) 
—is possible and even encouraged so as to add to a mutual understanding of how each person 
constructs their meaning and identity, and, therefore, their leadership.  
It was difficult to use these theories within the data since most interviewees did not speak 
in a manner that would allow a clear connection to be made between the data and existing 
theories. Rather than interpreting the data, I make the assumption that these leadership 
possibilities could be seen within the relational growth stage of the relationship with the data 
presenting two examples of a transformational relationship between a mayor and CAO. Within 
this social construct of a transformative leadership relationship, a conversation about what is in 
the best interest of the municipality can take place, regardless of structural realities.  
The data presents four stages of the relationship’s trajectory. The relationship between 
mayor and CAO is dynamic and likely starts with a set of defined roles and responsibilities for 
each member of the dyad. I call this the Learning and Orientation stage (middle white ribbon in 
Figure 5.1). These structural roles are defined externally but they are also interpreted internally 
by each, based on their past experiences, education, ideology, worldviews, role models within 
the local government fraternity and culture (Aston et al., 2007).   
In the next stage of development—what I have called the Test Driving stage—these 
structural responsibilities are then interpreted individually to make meaning and develop a new 
identity by each person in the dyad. Subsequently, a dyad develops a process for exchanging 
information and supplies a place for the testing of thoughts, ideas, preferences, worldviews, 
ideologies, feelings, and identities. 
 The third stage of the relationship—Task Performing—allows the leadership of the dyad 
to emerge. Conflict, and specifically how the mayor and CAO dyad engage in conflict, is 
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considered one of the important variables that must be managed within each stage of the 
relationship.  
The fourth stage of the relationship, the Interpersonal Growth stage, reflects a meaningful 
relationship between the mayor and CAO that allows the transformative aspects of the final stage 
of the relationship. My research suggests that shapeshifting, negotiating, strategizing, power 
sharing, boundary setting and harmonizing (Figure 5.1) all play an important part in managing 
conflict regardless of which stage of the mayor-CAO relationship the dyad is within. 
Conclusion 
My four-year doctoral journey of discovery has been long and, at times, difficult. 
Although I have no absolute answers to my research questions, I do have new perspectives on 
how the functionality of the mayor-CAO relationship dyad may operate. Suggestions of new 
ways of valuing different processes and phenomena have been made so as to reach the most 
effective way of understanding the mayor-CAO relationship. Because every relationship has its 
own context, history and dynamics there will not be any “correct” ways of making the 
relationship functional, however the research has presented a different way of understanding the 
mayor-CAO relationship’s dyad. I hope that through this learning, the dysfunctionality of these 
mayor-CAO relationships—which I have experienced personally—can be reduced. It may lead 
to less conflict and pain and a more stable functionality for those mayors and CAOs who are 
trying to serve their communities for the public good. 
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Purpose: To investigate the relationship between the Mayor and Chief Administrative Officers 
(CAO) within Local governments looking to understand how this relationship is functional. 
Recruitment: Mayors and CAOs will be recruited in British Columbia, Canada to be 
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(if a Mayor). These interviewees will be telephoned by the researcher and asked to participate. 
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Method: The participants will be interviewed by the researcher. The interviews will be 
transcribed electronically after being recorded with a handheld digital sound recorder. The 
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sure no one person can be singled out from the interview material. A digital sound recorder will 
be used during the interviews. 
Storage of Material: All interview transcripts, consent forms, or digital data will be kept under 
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7 years after the research is complete. Digital data will be kept on a separate hard drive and kept 
in the same locked cabinet. 
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I used Civic Info website to accumulate the municipalities that meet the population criteria of 
5,000 -100,000 persons living within the municipalities. 
 
My research assistant then sent a blanket email to the approximate municipalities. This email is 
attached: 
 
“Hello [name], 
 
Please allow me to introduce myself as a Research Assistant in service of the City of Prince 
Rupert. I’m contacting you on behalf of our City Manager Bob Long in order to request an 
interview with you.  
 
Mr. Long is doing research for his PhD regarding what makes a functional relationship between 
Mayors and CAOs. The methodology involves interviewing Mayors or CAOs regarding their 
experience of working with the other. The interviews are confidential and regarding past Mayor-
CAO relationships (not about current working relationships).  
  
After the interviews, Mr. Long will be anonymizing and compiling data to track themes that 
emerge. 
  
Thank you in advance for your time. I would be happy to connect with your assistant to look at 
availabilities, as well as answer any questions you have.  
  
Best regards, 
 
“Research Assistant” 
 
My research assistant then organized interviews based on availability of the interviewees and my 
schedule. 
 
Interviewees were then sent and signed the attached consent. 
 
Robert A. Long a PhD candidate at Antioch University. Mr. Long’s dissertation is investigating 
aspects of a functional Mayor-CAO relationship.  
Dear Mayors and CAO’s, 
This is a consent form for an interview about investigating aspects within the Mayor-CAO 
relationship that develops and maintains a functional relationship. This survey will give you an 
opportunity to help uncover what facilitates a functional relationship, which may in turn help 
your cohort to improve these relationships. 
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Your interview responses will allow the researcher to investigate the many complex aspects of 
the Mayor-CAO relationship with the hope that an academic theory of this social phenomena 
(the Mayor-CAO relationship) will be forthcoming from the interview responses. This theory 
will then lead to a better understanding of the relationship dyad of these two positions. 
There are minimal, if any, risks from participating.  Your identity will be anonymous and 
confidential.  You will not be asked for your name and all demographic data being collected will 
be reported as aggregated information.  No personally identifiable information will be associated 
with your responses to any reports of these data.  The interview will take approximately 60 
minutes to complete. 
These interviews are part of my dissertation research at Antioch University in the PhD in 
Leadership and Change Program. The study results may be included in future presentations and 
publications. 
 
Your participation is voluntary, and you may elect to discontinue your participation at any time. 
This project has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at Antioch University. If you 
have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact: 
 
Dr. Lisa Kreeger 
Chair, Institutional Review Board 
PhD in Leadership and Change, Antioch University 
Email: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 
If you have any questions about the research study, please contact me at: 
 
Email: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxor 250-XXX-XXXX. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE SIGN if you consent to be part of the study as described: 
 
I have read and understood the above information. By signing below, I am indicating that I have 
read and understood this consent form and agree to participate in this research study. 
 
 
___________________  
(Signature) 
 
___________________ 
(Please Print Name)  
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___________________ 
Date 
 
 
Please print a copy of this page for your records and return original to ________. 
 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
